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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes the Sri Lankan pattern of develop-
ment and its impact on contemporary social structure. 
It is argued that the Modernization, Marxist and Neo-
Marxist, Dependency and World Systems approaches taken alone 
cannot explain the development experience of colonial societies in 
general, or of Sri Lanka in particular. A theoretical framework 
is devised which combines processes internal to third world 
societies with the external forces of world capitalism to explain 
the course of development. 
The thesis being presented is that under the impact of 
colonial capital the pre-colonial 'feudal' order of Sri Lankan 
society was transformed into what may be characterized as a 
'peripheral capitalist' socio-economic formation which may be 
distinguished from the 'metropolitan' capitalism of the core 
economies. Although some traditional forms of social relations 
persist their structural bases have assumed a peripheral 
capitalist character. Because of this, it is argued, that it is 
incorrect to characterize Sri Lankan society as 'feudal' or 
'semi-feudal'. 
This penetration of colonial capital brought about peri-
pheralization and extraversion of the economy, commodification of 
land and labour, a re-ordering of the class structure, and the 
internal disarticulation and external dependence of the process of 
generalized commodity production. 
Under colonialism the peasantry underwent further diffe-
rentiation and wage labourers, landless tenants, landowners and 
merchant capitalists emerged as major groups in rural society. At 
the national level there has emerged a politico-administrative 
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elite and an indigenous bourgeoisie which includes 'national' and 
'comprador' fractions. Colonialism also resulted in the presence 
in Sri Lankan society of a non-indigenous metropolitan bour-
geoisie. 
Post-independence national regimes are formed out of 
alliances between these dominant groups. It is argued that the 
nature of these alliances determines strategies of 'national deve-
lopment'. The strategies have swung between 'populist', 'national 
developmentalist' and 'neo-colonial'. None of these strategies has 
been able to bring about self-sustaining economic development or 
to reduce poverty and inequality. It is argued these strategies 
have deepened and reinforced the dependence •of Sri Lanka on the 
metropolitan economies and perpetuated the uneven 'peripheral 
capitalist' pattern of development. 
Internal social relations are consequent upon this peri-
pheral capitalist pattern. Increasing social and economic inequa-
lity, the marginalization of a significant portion of the popula-
tion, and the trend towards a closer alliance between the indi-
genous and metropolitan bourgeoisie can be observed. The pro-
grammes of post-independence regimes, such as the land reform 
and 'green revolution' programmes, have failed to reverse these 
trends. It is argued that a policy of autochthonous development 
is the most appropriate basis for moving beyond the undesirable 
features of the present pattern. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The Research Problem 
The transformation of societies from 'agrarian' to 
'modern industrial' is a central issue in sociology. The path and 
level of development being followed by the group of nation states 
called 'the third world' is recognizably different to that which 
was the experience of the group of nations described as 
'modernized' or 'the advanced industrial societies'. The latter 
have emerged as societies with a greater generalized adaptive 
capacity and a high level of development of productive forces 
which has not been matched by the countries of the third world. 
In the course of development, nation states in the world 
have become economically polarized. Meanwhile disparities within 
the third world countries persist, as indicated by the presence of 
poverty in a significant portion of their populations. 
Widespread poverty, unemployment and relatively low standards of 
living are some of the undesirable consequences of the peculiar 
third world pattern of development. These patterns of 
development have been described variously. Some believe that the 
third world is moving from 'traditional' to 'modern' while others 
argue, on the contrary, that it is caught in a process of 
'underdevelopment'. Yet others see what is taking place as 
'dependent development'. This variety of opinion is indicative of 
the lack of consensus about the characterization of, and 
explanation for, the diversity of development experienced by these 
societies. More broadly, it relates to the issue of societal trans-
formation. 
The present thesis is concerned with the course and 
pattern of development in Sri Lanka. By one conventional indi-
cator, GNP per capita, Sri Lanka is placed among the poor 
1 
countries.' Its undiversified economic structure, composed of an 
export-oriented plantation sector and a low-productivity domestic 
agricultural sector, fits the third world model of an export-
dependent economy. Although the indicators of health and 
educational standards of the population generally are not 
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unimpressive in comparaison to many third world countries , 
sluggish economic growth, a low level of development of 
productive forces and the typical crises of an exporter of primary 
agricultural products have contributed to the persistence of 
poverty for a sizable proportion of its population. Further, 
policies aimed at national development and the alleviation of 
poverty have been largely ineffective. 
The aim of the present thesis is to trace the origins of 
the particular pattern and course of development being followed 
by Sri Lanka. The primary question posed is not: 'Why hasn't 
Sri Lanka become like developed countries?' but: 'Why has it 
followed a particular pattern of development?' and 'What are the 
causes, characteristics and consequences of that pattern ?' . In 
order to find answers to these questions selected aspects of Sri 
Lankan social and economic organization of the pre-colonial, 
colonial and post-colonial periods will be examined. 
Previous work 
The issue of the pattern of development in Sri Lanka 
has not been systematically addressed in the existing literature. 
There are no major analyses of the modern social organization of 
Sri Lanka or of the processes which generate this peculiar type 
of development which is marked by economic retardation. 
Most of the major sociological and anthropological works 
on Sri Lanka have concentrated exclusively on the study of the 
institutions of kinship and marriage and their relationship with 
the traditional system of land tenure. Leach (1961) and Yalman 
1. $US230 in 1979 (World Bank, 1981:134). 
2. For a comparison of social indicators of Sri Lanka 
with selected Asian countries, see Central Bank of Ceylon 
(1980:80). 
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(1967) are each cases in point. Their studies are oriented largely 
to issues in academic and theoretical anthropology hence their 
analyses are not sensitive to the issues raised in this thesis. 
A second theme in the analysis of Sri Lankan social 
organization has been associated with social scientists heavily 
influenced by American behaviourism. Attempts were made to test 
the validity of hypotheses derived fro m a neo-evolutionist 
tradition (Ryan, 1958), and to apply models developed by Americ-
an psychologists to analyse aspects of hu man personality 
(Strauss, 1951, 1954; and Strauss and Strauss, 1956). Ryan's 
'Sinhalese Village' (1958) is one such example. It is an account 
of the process of secularization of a village community under 
Western influence. The conceptual basis of the analysis was 
provided by Redfield' s folk-urban typology. Ryan not only 
ignores the degenerative effects of colonial penetration in Sri 
Lanka but asserts that such effects were non-existent. He implies 
that the role of the colonial rulers was that of transmitters of 
secularizing forces, western ideologies, market and technical 
influences to the folk peoples in order to carry the latter or 
push them towards 'progress'. He concludes: 
Western economic interests in Ceylon were at no period served 
by 	 policies 	 directly 	 disruptive 	 to local 	 traditional 
economy... [and further] the colonial rule had immediate 
organizing effects upon Sinhalese institutions rather than 
degenerative or disorganizing effects (Ryan, 1958:191, 193). 
As will be seen nothing could be further from the truth. 
Research on the caste syste m and modern elites 
constitute a third theme. Until recently, as Gunasinghe rightly 
pointed out, stratification research in Sri Lanka shows 'a curious 
refusal to deal with class structure' (1975b : 117). Ryan's 'Caste 
in Modern Ceylon', (1953) which is one of the very few 
book-length studies on caste, gave scant consideration to the 
issues of the relationship between caste and class, and the 
economic aspects of caste. Significant research has been done on 
the Sri Lankan elites with Pieris (1964), Fernando (1973) Roberts 
(1974 and 1982) and Singer (1964) being the most important 
contributors. A limitation of these contributors regarding the 
problems raised in this thesis is that they do not satisfactorily 
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explain the structural position and the role of the elites in the 
Sri Lankan pattern of development. 
Fourthly, the issues of persistent poverty and retarded 
development have attracted only oblique interest in political 
science circles. Within this tradition, explanations have been 
sought for the durability of the Westminster model of democracy 
despite severe economic crises, poverty and communal conflicts. 
Work by Jupp (1978), Kearney (1973), Wilson (1979) and Wriggins 
(1960) falls into this category. The peaceful transfer of 
parliamentary power among political parties and the absence of 
extra-constitutional efforts by the people to change state power 
(until the armed revolt of April 1971), have been the compelling 
features of Sri Lankan political life which political scientists 
have sought to explain rather than more fundamental economic 
conditions. Goonetilleke (1975a) attacks Kearney and Wilson for 
the ethnocentricity implied in their outlook, the conservatism 
reflected in their neglect of negative aspects of colonial 
incursion, their hostile view of the left, their explicit commitment 
to 'modernization ideology' and their neglect of important sources 
of information. 
A fifth theme is canvassed in studies by both govern-
mental and non-governmental agencies involved in development 
planning, implementation and research. Due to their applied 
nature they add little to the development of theoretical 
understanding. Goonetilleke (1975b) draws attention to the 
establishment of institutes to study and advise on the socio-eco-
nomic problems of Sri Lanka. These institutes are directly 
sponsored by the western countries or draw heavily from those 
countries for finance and expertise. He argues: 
because of the subservient role of the local institutes and 
personnel, no theoretical framework to fit local conditions 
develops and the conceptual output is often empiricism of the 
worst kind. (Goonetilleke,1975b:4) 1 
Nonetheless, many of the works by the above mentioned agencies 
are valuable sources of data for secondary analyses and have 
1. See the interesting comments on Goonetilleke's view on 
'cultural neo-colonialsm' and 'dependent intelligentsia' by Lipton 
(1975). 
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been used in the present thesis. 
Finally, the tradition in the Sri Lankan social sciences 
which was marked by, as Goonetilleke stated, an absence of 
works which raise fundamental issues of a political nature beyond 
empirical level or attempts at significant analysis of contempo-
rary problems appears to have been broken. A recent development 
in the sociological literature on Sri Lanka has been the attempt 
by several scholars to examine the impact of colonialism, the 
pattern of ' under-development ' the contemporary class structure, 
and other related issues. In this regard Alexander (1982 ) , 
Bandarage (1982 ) , S.B.D. De Silva (1982) and Gunasinghe (1975) 
are examples of researchers who are sensitive to the issues of 
"under-development' and it is in this tradition that the present 
research is being carried out. 
Characteristics of the Sri Lankan Course of Development to be 
Explained 
In many ways the social and economic organization of 
contemporary Sri Lanka resembles that of many ex-colonial third 
world societies. The peculiar organization of productive activity 
is reflected in social and political organization. Colonization 
brought with it an export-oriented economy which has remained to 
date with many superficial but few fundamental changes. In an 
export-dependent economy, productive activity is heavily commit-
ted towards supplying a few primary commodities to the world 
market and a major share of local consumption is comprised of 
imported goods . 1 It is an economy : 
with not merely a high ratio of imports and exports to 
national income, but one in which all the important macro 
economic quantities - government revenues and expenditures, 
private investments, imports and national income itself - 
posess a strong functional dependence upon the level of•
export receipts ( Snodgrass , 1966 :16 ) . 
1. The total value of exports in 1980 was $US964 million 
while the value of imports was $US1,909 million. In the same year 
exports per capita was $US65.4 and imports per capita amounted 
to $US129.5 (Central Bank of Ceylon, 1980 :52 ) . 
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The Sri Lankan economy has been heavily dependent 
upon export of three major crops .
1 Earnings from exports are 
utilized largely to import food and other consumer goods. Period-
ically world market forces operate unfavourably toward the export 
crops. This has created severe balance of trade problems in the 
Sri Lankan economy. These problems compound the relatively low 
standard of living of the majority of the population and low level 
of development of productive forces. 
It has been customary to view Sri Lankan agriculture in 
terms of two sectors: plantation or cash crop agriculture and 
peasant or traditional agriculture. The plantation sector posesses 
characteristics which distinguish it from the other agricultural 
activities of the country. The cash crop plantations, particularly 
tea and rubber, were financed by British and other foreign 
capital. They were owned and managed largely by foreign 
interests and worked almost exclusively by foreign labour. Their 
produce was destined for foreign market outlets. For the most 
part the holdings were large, were managed and operated on 
capitalist lines, and used relatively advanced techniques of 
production and management. 
In contrast, the peasant sector received no foreign 
capital investment, foreign management or foreign labour. The 
produce of this sector was exclusively for domestic consumption. 
Peasant agriculture is still organized largely around the culti-
vation of paddy but few other food crops. Most of the cultivated 
landholdings are very small, often to the point of being unecono-
mical. According to the Census of Agriculture, 1962,  forty-one 
percent of all agricultural holdings reporting paddy cultivation 
were below the size of one acre (Hameed et al., 1977:13 ) . 
Methods of cultivation are still largely traditional, 
1. The export of tea, rubber and coconut products 
constituted 88.5% of the total exports in 1970,  and 75.8% and 
54.7% in 1975 and 1980 respectively (Central Bank of Ceylon, 
1978:49 and 1980 : 53 ) . The decrease in the proportion, however for 
the large part, is due to falling prices and falling production of 
these comodities since the early 1970 ' s . 
hence productivity is low. Sri Lanka imports a portion of her 
rice requirements as the domestic supply cannot meet the demand. 
Ownership of land in the peasant sector, unlike joint stock 
companies in the plantation sector ' , is almost wholly in the form 
of private individual ownership. Sharecropping and other 
ostensibly pre-capitalist forms of tenancy and labour arrange-
ments persist in the peasant sector. Family labour and day-wage 
labour are other common forms of labour organization. Landless-
ness, fragmentation of land holdings, low production and low 
productivity are the prevailing features of that sector. 
Currently the industrial sector contributes only a small 
proportion of the GDP. In 1980 manufacturing contributed only 
13.7% of the GDP (Central Bank of Ceylon, 1980:7). Industrial 
output from this sector has largely been destined for the domestic 
market. The domestic market is small. The sector is heavily 
dependent on imported raw materials, and imported capital goods 
and suffers direct competition from imported products. 
The existing economic structure is characterised by 
sluggish growth, an absence of strong linkages between the 
branches of the economy, and the inability to achieve self-sustai-
ning economic development. The governments of post-independence 
Sri Lanka have been unable to transform this export-dependent 
economic structure. 
Until 1972 the Westminster model of parliamentary demo-
cracy operated. Major constitutional amendments were introduced 
in 1972 and 1977. The present system of presidential government 
has similarities with the French executive system. Two major 
political parties, the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), have held the ruling power alter-
natively since 1948. The United National Party is committed to a 
1. Cash crop plantations above 50 acres were nation-
alised by the Land Reform Laws of 1972 and 1975. Since the 
imposition of this ceiling on ownership of land and the nationali-
sation of large holdings, the lands organized under joint stock 
companies decreased drastically. See chapter seven for a detailed 
discussion on the land reform programme. 
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free entreprise economy while the Sri Lanka Freedom Party has 
favoured an economy directed toward increased state intervention 
backed by a populist ideology. The electorate is highly poli-
ticised as indicated by very high voter turnout at each general 
election. Political power has alternated between the two major 
parties. The major Marxist political parties - Lanka Sama samaj a 
Party ( LSSP ) and the Communist Party (CP ) have entered into 
coalitions with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party regularly since 1956. 
The tradition of the exercise of legal and constitutional means 
of electing and displacing governments was broken in 1971 with 
the eruption of a revolt aimed at seizing state power by means of 
violent attacks on the security forces of the country. This revolt 
signalled widespread discontent with an elitist political sytem 
and with the persistence of widespread poverty and unemployment. 
However, following the successful suppression of the insurgency, 
the system of government and national economic policies have 
continued without any fundamental changes. 
Attempts by various post-independence governments to 
diversify the economy and to bring about sustained economic 
development have not been successful. Growing poverty
' and per-
sistent economic and political crises suggest that the pattern and 
course of development may be viewed as retarded. 
Given this setting, several things remain to be ex-
plained. The major task is theoretically to delineate the pattern 
of development in Sri Lanka and its proper characterization. The 
causes and origins of this pattern of development need also to be 
explained as does the perpetuation of aspects of 'colonial 
economic structure' in the post-independence period and the 
inability of governments to transform the socio-economic structure 
to bring about sustained economic development. 
, 1. Proportion of the total population in poverty 
increased from 47% in 1969-70 to 69% in 1977-78 ( Colombo Plan, 
1978 : 221 ) . A more recent study reported 19% of all households in 
the island or 13% of the total population to be in Absolute 
Poverty measured by serious dietary inadequacy ( Marga Institute, 
1981:48, 49). 
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Perspectives to Explain the Course and Pattern of Development 
Theories which attempt to explain societal development 
can be divided into two broad categories : liberal developmentalist 
and variations on Marxism. In the liberal developmentalist 
tradition, modernization theory, which was spawned by the 
evolutionist and the functionalist schools of sociology, became the 
dominant mode of analysis of social change by the 1960s. Apter 
(1965 ) , Black (1966 ) , Eisenstadt (1966 ) , Lerner (1959) , McClelland 
(1961 ) , Levy (1969 ) ) and Smelser (1967) are among the leading 
proponents of modernization theory. 
Classical Marxist social theory has been less influential 
than modernization theory in the analysis of the issues of deve-
lopment, particularly the development of the South Asian 
societies. According to Diamond (1979 ) the prominence given to 
what he called ideological Marxism during the Stalinist era is 
partly responsible for the demise of the 'critical Marxist 
tradion ' . 1 Yet works by Marx and Lenin continue to be major 
influences on the study of societal development. 
The current debate on development and underdevelopment 
is heavily weighted towards neo-Marxist -contributions?. The in-
tensity of debate and the disagreement among writers of the 
Marxist school is such that it is extremely difficult to find a 
common denominator of the ' underdevelopmentalist paradigm' 
(Leaver, 1973 ) . Among the newer approaches the dependency 
perspective, and the world systems perspective pioneered by 
Wallerstein (1974) have become influential forces. Some of the 
leading variants of ' Marxist ' development theory are Amin (1974 ) , 
Alavi (1982 ) , Mandel ( 1975) and Petras (1978 ) . In the following 
section these perspectives are briefly reviewed in order to derive 
a theoretical framework appropriate for the analysis of the Sri 
Lankan pattern of development. 
1. cf.  . Wallerstein (1974:387 ) . 
2. For details on the variety of neo-Marxist contribu-
tions and on their debate about underdevelopment, see Foster-
Carter (1973 and 1978 ) . 
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Modernization Theory 
Despite the variations among its advocates, some 
assumptions and core propositions common to modernization theory 
can be identified. Taking the 'nation states' as their unit of 
analysis, they define 'modernization' in terms of the bi-polar 
concepts of 'tradition' and 'modernity'. Accordingly, 'moderniza-
tion' is a process of transition in which societies progress from 
'traditional' to 'modern'. Societies are temporally located on a 
continuum of tradition and modernity in terms of, the degree to 
which they possess the attributes of modernity •that are derived 
from the observation of already modernized societies. The 
attributes of the modernization process are certain selected 
institutional, cultural, economic characteristics and behavioural 
patterns found in the modernized societies - especially Anglo-
American societies.The Parsonian pattern variables have often 
been utilized to distinguish between traditional and modern 
societies. For instance the modernized societies are typically 
characterized by a predominance of achievement-oriented, univer-
salistic behaviour patterns, a high degree of political universa-
lism and a highly differentiated occupational structure. Converse-
ly, modernizing societies are characterized by a predominance of 
ascriptively-oriented and particularistic behaviour patterns, a 
lower degree of political inclusiveness and a relatively less 
differentiated occupational structure. 
Modernization theorists hold that as a result of a pecu-
liar constellation of circumstances, the societies of western Europe 
modernized before most of the rest of the world. Nations outside 
western Europe are viewed as late starters in the modernization 
process. These theorists presume that traditional or modernizing 
societies will traverse the same stages of development which the 
already modernized have 'apparently traversed historically' 
(Hopkins, 1982a:10). This view of unilinear progression from 
tradition to modernity is implicit in Lerner (1958) and Eisenstadt 
(1966). Lerner wrote: 
The model evolved in the West is an historical fact. That the 
same basic model reappears in virtually all modernizing 
societies of the world, regardless of variation in race, color, 
creed ... (Lerner, 1958:46). 
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As late as 1966 Eisenstadt perceived modernization as 
(that) process of change towards those types of social, 
economic and political system that have developed in Western 
Europe and North America from the seventeenth century, to be 
nineteenth and then have spread to other European countries 
and in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to the South 
American, Asian and African continents (Eisenstadt, 1966:1). 
It is also believed that the already modernized North Atlantic 
societies and the United States of America will aid the late star-
ters to become modernized by means of a process of 'diffusion'. 
• 	 The absence of attributes of modernization is itself 
implied to be a barrier to the process. Further, cultural and 
institutional factors internal to, and inherent in, national 
societies are believed to be further obstacles to modernization. In 
order to progress along this path, a transfer or diffusion of the 
elements of modernization from the modernized societies to 
traditional societies is recommended. 
At present it is presumed that the highly modernized, 
neo-capitalist countries of the west are involved in altruistic 
activities in aiding, through economic, political, social, 
educational and cultural assistance, the modernization of 
traditionally underdeveloped, backward societies, and that 
this aid will assist these underdeveloped countries to reach 
a take-off stage quickly and would launch them in the path 
of harmonious modernization (Desai, 1976:95). 
Several problems which plague modernization theory 
reduce its utility as •a mode of analysis in the study of deve-
lopment in the third world. Skocpol summarised the major metho-
dological objections to it as: 
the tendency to reify the nation state as the sole unit of 
analysis; the assumption that all countries follow a similar 
path of growth; the disregard of transnational structures; 
and the method of explanation based on ahistorical ideal 
types (Skocpo1,1977:1075). 
The criticism that modernization theorists reify the 
nation state as the unit of analysis is advanced mainly by 
dependency and world-systems theorists who argue that nation 
states cannot be considered as 'autonomous units as they are 
integrated into a global capitalist system which consists of 
'hegemonic' and 'dependent' subsystems. 
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The assumption that all countries follow a universal 
path of development has been proven invalid by the empirically 
observable diversity of development experience of different nation 
states. Valenzuela and Valenzuela (1979:56) observe that 'it is 
inconceivable to think that the individual nations in the 
periphery would replicate the evolutionary experience of now 
developed nations'. 
The modernization theorists have not given sufficient 
attention to external sources and influences of social change. 
Even modernization theorists such as Lerner, for example, 
who emphasize the role of the 'Western impact' in moderniza-
tion tend to look at the 'impact' only in terms of its conse-
quences. for the diffusion of particular cultural attributes, 
ignoring the structural mechanisms of the interaction between 
societies (Tipps, 1976:74). 
To ignore historical and contemporary structural mecha-
nisms governing the interaction between societies makes it diffi-
cult to comprehend and explain the processes of change, particu-
larly in ex-colonial societies such as Sri Lanka. While emphasi-
zing that aspects of 'cultural diffusion' contribute to moderniza-
tion, the modernization theorists ignore the 'cultural domination' 
associated with this process of diffusion. As S.B.D. De Silva 
correctly pointed out: 
In these models, underdevelopment is a primordial condition, 
like original sin - to be overcome by contact with the 
culture and organization of the already dominant economies, 
regardless of the terms on which such contact takes place 
(S.B.D. De Silva, 1982:9). 
As Tipps concludes 
Any theoretical framework which fails to incorporate such 
significant variables as the impact of war, conquest, colo-
nial domination, international political and military rela-
tionships or of international trade and the cross-national 
flow of capital cannot hope to explain either the origins of 
these societies or the nature of• their struggles for political 
and economic autonomy ... (Tipps, 1976:74). 
In the case of Sri Lanka, which carries a history of colonial 
domination, and which has been profoundly influenced by the 
forces of the world economy, modernization theory appears inap-
propriate. 
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The bi-polar categorization of societies into 'traditional' 
and 'modernized' using concepts derived from the study of 
modernized societies is 'inaccurate', 'ahistorical' and 'methodo-
logically invalid' (Frank, 1971). Much of Frank's work has 
sought to demonstrate that the pattern variables of modernity and 
tradition are not mutually exclusive. In his view behaviour 
patterns and institutional features associated with traditionalism 
can be found in the modernized societies. For example Hoselitz' 
identification of the Parsonian pattern variables achievement, 
universalism, and specificity as the defining attributes of 
modern society, and his attempt to evaluate all traits of moder-
nizing societies by this yardstick, is open to question. It is 
pointed out that 'there are important elements of the qualities on 
both sides of each dichotomous choice in both the traditional and 
the modern society' (Varma, 1980:56). It is possible that elements 
of traditional behaviour have contributed towards the moderniza-
tion of societies. Considerable diversity in social structures is 
apparent between the societies categorized as 'traditional'. 
The absence of a causal analysis of change is yet 
another major limitation of modernization theory. Indeed a 
leading partisan of modernization theory, Smelser, has admitted 
that 'his systemic analysis does not account for the determinants 
of economic development nor can it show causal precedences in 
social change' (Varma, 1980:46). Its application is therefore 
limited to static descriptive and typological analyses. 
Limits to the utility of modernization theory are best 
revealed in the ineffectiveness of development policies based on 
it. The growing disparity between the modernized and the 
modernizing nation states and increasing poverty within the latter 
despite decades of diffusionist policies are indicative of the 
limitations of policies based on faulty analysis. 
Modernization theory not only could not adequately 
explain the extreme disparity in the distribution of wealth 
between the nations but also failed to guide policy decisions to 
zation theory 
application to 
evaluates 
raises doubts about the suitability of its 
the non-Western societies. Modernization theory 
to the modernity of nations by their proxi mity 
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overcome economic and social problems of the third world. Even 
when policy prescriptions are given by the modernization theorists 
their effectiveness is doubted. As an illustration Eisenstadt ' s 
recommendations can be pointed out. His prescription is to remove 
structural duality in modernizing societies by 'absorbing the 
left-out groups in the consensual process ' . Varma (1980 :45 ) sees 
this as an idealistic prescription or simply to mean urbanizing 
the left-out groups. And 'the problems of over-urbanization of 
some developing countries are well known ' . 	 Further 'the 
frightful costs of massive urbanization and industrialization are 
ignored or perhaps considered necessary ; also often the urban 
oriented industrializing society is projected as the utopia for all 
societies seeking change' ( Varma , 1980 :49) . 
The ethnocentricity or the Western-centricity of moderni- 
institutions and values particularly of Anglo-American societies. 
Eisenstadt (1973) equates modernity to Westernization. As moderni-
ty connotes progress the Western-centricity of this equation is 
less than subtle. Tipps pointed out that 
By deriving the attributes of 'modernity' from a generalized 
image of Western society, and then positing the acquisition 
of these attributes as the criterion of modernization, 
modernization theorists have attempted to force the analysis 
of non-Western societies into what Bendix has termed 'the 
Procrustes bed of the European experience' ( Tipps , 1976:69 ) . 
Finally, at the ideological level, modernization theory 
has been criticised for providing ideological support to suit the 
goals of American expansionism ( Tipps :1976 ) . Thinking of 'the 
destiny of nations in terms of the capitalist image of societies' 
(Varma , 1980 : 27) by the modernization theorists and the neglect 
of scientific analysis of the modernization process of the countries 
which have taken the non-capitalist path (Desai , 1976 :99 ) are 
also pointed out as weaknesses. 
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In response to these mounting criticisms attempts have 
been made by some, such as Eisenstadt (1973), to reformulate and 
revise earlier models of modernization theory. He has questioned 
the validity of the tradition-modernity dichotomy and rejected the 
initial assumption of universality in the process of modernization, 
and in doing so has shifted the emphasis to the analysis of 
multilinearity, discontinuities and diversity in the process. His 
recent work recognizes the possibility of 'breakdowns', 'halts' 
and 'political decay' in the modernization process (Eisenstadt, 
1973:18). 
In contrast to older literature (e.g. Lerner, 1958) which 
condemned all traits associated with tradition, the newer litera-
ture from the mid 1960's (e.g. Eisenstadt, 1973) began to assess 
the role of the traditional traits in the modernization process. It 
was realized that the mere destruction of traditional forms does 
not necessarily result in modernity; that there can be possible 
negative effects in the process of modernization due to the 
destruction of the traditional; that there can be possible 
contradictions between the attributes of modernity; and that the 
extension of various sociodemographic and structural indices does 
not necessarily assure a continuation of the modernization process 
(Eisenstadt, 1973:99-100). Riggs for instance, in his study of 
Thailand showed how under the impact of external forces of 
modernization, a traditional system develops systemic character-
istics and properties of its own thus developing in a direction 
different to that envisaged by early modernization theorists 
(Eisenstadt, 1973:102). 
Eisentadt's revisionist attempt has not been free from 
criticism. While questioning the validity of tradition-modernity 
dichotomy, Eisenstadt (1973:4-5) formulated three dichotomies: 
liberty vs. authority, stability and continuity vs. change and 
modern social rationality vs. cultural orientation. Durkheim's 
distinction between mechanical and organic solidarity is used by 
Eisenstadt as support for the relevance of such dichotomies. But 
according to Levy (1976:1262) Durkheim saw through his own 
distinction and it can be claimed that Eisenstadt is misreading 
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Durkheim. Further, although Eisenstadt promises a new paradigm 
in the section titled 'Modernization and Development - The New 
Paradigm' (1973:11-18) he gives no definition of modernization or 
any single clearcut paradigm (Levy, 1976:1264). Moreover newer 
concepts such as 'patrimonialism' (Eisenstadt, 1973:103) and 
'transitional' societies do not effectively solve the difficulties of 
the modernization theory. Tipps' criticism of the concept of 
'transitional' societies is of special relevance in the context of 
the present study. Accordingly the 'hybrid societies' produced by 
colonial conquests cannot be adequately explained by labelling 
them transitional. For the effects of colonial domination cannot be 
dismissed as 'transitional' since 'their scope and duration are 
often just as significant as is that of pre-colonial conditions, 
particuarly in those instances where colonialism endured for a 
number of generations' (Tipps, 1976:76). 
Despite these attempts at revision modernization theory 
remains Western-centric, ahistorical and acausal. Its neglect of 
the structural mechanisms of interaction between societies, its 
inability to provide a staisfactory conceptual framework to 
explain causes and consequences of 'patterns of variability and 
convergence in the formation and transformation of national 
societies' (to borrow Tipp's (1976:85) phrase), and finally the 
failure to explain the disparity in the distribution of wealth 
between the nations all continue to plague modernization theory 
and diminishes its utility as an explanatory tool in the study of 
the development experience of ex-colonial societies in particular 
such as Sri Lanka. Indeed following a critique of modernization 
theory, Tipps concluded that: 'constant revision will not lend 
substance to the illusion of modernization; it must be superseded' 
(Tipps, 1976:84). 
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The 'Marxist' Perspective 
The classical Marxist theory of societal evolution has 
been subjected to various interpretations. The accuracy of Marx's 
views on the capitalist development of the now underdeveloped 
countries, particularly in Asia, has been increasingly challenged. 
Marx outlined four progressive historical stages in the 
process of the evolution of human societies: Asiatic, ancient, 
feudal and capitalist. Each of these epochs is characterized by a 
particular mode of production. In different stages of the evolution 
of human societies, the forces of production - land, labour and 
the means of production (including the manner of their technical 
combination) are combined in different forms. The concept of 
relations of production refers to the social organization of this 
combination. Particular forces of production and particular 
relations of production together form a particular mode of 
production according to Marx. 
The dynamics of societal change are explained by refe-
rence to conflict. 'At a certain stage of their development the 
material forces of production come in conflict with the existing 
relations of production ...'(Bottomore and Rubel, 1963:67). Each 
historical stage is characterised by its class contradictions which 
are inherent in the organization of production. As Hoogvelt notes: 
These contradictions become aggravated as a result of the 
development of the forces of production to a point where 
these can no longer be usefully contained utthin the existing  
relations of production. They then lead to class conflict, 
revolution and ultimately an historical transformation of the 
mode of production (Hoogvelt, 1982:157). 
Marx's insight into the evolution of human societies, his 
method of inquiry and his theoretical constructs, (such as laws 
of motion of capitalism and class relations), have been extremely 
influential in shaping the modern social sciences. However, 
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inaccuracies in the characterization and prediction of the evolu-
tion of A-sian societies seem to require revisions to his original 
views. The concept of the Asiatic mode of production has been a 
topic of controversy. ' The expansion of European capitalism has 
failed to dissolve completely the pre-existing modes of production 
in many third world societies. Neither did it succeed in 
transforming them into societies having a capitalist mode of 
production of the European archetype. This is in contrast to 
Marx's forecasts. In contrast to Marx's prediction, British 
colonial penetration manifestly has not fulfilled the regenerating 
mission of laying the material foundation of Western society in 
Asia. Neither did the European expansion compel Sri Lanka, or 
for that matter India, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production 
such as the European mode. As Brenner (1977:25) argues, the 
capitalist expansion in the third world has not only failed to 
introduce capitalist economic development but has also served to 
erect barriers to that development. 
The problems faced by Marxist theory in explaining the 
development experience of the third world, coupled with critiques 
of the 'simple evelutionary teleology' of the Stalinists, led 
researchers to reassess Marxist theory. Increased attention was 
directed to a ' re-examination of the course of capitalist 
development, the role of imperialism and its effect on the third 
world and the proper characterization of social formations in the 
third world. The dependency and world systems paradigms are 
among the more influential and important results of these 
exercises. 
The Dependency Perspective 
The historical roots of the dependency perspective lie in 
the work on the theory of imperialism and capitalist development 
by such writers as Hobson (1948 ) , Lenin (1973 ) , Baran (1957 ) and 
1. Marx's characterization of pre-colonial Asian society 
and his views about the role and impact of British Colonialism on 
that society have been rejected by some writers such as Chandra 
(1981 ) and Alavi (1980 ) . See chapter three for a discussion. 
Prebisch (1950). In almost all of these contributions the influence 
of classical Marxism is immense. The work of Hobson and Lenin 
has sought to explain sources of imperialist exploitation while the 
emphasis in dependency theory is directed toward explaining the 
effects and impact of imperialism on the third world. In large 
measure the focus is on the 'pathology of development', namely 
'underdevelopment'. 
In direct contrast to liberal theories of development, the 
dependency perspective conceives 'underdevelopment' in the third 
world as primarily a result of the 'contact' between the now 
developed nations in the west and third world nations. Therefore 
the modernizationist notion of 'modernization through culture 
contact' or 'cultural diffusion' is replaced by the notion of 
'underdevelopment through cultural domination'. According to the 
dependency perspective, the historical process of European 
capitalist expansion through mercantalist and colonial periods has 
integrated third world countries into an international capitalist 
economic system. This system is made up of metropolitan or core 
economies in the centre, and satellite economies in the periphery. 
The more developed industrial capitalist countries are the 
metropolitan economies while the third world nations occupy 
satellite positions in the periphery. 
The dependency perspective associates the underdeve-
lopment of the third world with the very same processes that 
transformed the now developed metropolitan economies. The metro-
politan economies developed by expropriating the economic surplus 
from the former and the former became underdeveloped 'aiding the 
ascendency' of the latter. Therefore, for the dependency 
theorists, the development of the centre and the underdevelopment 
of the periphery are two sides of the same coin. 
Primitive accumulation by the European capitalists 
during the mercantalist period, and unequal trade relationships 
forged and maintained in the colonial and neo-colonial periods 
between the centre and periphery, are the avenues of transfer of 
surplus from the periphery to the centre. The need for 
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European capitalism to expand geographiclly to envelop peripheral 
regions is explained by reference to the laws of motion of 
capitalist development as shown in the now famous Hobson-Lenin 
thesis. 
The mechanisms of unequal trade are associated with 
historical distortions in the world market. The process of 
European capitalist expansion created an international division of 
labour where the third world specializes in the production of 
primary agricultural exports and the metropolitan centre special-
izes in manufactured products. As Prebisch (1950) and the 
Economic Commission of Latin America (ECLA) argued this division 
of labour essentially produces an increasing inequality in 
international trade to the disadvantage of the producer of 
primary exports. The primary export products suffer from a 
tendency to decline in price and demand in the world market, 
while the manufactured products from the metropolitan economies 
show a tendency to increase in price. In consequence, third 
world economies face a deterioration in the terms of trade in 
relation to manufactured products and experience a 'widening 
foreign exchange gap'. According to P-rebisch (1950), this 
increasing inequality of trade is due 	 largely to the demand 
inelasticity of primary agricultural 	 products, the substitutabi- 
lity of primary products by synthetics, and the decreasing ratio 
of raw material inputs in manufacturing production which 
accompanies technological progress. The unequal distribution of 
the gains of technological progress in the centre and in the 
periphery further contributes to the problem. It is only in the 
centre, and not in the periphery, that wages rise as a result of 
technological progress and increases in productivity. The 
continuity of 'unequal exchange' between the periphery and the 
centre, which began during the merchant capitalist period and 
progressed through the colonial period and into the present 
neo-colonial period, can be explained by reference to the ability 
of metropolitan economies to manipulate production processes and 
markets to their advantage. 
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As part of the process of integration of peripheral 
regions into the centre-periphery relationship there emerges in 
the periphery a comprador class (which Frank called the 'lumpen 
bourgeoisie' ) whose economic interests become closely linked with 
those of the metropolitan bourgeoisie. This alliance between the 
dominant strata in the periphery and in the metropolis is 
perpetuated to the detriment of 'development' in the periphery. 
For the dependency theorist, the social formation in the 
periphery is capitalist because economic production is geared to 
the capitalist world market. In order to bring about development, 
underdeveloped nation states in the periphery are recommended to 
break away radically from the world capitalist system. 
Although the dependency perspective stresses important 
factors causing 'underdevelopment' which are ignored in liberal 
theories, it faces, theoretical and empirical problems itself. 
First, the dependency perspective does not clearly deli-
neate how the mechanisms of expropriation of surplus from the 
periphery to metropolitan societies lead to the exploitation of the 
former. 
Secondly, the 'stagnationist' view of the dependency 
theory holds that capitalist industrial economic development is not 
possible in the peripheral economies while they remain in the 
world system. The impressive growth experienced by selected 
peripheral economies such as Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea 
and Taiwan illustrates the limitations of this view (cf. Warren, 
1973). 
Thirdly, Brenner (1977) attacks the dependency theo-
rists' belief that the transfer of surplus from the periphery to 
• the centre is largely responsible for the development of the latter 
and the underdevelopment of the former. The criticism is that 
mere transfer of wealth from one region to another does not lead 
to capitalist development in the receiving region nor underdeve-
lopment in the originating region. He argues that 'no amount of 
accumulated money or wealth can explain the accumulation of 
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capital for this requires certain historically developed social 
production relations' (1977 :66). .  
Fourthly, dependency theory has been criticised for the 
omission of the social relations of production or class analysis 
from the model. Critics claim it is production relations that 
determine the type of exploitation and type of interaction under 
different historical conditions between centre and the periphery. 
The involvement of underdeveloped countries in the world economy 
was significant only because it 'locks into position certain 
classes that stood in the way of capitalist transformation' 
( S. B .D . De Silva, 1982:11 ) . Thus it is argued that it is in the 
sphere of production that the exploitation must be located and not 
in the sphere of exchange as the dependency theorists would 
believe. 
Fifthly, dependency theory has been attacked for cha-
racterizing third world social formations as capitalist. An essen-
tial property distinguishing the capitalist mode of production, 
according to Marx, is the presence of 'free wage labour ' . Under 
the capitalist mode the labour is free both from the ownership of 
means of production and from feudal obligations - the direct 
producer is free to sell his labour (Alavi , 1982a ) . As Laclau 
(1971 ) argues, the presence of pre- capitalist and ' unfree ' forms of 
labour relationships, such as service obligations in exchange for 
tenancy rights, makes it difficult to characterize certain Latin 
American economies as capitalist. 
Finally, the dependency thesis does not enable the 
researcher to explain how and why the unequal exchange and 
exploitation of the periphery continues under different historical 
conditions. The questions 'How long can peripheral underdevelop-
ment, due to transfer of surplus, continue?', and 'Would the 
peripheral surplus di sappear at a certain point of time, if it 
continues to flow out?' , remain unanswerable in the dependency 
model. Nevertheless it should be acknowledged that 
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the central contribution of the dependency theorists was the 
insight that it was of limited value to study the development 
of the societies of the third world in isolation from the 
development of the advanced societies' ( Roxborough 
1976 :177 ) 
The World Systems Perspective 
The world systems perspective pioneered by Wallerstein 
(1974) has attempted to overcome the problems faced by the de-
pendency paradigm. The world systems perspective may be consi-
dered as a refinement and reformulation of• the dependency 
paradigm. Skocpol has summarized world systems theory as 
follows: 
The capitalist world economy is based upon a geographically 
differentiated division of labor, featuring three main zones - 
core, semi-periphery and periphery - tied together by world 
market trade... Each major zone of the world economy has an 
economic structure based upon its particular mixture of 
economic activities and its characteristic form of 'labor 
control ' ... The different zones are differentially rewarded by 
the world economy, with surplus flowing disproportionately to 
the core areas. Moreover, the economic structure of each zone 
supports a given sort of dominant class oriented toward the 
world market, as well as states of a certain strength 
(strongest in the core and weakest in the periphery ) that 
operate in the interests of that class... The differential 
strength of the multiple states within the world capitalist 
economy is crucial for maintaining the system as a whole, 
for the strong states reinforce and increase the differential 
flow of surplus to the core zone. This happens because 
strong states can provide ' extraeconomic' assistance to allow 
their capitalist classes to manipulate and enforce terms of 
trade in their favor on the world market (Skocpol, 
1977:1076). 
There are two modes of transfer of surplus from the 
periphery to core, namely economic and political. Different wage 
levels in different zones, determined largely by the international 
division of labour and specialization, results in unequal exchan-
ge between the zones in favour of core. At the political level, 
1. Following a critical assessment of dependency theory, 
Palma (1978:912) concludes: 'We find in ( dependency ) analyses a 
inetlwdalogy adequate for the study of concrete situations of 
dependency, from which concrete concepts and theories can be 
developed, and from which strategies of development can be set 
up in terms of specific situations of each society with economic 
analysis placed within clear social and political coordinates ' . 
- 24 - 
the stronger states, which invariably develop in the core, utilize 
'extra-economic means' to impose and maintain unequal exchange 
relationships which favours the core against the periphery. In 
periods of recession, according to the world systems perspective, 
peripheral states can seize the opportunity to move upwards and 
become semi-peripheral zones. The semi-peripheral zones, or 
'sub-imperialist' states as Frank (1979) labelled them, are 
'middle sector' or 'go-between' areas of the world capitalist 
system. 
Thus the world systems perspective reaffirms that social 
formation in the periphery is in fact 'capitalist'. It insists on 
taking the world capitalist system as the unit of analysis and 
not the nation state as is the case in the liberal developmentalist 
perspective. Like dependency theory it locates underdevelopment 
in the sphere of international exchange. Wallerstein, by 
introducing the concept of semi-periphery, insists that the world 
systems perspective can explain the different 'levels' of growth 
in subsystems of the world system. 
Several of the criticisms levelled at dependency theory 
have been extended to the world systems perspective. Smith 
(1980:495) attacks the 'unhistorical determinism of the world 
systems view in which internal structures are totally determined 
by external forces'. This echoes the Marxist objection to locating 
exploitation in exchange relationships rather than in the sphere 
of production relationships. According to Marx, production, not 
exchange, is the determinant of the mode of production of any 
given social formation (Navarro, 1981:81). 
In world systems theory, 'stagnationist' tendencies 
apply similar to those which may be seen in the dependency 
theory. The view that the internal structures of the subsystems 
are determined by external forces, paints a pessimistic picture of 
the prospects for national development in the third world. 
According to world systems theory a subsystem within 
the world capitalist system cannot become socialist unless the 
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entire world system changes. This belief poses problems to world 
systems theory, particularly in relation to the position of socia-
list economies and the presence of revolutionary class struggles 
in the subsystems (Navarro, 1981 :83 ) . 1 
The primacy of the external forces as determinants of 
whatever happens in a subsystem of the world system under-
estimates the conflict between classes within a subsystem arising 
from internal contradictions. Consequently, it should be noted 
that, 
while international exchange reinforces existing class rela-
tions or shapes them in certain directions, communities of 
peasants and urban workers play an active role in shaping 
responses to the world system rather than simply being 
shaped by it (Evans, 1979:19 ) . 
It is this lack of emphasis on factors internal to a 
given society which represent a further weakness of world systems 
theory. According to Eisenstadt (1979: 5 ) , 'there is a discrepancy 
between their [ world systems theorists ' ] analytical conceptual 
framework and the richness of historical material on social 
change ' . This inability to explain the historical material by 
their conceptual scheme is largely due to 'the neglect of the 
analysis of internal cultural and social structures of both the 
hegemonic and dependent units '. The lack of specificity in the 
world systems approach creates a need for the study of internal 
patterns of social organization. Eisenstadt argues that this lack 
of emphasis on internal variables is a result of 'over-emphasis of 
the modern world system as the most important single determinant 
of dynamics of contemporary international system' ( Eisenstadt, 
1979: 5 ) . As Smith (1980 :495 ) has noted many of the shortcomings 
of the world systems and dependency paradigms seem to emanate 
from 'their preoccupation with the search for ' grail '- the all 
encompassing theory of the world which will explain all important 
economic forces ' . Nonetheless the emphasis in both these 
approaches on the role of trans-national structures and entire 
1. See also Worsley ' s (1980 ) criticism of world systems 
perspective on the issue of viewing countries in terms of a one 
single world capitalist system. 
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mechanisms in shaping processes of change has indelibly affected 
the analysis of patterns of third world development. 
Recent Developments 
Whilst the dependency and world systems theorists give 
primacy to exchange relations among the units in the world 
capitalist economy, the 'Marxists' emphasize the analysis of 
production relations. Hence the former are labelled as the 
'circulationists' and the latter 'productionists' . Recent writers 
(Amin, 1976; Mandel, 1975) have attempted to synthesize common 
elements from these viewpoints. Yet others (Alavi, 1982; Laclau, 
1971) have sharpened the mode of production analyses. 
As shown in the discussion Above the dependency and 
world systems paradigms- located the roots of 'underdevelopment' 
in the exploitative capitalist world market arrangements. Writers 
such as Laclau (1971), in contrast, locate the roots of 'underde-
velopment' in the third world in the exploitative actions of the 
advanced countries which find expression in imperialist dominated 
production relationships in the third world itself. According to 
this view the mode of production in the periphery is character-
ised by the articulation of elements of both capitalist and 
pre-capitalist modes of production though the dominant mode is 
capitalist. Accordingly, the European capitalist expansion did not 
supplant pre-capitalist formations in the periphery entirely ' 
instead a 'peripheral' social formation emerged as an articulation 
of capitalist and non-capitalist modes of production. Thus, in the 
periphery we find capitalist commodity exchange side by side 
with pre-capitalist servile exactions, slave labour and other 
forms of feudal or semi-feudal relations of production. The 
peculiar pattern of third world development can be understood as 
a result of this peculiar articulation. As Hoogvelt puts it: 
Capitalism overseas came to have the best of both worlds: it 
introduced commodity exchange all over the globe arranging 
for an international division of labour most suited for its 
own needs, and at the same time it could get overseas 
products at prices which were obtained through extraeconomic 
means (Hoogvelt, 1982:175). 
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The pre-capitalist extra-economic means of surplus extraction ex-
plain low wage levels, low ground rents and the low price level 
for the commodities of the periphery in relation to those with the 
core. 
In my view, this understanding of the way that social 
relations of production leads to 'underdevelopment' is indispens-
able but of itself is not sufficient to fully explain the course or 
pattern of development. 
Both views contain elements of truth. In some third 
world regions, as Laclau (1971) pointed out in the case of Latin 
America the 'articulation' of elements of pre-capitalist and 
capitalist modes of production have created and continue to 
reproduce conditions of exploitation. For example, it may be 
argued that low wage rates in the third world export sectors are 
obtained and maintained by relations such as servile labour 
obligations. It is also true that distortions in the world market 
arrangement created and maintained by the hegemonic advanced 
capitalist countries reproduce conditions of unequal exchange. The 
international division of specialization, where economic tasks 
involving high capital and high skills are concentrated in the 
core, leads to inequalities in exchange relations and hence in the 
economic rewards which flow to peripheral regions. These world 
market arrangements, which favour the advanced industrial 
capitalist countries, thus help explain unequal exchange between 
core and periphery. The view that emphasises the analysis of the 
modes of production supplements the understanding of 'under-
development' by explaining the nature of peripheral socio-eco-
nomic structures. 
In my view, Alavi's analysis (1980; 1982a)better captures 
the process of transformation of third world societies under the 
impact of colonial capitalism, and the structural characteristics 
of the ensuing social formation, which he calls 'peripheral 
capitalism'. ' According to him, colonial capitalist activity in 
third world societies has transformed the pre-colonial social 
1. Also see McEachern (1982), on this line of argument. 
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formation into a distinct form of capitalism - that is, peripheral 
capitalism. Pre-capitalist structures and relations, which at a 
superficial level appear unchanged, are imparted with new 
meanings and significance when the structural bases of social 
relations are profoundly transformed by the impact of 'colonial 
capital and the development of indigenous capital' ( Alavi , 
1982a :173 ) . Thus the third world societies have ceased to be 
feudal. 
Recent writers who adopt the world systems perspective, 
unlike those of an earlier day, appear more willing to 
accommodate the notion of the articulation of modes of production. 
Mandel observed: 
A capitalist world economy is an articulated system of 
capitalist, semi-capitalist and pre-capitalist relations of 
production linked to each other by capitalist relations of 
exchange and dominated by the capitalist world market 
(Mandel, 1975: 48 ) . 
In the capitalist world system, as Mandel points out, elements of 
more than one mode of production are combined in the periphery. 
This articulation, with the aid of associated distortions in the 
world market, results in unequal exchange. Extra-economic 
pressure by the states in the core further enhances the dispro-
portionate flow of economic rewards. 
This convergence can be seen reflected in the work of 
Amin, a 'third worldist ' , who attempted to synthesize both ' cir-
culationist ' and ' productionist ' concepts. According to Amin 
(1976 :73 ) capitalism in the centre is an autocentric system which 
is characterised by 'simultaneous production of production goods 
and consumer goods ' . Colonialism imposes a specific structure in 
the periphery which Amin calls 'peripheral capitalism' which may 
be distinguished from the ' pure ' capitalism of the centre.' 
In peripheral capitalism , productivities , income and 
profitability between sectors in the peripheral economy are 
extremely uneven. By creating an export sector in the periphery 
during the colonial period, the centre capitalist countries 
1. 	 . Alavi (1982a:178-182). 
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obtained raw materials and food at production costs lower than 
those of the centre.- Unlike the economies of the centre, wage 
levels in the periphery do not keep pace with increases in 
productivity. 
The import-substituting industrialization strategy of the 
peripheral countries deepens the dependency of the peripheral 
economies on the centre for capital, technology and raw materials 
and perpetuates the integration of the periphery into the world 
economy. This reproduces conditions for continued unequal 
exchange. 
In the neo-colonial period the inequality continues but 
in novel forms. The multinational corporations establish manu-
facturing plants in the periphery. Sub-imperialist countries emer-
ge in the periphery and are characterised by a new division of 
labour. But such countries inherit 'industries that have limited 
scope for expansion and for growth potential (hardware), while 
the centre keeps back for itself those (industries) with highest 
potential for progress (software) ' (Amin, 1976:382). 
At the level of international politics, Amin considers the 
resistance movements to world capitalism such as OPEC and 
demands for a New International Economic Order (NIE0) by the 
third world as a 'break towards socialism'. This third worldist 
view however is rejected by some writers. For example, Petras 
(1978:39) argues: 'underdevelopment is the product of the capita-
list mode of production, not of patterns of distribution. Therefore 
policies at the level of distribution are misleading'. In contrast 
to the view espoused by Amin, Petras reasserts the primacy of 
class analysis and emphasises social relations of production 
characterised by exploitation rather than underdevelopment. 
However, he too acknowledges the influence of world market forces 
on the internal organization of production in peripheral societies. 
By now a diversity of opinions will be apparent in the 
literature. Some (Warren, 1973) argue that the third world is in 
an early stage of capitalism and industrialization; others (Frank, 
1967; Wallerstein, 1974) that the third world is capitalist. Amin 
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(1974) claims that the third world is en route not to 'pure' but 
'peripheral' capitalism while Alavi, (1975) argues it is a 
colonial mode of production. Laclau (1971) insists it encompasses 
more than one mode of production. 
The position taken in this thesis is that the process of 
colonial transformation led to the emergence of a social formation 
and a pattern of development that can best be characterized as 
peripheral capitalist, as distinct from metropolitan capitalist, 
and that the course and pattern of development followed by Sri 
Lanka is best understood from this perspective. The theoritical 
and conceptual framework used in the thesis is spelt out more 
fully in Chapter Two which discusses the external factors 
influencing core-periphery relations. The remainder of this 
chapter meanwhile concentrates on the conceptual issues involved 
in the characterization of peripheral capitalist social formations, 
and in analyzing the rural class formation and the power struc-
ture at the national level with special reference to Sri Lanka. 
Characterizing Peripheral Capitalist Social Formations 
The debate about the proper characterization of third 
world social formations is a heated one. It may be recalled that 
the third world societies are classified variously as feudal, 
semi-feudal, capitalist and semi-feudal-semi-capitalist. In the 
case of Sri Lanka, the capitalist nature of production relations 
in the urban industrial and service sectors of the economy are 
not much disputed. But this is not so in the case of the rural 
peasant agricultural sector. The presence of apparently non capi-
talist relations such as ande or sharecropping tenancy, has rais-
ed doubts about characterizing the peasant agriculture as 
capitalist. The position adopted in this thesis is to argue that 
Sri Lankan social formation is neither feudal nor semi-feudal but 
peripheral capitalist. This position runs counter to the view of 
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those who had been tempted, for instance in the case of Indian 
agriculture, to designate agricultural relations as non—capitalist, 
on the basis of the existence of sharecropping and debt bondage, 
the absence of a developed labour market and on the basis of 
features of the labour process, such as the minor role played by 
wage labour and the major importance of land rent. ' 
Similar arguments have been made in relation to Sri 
Lanka. The presence of two forms of rent relations, namely la-
bour rent and produce rent, prompted Gunasinghe (1975b) to 
argue that pre-capitalist extractive relations continue to exist in 
Kandyan rural areas. However observing the widespread commodity 
production and monetary circulation (which are incompatible with 
the designation of the above as feudal relations), he designates 
them as not feudal but semi-feudal. For him: 
the adjective 'semi' applied in front of the word 'feudal' 
clarifies the specific situation present in the Kandyan rural 
areas. Though some production relations are feudal in foitm 
they are located in a general structure which is bourgeoisie 
in contemt. This lacks the 'purity' of a feudal production 
relation located in a feudal general structure. Moreover, the 
presence of commodity exchange, monetary circulation, etc. 
has subjected the very basis of feudalism, land itself, to 
market forces. Hence, these relations taken in general 
context, are not feudal but semi-feudal (Gunasinghe, 
1975b:122). 
Although he asserts that the basis of feudalism had been 
changed, a clear analytical statement of how they are transfor-
med is not provided. 
As Patnaik (1983:80) correctly pointed out 'the form of 
rent appropriation itself tells us very little about the underlying 
production relation on the basis of which that rent is produced'. 
Therefore: 
to establish whether a relation is 'semi-feudal' or not we 
have to look not at the form of rent but who is producing 
the rent: the petty producers, on the basis of family labour; 
or the capitalist entrepreneur, on the basis of wage labour. 
A share-of-crop rent in the first case is pre-capitalist rent; 
the same form of rent as share-of-crop represents, however, 
is capitalist rent in the second case (Patnaik, 1983:81). 
1. See McEachern (1976) for a summary of the arguments 
raised in the famous debate on the mode of production in Indian 
agriculture. 
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Because and tenancy in Sri Lanka is generally empirically asso-
ciated with petty producers operating by utilizing family labour, 
the question arises whether it is a pre-capitalist form. According 
to . Patnaik (1983:82) 'empirical association is a different matter 
altogether from an analytical definition' and 'sharecropping as a 
sub-form of kind-rent is not restricted to petty production, but 
can be compatible with transitional and capitalist production as•
well'. Sharecropping therefore is seen as an intermediate or 
transitional form of surplus extraction. 
Failure to capture precisely the nature of the trans-
formation of social structures under colonial capitalism and the 
new meanings imparted to old relations through that process, 
leads to characterizing social formations incorrectly in the third 
world as semi-feudal. It will be argued that the bases of 
surplus extraction in the pre-colonial society - the divided 
ownership of the means of production and extra-economic 
compulsion, had been replaced by separation of actual producers 
from the means of production (primarily land) and economic 
compulsion under the impact of colonial capitalism. Coupled with 
generalized commodity production, these changes have transformed 
pre-capitalist structures and Sri Lanka is no longer pre-capita-
list or semi-feudal. Some old fo1Lm4 which are apparently survi-
ving have been imparted with new meanings and significance 
because the structural bases underlying them has been transfor-
med. 
For instance, following the penetration of capitalist 
relations, the nature of sharecropping tenancy relations have 
undergone changes. Sharecropping in the contemporary third world 
is significantly different from that under feudal production 
Firstly, under feudalism, rent is based on divided ownership of 
means of production and the economic and political role of the 
dominant class towards the production process 'whereas in the 
third world under the changed conditions, rent relations work on 
the basis of the separation of the direct producer from the basic 
means of production' (McEachern, 1982:13). Secondly, under 
generalized commodity production, use-value dominated production 
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has changed into exchange-value dominated production. Prior to 
the penetration of capitalist relations the kind rent 'was used to 
a considerable extent - and possibly to a greater extent - to 
meet landowners' personal needs and did not get into the sphere 
of exchange relations' (Rastiannikov, 1962:13). But with the 
spread of commodity and money relations, it has increasingly 
become exchange value for the landowner - it is now extracted 
mainly with the aim of marketing. 
Following this line of thought, the relationship between 
rent and sharecropping in Sri Lanka can be interpreted as a 
transitional form of wage labour/capital relationship. These forms 
will decline with the advent of real subsumption of labour by 
capital with the introduction of new improved technology and 
greater investment in agriculture. 
Failure to capture the precise nature of the transfor-
mation of pre-colonial structures under the impact of colonialism 
is further reflected in some of the models used in analysis of 
South Asian agrarian social structures. One such model, as 
observed by Herring (1981), attempts to analyse agrarian rela-
tions in terms of semi-feudal patron-client framework which 
depicts relations as complementary and harmonious. This view 
ignores the material basis of the patron-client relationship - the 
structural inequality in the access to the means of production. 
Also it does not grasp the new meanings imparted in the old•
forms through the process of colonial social transformation. 
According to Herring (1981:13) this view 'overlooks roots of 
deference and voluntary acceptance of ideologies that legitimate 
structural inequality'. Indeed, not only was the basis of 
traditional relationships transformed; they were being progressi-
vely replaced. 
Analyzing Rural Class Structure 
Another pitfall which needs to be avoided is the attempt 
to - analyze class formation in terms of arbitrary statistical 
categories. Classification of peasant population into statistical 
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categories using arbitrary criteria has led to the formulation of 
ambiguous schemes which do not approximate reality. Occupation, 
size of income, value of assets and ownership of land are 
criteria frequently utilized in studies of social stratification. 
Ohrling ' s (1977:209) scheme of classification is a sufficient 
example to illustrate pitfalls of the use of arbitrary criteria. He 
classifies the population in his study area into four groups on 
the basis of differentials in ownership of land. These groups are: 
'big landowners' (owning more than 10 acres ) ; 'middle-class 
farmers' (owning 3.1 - 10 acres ; 'small farmers' (owning 0.1 - 3 
acres ) and the ' landless ' . In terms of the differences in 
ownership of land alone there hardly exists a sociologically 
meaningful difference between a person owning 3 acres and a 
person owning 3.3 acres although the former is classifed as a 
'small farmer' and the latter a 'middle-class farmer ' . This is 
not to argue that differentials in ownership and control of land - 
the primary means of production in agriculture - are of no 
importance in determining one' s socio-economic position in villa-
ges. But arbitrary classification schemes, as demonstrated above, 
do not reflect the structurally determined social inequalities, and 
the issue of class formation and inequality cannot be reduced 
simply to differences in the size of holdings or landownership. 
Similarly, the categories used in government legislations, such as 
the Paddy Lands Act of Sri Lanka 1958,   are based on abstract 
legal-administrative definitional criteria and as such are of 
limited •use in the analysis of rural class formation. 
Identification of sociologically meaningful groups going 
beyond classification of populations into statistical categories 
utilizing arbitrary criteria, is an initial requisite in analyzing 
social relations. For a proper understanding of the rural social 
structure, structural and relational criteria need to be utilized 
in distinguishing between social groups. This task is particularly 
difficult in Asian societies such as Sri Lanka where agrarian 
transition has not polarized the rural population into neat cate-
gories of wage labourers and a class of landowners, and where 
the rural population is far more differentiated and complex than 
simply to be denoted by the blanket term ' peasantry ' . The 
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boundaries between the groups are blurred and they often 
overlap. For example, there are independent peasants who 
cultivate holdings owned by them, using their family labour and 
at the same time they work for others as wage labourers or 
engage in production as tenant cultivators. Thus the classifica-
tion of rural populations is a delicate task, particularly in the 
South Asian context (Mitter, 1977:21: Beteille, 1974:15-33). 
For the task of classification, one must fall back on 
analytical, not statistical categories. In situations where a per-
son enters into more than one relation of production, for instan-
ce, the difficulty of classification can be met, as discussed by 
Alavi, by determining the pitinci_pca. relation of production from 
which the person draws his livelihood. Accordingly: 
a peasant who owns a tiny patch of land, but depends for 
his livelihood r aLray on sharecropping for a landlord or on 
working as a labourer, is classed as a poor peasant; he is 
not classed as a middle peasant even though he owns some 
land. Again, a middle peasant who employs casual labour 
occasionally to cope with peak operations is classified as a 
middle peasant, for his livelihood does not depend primarily 
on the exploitation of the labour of the others (Alavi, 
1973:295). 
Power Structure at National Level 
At the other end of the hierarchy, in the analysis of 
the power structure at the national level, two models have been 
dominant, namely the class model and the elite model. The dis-
cussion first turns to the utilization of the concept of elite. The 
term 'elite' was used by classical theorists, Pareto and Mosca, to 
describe the group of individuals in society who actually wield 
supreme power. The governing elite is distinguished from the 
masses by their 'superior qualities'. In opposition to Marxist 
theory of classes, the classical elite theorists viewed the gover-
ning elite as an inescapable necessity of every human society. As 
Putnam (1976:4) summarized, they portrayed the governing minority 
of elite as 'a socially isolated, self-seeking leadership caste that 
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cleverly dominates the abject masses' . 1 
Little consensus exists among the social scientists about 
the definition of elite and the term is now commonly used, free 
from the shackles of the classical theories of elites, to refer to 
economically, politically and socially dominant groups in the 
society. Some elements of class theory have blended with, and 
been introduced to supplement, the analysis of elites. 
Despite its several drawbacks, the elite concept is 
recurrently applied to the study of the underdeveloped societies. 
This is particularly so by those social scientists favouring the 
modernization perspective from which to study political stratifi-
cation and socio-political structure in the third world. Apart from 
the alleged absence of classes in the Marxian sense in the third 
world, the divergences from the ruling class model are factors 
favouring the application of the idea of elite in these societies. 
The absence of classes in colonial societies correspon-
ding to the classical western European archetypes is only to be 
expected as capitalism in these societies took a different form to 
that it took in the west, largely as a result of colonial 
penetraton and integration of these societies into the world ca-
pitalist economy. However, this does not preclude the use of the 
concept of class as an analytical tool, and the class model may 
be supplemented but not necessarily be supplanted. 
1.The classical elite theories have been criticized for 
their failure to adequately explain the bases and sources of power 
of the elites, the cohesiveness of the elite, elite transformation 
and also for their failure to satisfactorily explain social change 
(see Bottomore 1964). Further, these theories do not suggest a 
way out of minority elite rule and the masses are viewed as 
passive spectators, and therefore are 'anti-masses'. According to 
Shivji (1976:25) successful revolutions in China and elsewhere, 
where masses have played an active role in the making of 
history, present evidence against this view of the non-elite as 
passive. 
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There is general agreement on patterns of the elite 
structure in ex-colonial societies. The following features are 
common to the elite model of most of the modernization and liberal 
theorists: Many of the ex-colonial Asian societies are ruled by a 
political elite which emerged during the colonial rule and entered 
into national politics through the independence movements. The 
elite is composed largely of professionals, top bureaucrats, 
intelligentsia and also businessmen. The third world elite is a 
cosmopolitan one and its life-style and values are western. The 
influence of the exposure to western education, values, material 
culture and liberal democratic ideologies is reported to have 
inspired them to cry out in their own societies. Thus they are 
designated 'modernizing' or 'Westernizing elites'. The implication 
is that the elite is equipped with the skills and outlook and 
experience derived from the modernized societies to take up the 
task of steering their own societies along the path of 
modernization. The major tasks facing the third world elites are 
economic development, national integration and the breaking down 
of feudal autocratic systems (Bottomore, 1964:89). 
This modernizationist view of the third world elites is 
not shared in this thesis. This conception is inadequate to 
understand political economy of peripheral capitalist societies 
because it does not place the dominant groups in ex-colonial 
societies in their proper socio-economic context - as part of a 
peripheral capitalist structure dominated by the centers of the 
capitalist world economy. Such groups must be viewd in relation 
to the specific socio-economic formation that evolved as a result 
of colonial penetration. Their class position and commitments, and 
the constraints within which they operate, are derived from this 
specific structure, and are influenced largely by the given 
society's position in the world capitalist economy at a given 
time. Among third world societies, variation in the pattern of 
class formation exists. These variants depend on the nature of 
pre-colonial social formation in a given peripheral society, the 
dominant 
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role and position of a given peripheral society in the modern 
world economy and the nature of specific responses by the social 
groups in these societies to the structural position. In some cases 
the local entrepreneurs join the metropolitan capitalists as junior 
partners and begin to play a comprador role. Bureaucratic and 
professional groups in this siutation play an ancillary role of 
organizing and managing the state apparatus. For instance Andre 
Gunder Frank argued 'that there is no national bourgeoisie in 
Latin America but only the local agents and accomplices of U.S. 
imperialism' (Barratt Brown, 1982:168). Yet in other places, such 
as in India, it is argued that a small national bourgeoisie 
emerged which, together with the radicalized sections of the 
educated elite, formed the Congress Party. 
The classical distinction of two upper classes - landed 
oligarchy and industrial bourgoisie - may not be present in some 
third world countries. Instead, as shown in the case of Brazil 
and Chile for example, 'family groups of industrialists and 
agriculturalists overlap considerably so that members of the same 
family have interests both in industry and in agriculture' 
(Roxborough, 1979:76), thus indicating the unitary nature of the 
interlocked and interwoven by kin relations. 
Further, as Alavi argues, in some peripheral 
societies (such as India) the indigenous bourgeoisie, the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie, and the landowning classes do not stand 
in 'irreconcilable contradiction vis-a-vis each other', rather they 
are 'located in the single structure of peripheral capitalism which 
admit their competing interests without a structural contradiction 
between them' (Alavi, 1982b :298). 
Although their roles are mutually exclusive rather than 
complementary, their common ground provides them with a basis 
of mutual class alliance. Whereas Baran (1982: 202) emphasised 
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the parallel nature of the interests of 'merchant capitalists', 
'industrial monopolists' and 'feudal landowners' leading to 
political and social coalitions, Wallerstein (1974) points out the 
opposition of interests of the capitalist landowners and the local 
commercial bourgeoisie in the peripheral countries, leading to a 
reduction in the strength of the state machinery. 
The national regimes in the peripheral capitalist society 
may forge a variety of class alliances -_ the nature of such 
alliances being determined by a specific historical, cultural and 
economic situation in a given peripheral country. They may take 
the form of a populist alliance of landed upper class, national 
bourgeoisie, and labouring population. On the other hand, the 
national bourgoisie may join with the peasantry, the proletariat 
and intellectuals against landed oligarchy. Petras (1978) classi-
fies class alliance or strategies open to post-independence 
national regimes in the peripheral societies. The first is called 
the 'neo-colonial strategy' under which the national regime joins 
the imperial firms to extract economic surplus from the labouring 
population. Where a relatively strong national capitalist stratum 
is present a second strategy may be followed. Called the 
'national bourgois strategy', it limits the share going to the 
imperial firms while extracting surplus from the labouring 
population and retaining it in the national capitalists' hands. 
The third, the 'national popular strategy', is characterised by 
its extension of areas of national control through nationalization 
and redistribution of income within the national class structure. 
In this thesis the terms politico-administrative elite (or 
politico-bureaucratic elite), indigenous bourgeoisie, and the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie are used to identify the dominant groups 
at the national level in the Sri Lankan peripheral capitalist 
formation. 
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The politico-administrative elite is the group which led 
the independence movement (as will be shown in Chapter Six) and 
eventually came to control the state apparatus. The basis of their 
power is their possession of the instruments of state power and 
they can thus be seen as the 'ruling clique'. This category is 
drawn from the upper ranks of the political parties, political 
heads of government ministries, top levels of civil service, 
bureaucracy, judiciary, military and police, public corporations 
and other state apparatuses. Control and access to political 
power are viewed as the initial deter minants and pri mary 
attributes of this group to which wealth was subsequently added. 
As the post-independence state became increasingly a source of 
economic power, in addition to an instrument of political control, 
the economic interests of this group became closely linked with 
that of their political power. This process has led some third 
world writers (Shivji, 1976; Roxborough, 1979) to refer to this 
category as a 'state bourgeoisie'. For example in Tanzania as 
the state and state institutions became the dominant factor in the 
economy following the Arusha Declaration, and the dominant group 
is said to have changed from a politico-administrative elite to a 
state bourgeoisie. According to Shivji (1976:85) 'political power 
and control over property had now come to rest in the same 
class'. 
Two fractions or groups within the indigenous bourgeoi-
sie in Sri Lanka can be distinguished. They are the 'national' 
fraction and the 'comprador' fraction. Indigenous bourgeoisie 
refers to the group who owns and controls big commercial, and 
industrial enterprises. The comprador fraction is tied to the 
import-export business and has strong links with metropolitan 
firms. Its members are commonly part-owners, 	 managers and 
executives of foreign companies. This fraction is formed in res-
ponse to the opportunities provided by foreign industry and 
commerce and hence plays a role ancillary to the metropolitan 
capital. 
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The national fraction of the indigenous bourgeoisie, on 
the other hand, has no direct ties with the metropolitan capital 
and plays a 'nationalistic' role and commonly takes an 
anti-imperialist economic and political stance. 
The metropolitan bourgeoisie retains its influence in the 
peripheral capitalist society by their direct presence through 
multinational corporations and joint ventures. 
The politico-administrative elite, the indigenous bour-
geoisie (including the national and comprador fractions) and the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie make up the dominant group coalition in 
the peripheral capitalist society and their alliances, internal 
struggles and conflicts with other social classes in the society 
determine the course of national development. 
Organization of the Thesis 
Chapter One outlines the problem, reviews previous 
literature on Sri Lanka and describes the characteristics of Sri 
Lanka's course of development which are to be explained. The 
major theoretical perspectives used in the analysis of 'develop-
ment' and 'underdevelopment' are also examined. The theoretical 
stance adopted in the thesis is stated and conceptual issues in 
the analysis of the internal structures of the peripheral 
capitalist societies are clarified. Major focus is on the issues 
involved in characterizing peripheral capitalist social formations, 
analyzing rural class formation and the power structures at the 
national level. In Chapter Two the broader theoretical framework 
adopted is spelt out more fully emphasizing mainly on the 
external factors that are shaping core-periphery relations. 
Chapter Three describes the main features of the pre-co-
lonial social and economic organization of Sri Lanka. Beginning 
with a review of the debate over the pre-capitalist formations in 
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Asia, the focus then shifts to a discussion of the features of the 
ancient Dry Zone civilization in Sri Lanka and then to Kandyan 
social organization as that social formation which came into 
contact with colonial capitalism. The process of socio-economic 
transformation under colonialism is analyzed in Chapter Four. The 
advent of plantations and the peripheralization of the econmy, 
the impact of the colonial state policies, and changes to the 
labour process and to the socio-economic hierarchy are discussed 
as processes integral to the emergence of a 'peripheral 
capitalist' society. 
Chapter Five is devoted to an analysis of rural class 
structure and the livelihood strategies of rural social groups. 
Chapter Six focusses on the social and economic power structure 
at the national level. The• composition of the dominant groups and 
the pattern of their political alliances are topics dealt with in 
this chapter. Chapter Seven critically examines the economic and 
political strategies of the post-independence national regimes. 
These strategies are viewed in relation to the class composition 
and alliances of the various regimes which have held power since 
independence. This chapter evaluates some selected policy 
programmes of the post-independence period. 
In the concluding chapter the argument is briefly 
reiterated, and the utility of the chosen perspective in explaining 
the pattern of development in Sri Lanka in particular and in 
colonized societies in general, is highlighted. Implications for 
future strategies and programmes intended to alter the pattern of 
uneven development and alleviate major social inequalities are 
also discussed. 
CHAPTER 2 
CORE PERIPHERY RELATIONS AND PATTERNS OF DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter deals with the process of development of 
world capitalism. It examines the origin of European-centered 
world capitalism, and the transformation of third world societies 
under the impact of the penetration of capitalism in general and 
the transformation of Sri Lankan society in particular. 
The Development of World Capitalism and Transformation of 
Third World Societies 
The development of a European-centered world economy 
from around the sixteenth century is a major force in modern 
societal development. It has since grown 'in its geographical 
scope, in its productive capacity, in its integration as a whole 
and its penetration and organization of social relations' (Hopkins 
and Wallerstein, 1982a:42). 
The origins of this world economy date back to the 
socio-economic transformation of Europe during the period from the 
eleventh to the sixteenth century. The crisis of feudalism coupled 
with technological advances in Europe during this time, are key 
variables explaining the massive transformation. Symptoms of the 
end of feudalism were many. The feudal system began to 
disintegrate under pressure from falling real income and 
internecine warfare in the ruling strata, due to rising real 
wages, demographic disasters, and a rebellious peasantry. Eco-
nomic advantage began to accrue to those who adopted alternative 
modes of surplus appropriation, notably those based on market 
mechanisms. Simultaneously Europe experienced technological 
advances, especially in navigation and shipping, metallurgy and 
the manufacture of weapons, which conferred . an advantage in 
mercantilist activities overseas and gave an edge in industrial 
production at home. 'The changes in socio-political structure 
provided an appropriate framework for technical progress and 
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were themselves influenced by the latter' (S.B.D. De Silva, 
1982:19). Eventually the feudal mode of production became over-
shadowed by the capitalist mode. 
The adoption of alternative modes of surplus appropria-
tion involved geographic expansion, regional economic specializa-
tion and the rise of the absolutist state; in short, the creation 
of a capitalist world economy (Wallerstein, 1976:351). Primitive 
accumulation of wealth through mercantilist activities overseas 
fuelled the process of industrial revolution in England such that 
by the eighteenth century, England overtook the Netherlands and 
France in the competition for commercial and industrial suprema-
cy. By the nineteenth century European-centered capitalism had 
expanded to envelop the whole globe. 
Capitalist development is subject to its inherent cyclical 
crises. The basis of these crises in capitalist accumulation are 
the periodic discrepancies between production and consumption. 
These are described generally as crises of over-production and 
under-consumption. These crises make imperative the geographic 
expansion into new markets, raw material supplying areas and 
areas for capital investment. 
Commodification and expansion are two of the major ways 
of resolving the crises of capitalism. 'Commodification' means: 
the transfer of land, labor and natural resources from 
phenomena utilized and distributed in terms of social con-
ventions of limited flexibility into commodities available for 
'purchase' on a 'market' (Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982a:- 
56). 
'By expansion' is meant:, 'the peripheralization of external areas 
through their incorporation into the world economy'. However, 
capitalism today has expanded its boundaries to encompass the 
whole globe and there is hardly any room left for further• geo-
graphical expansion. 
The only, real solution to the crisis of supply outstrip-
ping demand is to expand demand by redistributing the surplus. 
But this leads to a contradiction: 'Since the object of the econo- 
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mic exercise is ceaseless accumulation, redistribution of the 
surplus involves a diminution in global accumulation because it 
diminishes profits' (Wallerstein, 1982:18). Proletarianization invol-
ves an effective real increase in workers' income but it eats into 
the capitalists' profits. 
The dynamics of the contradictions of the capitalist 
world economy are that the crises of over-production and under-
consumption call into play recuperative mechanisms such as 
commodification, proletarianization and expansion which in the 
long run are asymptotic and make the system unfunctional 
(Wallerstein, 1978:233). 
In the process of expansion, hitherto external areas are 
incorporated into the capitalist world economy and a global 
core-periphery division of labour is established. The global di-
vision of labour, and the formation of polities or nation states, 
are two of the fundamental yet contradictory features of the world 
economy. The division of labour both divides and at the same 
time integrates the world economy. The integration of core and 
peripheral economies may be effected, among other means, 
by colonial trade monopolies, by transactions internal to 
contemporary multinational corporations, by a world scale 
market mediated through one or more commodity-exchanges, 
'by bi- or multilateral barter-like arrangements among states 
(Hopkins, 1982a:20). 
In the process of incorporation of these areas, colonial 
capitalism transformed pre-colonial socio-economic structures into 
peripheral capitalist social formations. Peripheral capitalist 
social formations have properties distinct from those of metropoli-
tan capitalism (Alavi, 1982a). While production relations assume 
a capitalist character under the peripheral capitalism, the 
structural specificity of peripheral capitalism lies in the nature 
of the generalized commodity production and the extended repro-
duction of capital. 
The circuit of commodity production in peripheral capitalist 
societies is not internally complete as in the case of metro-
politan capitalism. For them that circuit is completed only 
by virtue of their links with the metropolitan economy, by 
production for exports, and as markets 'for colonial imports. 
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... In the case of peripheral capitalist societies, insofar as 
the surplus value generated in them is appropriated by 
metropolitan capitalism, this leads to a growth of productive 
powers not in the peripheral capitalist society but in the 
metropolis (Alavi, 1982a:181). 
Under the division of labour of the world economy, 
various geographical areas specialize in different productive 
tasks which carry differential economic rewards. The advanced 
industrial economies occupy core positions while the third world, 
or newly incorporated areas, have been assigned the role of the 
periphery. The core has always specialized in 'comparatively 
highly mechanized, high profit, high wage, highly skilled labor 
activities against the comparative opposites' of the periphery 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982a:59). Typically, the periphery 
specializes in the production of primary agricultural and mining 
commodities in exchange for the manufactures of the core. 
This division of labour creates and reproduces mecha-
nisms of unequal exchange and consequently, uneven development 
in the world economy, as reflected in the growing productive 
capacity of the core and 'underdevelopment' in the periphery. 
The mechanisms of unequal exchange, in the form of relative 
differentials in elasticities of demand for primary agricultural 
exports from the periphery and manufactured exports from the 
core, is reproduced throughout the development of the world 
capitalist economy. The fact of unequal exchange continually 
reproduces core-periphery division of labour and this division is 
further maintained by a structure of power-dependence relations 
in which, as Chase-Dunn (1978:163) notes, 'the transfer of 
surplus product from periphery to the core, the class alliance, 
infrastructure and political regimes created by this division of 
labour act to reproduce it'. 
Paralleling the creation of inequalities in the exchange 
relations in the world market is the formation of class structures 
and alliances in the periphery, which are conducive to the repro-
duction of peripheral capitalist patterns of development. The 
process of class formation and types of class alliances that 
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incorporation brings about in the peripheral societies are central 
to the understanding of the pattern of development. 
The internal variations in class development are largely a 
product of the interface of the original organization of 
production and the particular moment of imperial domination 
(Petras, 1978:35). 
The significance of the incorporation of the periphery in 
the world capitalist system lies in 'the impact it had on the 
internal class structures of these countries ... ' ( S. B.D . De Silva, 
1982:11 ) . In the periphery there emerged a comprador or 
collaborative groups, merchant capitalists and politico-adimi-
nistrative elites dominating and steering the state. Present in 
peripheral societies, such as Sri Lanka, are three major dominant 
strata : indigenous bourgeoisie ( including ' national ' and 
'comprador ' fractions, the administrative-bureaucratic elite and, 
the metropolitan capitalists. The 'confrontation and compromise' 
within a 'triple alliance' of these strata are important 
determinants of the peripheral capitalist pattern of development 
(Shanin , 1982:317). 
The history of the development of the world economy has 
passed through mercantilist and industrial-capitalist phases .
1 
The recession of 1650-1730 resulted in vigorous mercantilist 
activities by leading European powers. These• powers accumulated 
wealth by means of trading activity in the periphery and this 
wealth was instrumental in fuelling the process of industrial 
development in Europe. Following the industrial revolution in the 
mid-eighteenth century, European-centered world capitalism enter-
ed a new phase where peripheral areas began progressively to be 
1 .Amin (1982:168) identifies three main stages of the 
history of the development of capitalism: 'mercantilism (16th and 
17th centuries ) , competitive capitalism ( 19th century ) , and 
imperialism or industrial oligopoly (from 1880) . In all these 
stages, ' A ' phases of systemic growth and ' B ' phases of crisis or 
transition from one A phase to another can be distinguished. 
Accordingly, during the imperial phase for instance, there was 
'an A phase (1880-1914) characterized by an equilibrium among 
several intensely competing cores some of which are aiming at a 
hegemonic position ; a B phase (1814-1945) characterized by con-
flict between the cores; and an A phase (1945-1970) characterized 
by a new hegemony, that of the United States ' . 
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incorporated as satellites, specializing in peripheral types of 
economic activity. In the period after World War One, a new 
phase is apparent in the world economy, generally known as the 
neo-colonial phase. The term neo-colonialism denotes 'the continu-
ing ability of core states to interfere politically in the economic 
activities of the peripheral states with the intention of altering 
allocation in the world market' ( Hopkins and Wallerstein , 
1982a : 51). This was a phase of consolidation for the core powers. 
De-colonization movements in the periphery and the internationa-
lization of capital are two processes apparent in this phase. As 
Wallerstein explained, the internationalization of capital is a 
'new political demand by certain sections of the capitalist class 
to ensure maximization of profits in the world economy' 
( Wallerstein , 1974:401 ) . The classes which pressured their states 
to impose restrictions now find these restrictions constraining. 
Also the shift of hegemonic position of the world economy from the 
United Kingdom to the United States of America has taken place in 
this phase. 
Incorporation of an external area into the world economy 
Involves a break in that area's history, the dislocation of social 
processes and the generation of profound structural changes. The 
changes brought about in the area's processes of production and 
In the processes of governance and rule are pivotal. 
In the sphere of production, the role of specialization in 
the peripheral type of economic activity is assigned to the newly 
incorporated area. Typically the roles assigned involve speciali-
zation in primary agricultural and mining products. Further, the 
development of activities other than those assigned is deliberately 
blocked. The economic roles assigned to the periphery often 
involve the introduction of processes of production which are 
partly or totally new to the incorporated area. The introduction 
of exotic crops under exotic systems of production, such as the 
plantation system, is a ca se in point and common to many 
peripheral societies. Incorporation also can involve a redirection 
of the flow of products already produced in that region. 
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As a consequence of the core-periphery division of 
labour, a mechanism of differential flow of economic surplus is 
set in motion. The concept of 'unequal exchange' denotes this 
feature. As Prebisch (1950) showed, unequal exchange, resulting 
in deteriorating terms of trade of peripheral exports, is a struc-
tural feature of the pattern of export specialization established 
by the core-periphery division of labour. The inclusion of regions 
as peripheries also leads to lop-sided economic structures in 
these areas as opposed to auto-centric or integrated economic 
development in the core areas. The absence of self-sustaining 
economic development is a feature of this peripheral pattern of 
• development. Marked differences in the productive capacities of 
the core and the periphery can be seen. In the course of the 
development of the world economy a competitive advantage in 
production and exchange is concentrated in the core countries. 
This is partly a result of the structure of the core-periphery 
division of labour. As a result, a growing productive capacity in 
the core economies and 'underdevelopment' in the peripheries can 
be observed. 
Also characteristic of the pattern of development in the 
periphery is the lower technical composition of capital in the 
peripheral mode of production. Technical improvements in the 
tools and in the organization of production are minimal. As a 
result the periphery is at a competitive economic disadvantage. 
The reconstitution of the processes of production in the 
peripheralized areas also involved changes in the labour process. 
It entailed the transformation of the areas population into 
labour-in-relation to capital...; the forceful conversion of 
workers into labour in this sense, and so an increasing and 
increasingly extensive coercion of labour; and a more or less 
rapid, more or less extensive decline in the material well 
being of the population in the area from what it had been 
(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982b:129). 
The introduction of new forms of labour and an intensifaction of 
existing forms of labour is common. Following the incorporation of 
external areas into the world economy subsistence households in 
the periphery are transformed from 'subsistence' into 'part-life- 
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time proletarian households" They are moved but only under 
duress. 
Everywhere, expropriation of production of subsistence..., 
physical coercion, [and] compulsory production... have been 
the processes of expansion and of the movement of workers 
from external areas into the world-economy. Consequently, 
the movement towards part-life-time proletarian household 
status has entailed, overall, a broadly lower level of living•
(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1982a: 69) 
Further, the duress of the movement of workers often 
leads to emergence of exploitative forms of production relation-
ships. The loss of peasant land and compulsory production fuels 
the emergence of exploitative forms of production relationships. 
The bases of extraction of surplus from the direct producers 
undergo changes and consequently production relations are 
transformed into capitalist ones. 
The life-time proletarians receive relatively higher 
wages because the full cost of reproducing their labour is borne 
by the employer and also because 'full proletarianization carries 
in itself political conditions conducive to the growth of workers' 
organizations, with their upward pressure on wage levels' 
1. The world systems theorists classify 'workers' house-
holds, in terms of their source of life-time income, into three 
categories: subsistence-redoubt households (those who receive 
their life-time income from production unrelated to capitalist 
world economy's division of labour) ; part-life-time proletarian 
households (those who receive part of their life-time income from 
employers in return for work (wages) and a part of their income 
from direct production either by themselves or by kin or from gift 
income); and life-time proletarian households (those who receive 
their entire life-time income from employers in return for their 
work - wages). The life-time proletarian household receives a 
higher wage than that of the part-life-time proletarian household. 
In the former' s case, the full cost of production is borne by the 
employer and the entire amount of wage is paid over a life-time 
by the employer, while in the latter' s case the full cost of 
production is not borne by the employer and a part of the 
life-time income is generated from direct production by that 
household. For instance, in the case of epart-life-time proletarian 
households, ... if the household itself can sustain itself for a 
part of a life-time, it is possible for the employer to pay for 
that portion of the life-time in which this household works for 
the employer, less the proportionate amount of a life-time 
minimum wage: ( Wallerstein :1978:227). 
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(Hopkins and Wallerstein, 1928a:69). In contrast, the wage levels 
for the part-life-time proletarians are relatively lower because 
they can be given wages below the physiological minimum wage 
as the full cost of reproducing the labour is not borne by the 
employer. Thus the same kind and amount of labour in the peri-
phery attracts a lower wage than it would if it occurred in the 
core. ' This is another dimension of unequal exchange between 
the core and the periphery. Reference has been made to 
arguments which attempt to explain this unequal exchange in 
terms of the persistence of features of non-capitalist or feudal 
modes of production in the periphery, thereby maintaining the low 
wage levels to the advantage of the core economies which 
exchange with the peripheries. 
Besides the comparatively lower levels of living stand-
ards of the periphery's working population, the low wage base 
hinders effective development of indigenous industries because the 
domestic market is unable to accomodate such development. 
However, the core economies find the low wage base in the peri-
phery an attractive reason for the re-location of production and 
for the continuation of economic exchange with the periphery. 
Adjustments to the periodic crises of capitalist accumu-
lation often take the form of a re-location of the production sites 
to areas where the cost of production is lower and this means 
re-location to the periphery. This is generally known as 'interna 
tionalization of production' and has taken place increasingly in 
the latest phase of the capitalist development under the aegis of 
multinational corporations. The industrial growth recently experi-
enced by certain third world countries is corollary to this fact. 
With the centralization of capital, the multinational corporations 
have re-located their production sites to the periphery where the 
cost of production is significantly lower largely due to the low 
level of wages. Parallelling the transfer of sites of production is 
the transfer of 'formerly leading but now second level industries 
1. Frank (1981:157-187) presents evidence from several 
countries to show the wage differentials between the core and the 
peripheries and consequent 'super-exploitation' of labour in the 
third world. 
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to semi-peripheries' 	 (Wallerstein , 1982:19 ) . This re-location 
results in the enlargement of intermediary strata employees such 
as middle level technicians and professionals, increases in their 
income, and also the transformation of a section of the work 
force to life-ti me proletarians or at least to part-life-ti me 
proletarians. 
With regard to changes in the processes of governance 
and rule, the incorporation of external areas involves the forma-
tion of more or less rationalized and centralized structures in the 
new area. The newly formed state apparatus 
is or becomes strong enough in relation to local ( internal ) 
forces to assure flows of goods, people and value in money 
forms across the borders of its geo-political jurisdiction, but 
( it ) is or beco mes weak enough in relation to other 
jurisdictions (mainly core ) to be incapable of blocking such 
flows [ when and if necessary] (Hopkins and Wallerstein , 
1982b :132 ) . 
This formation of weak states contributes to the reproduction of 
the core-periphery division of labour and to unequal exchange. 
Another dimension of' the state formation in the periphery is the 
emergence of an 'overdeveloped state ' :1 
overdeveloped, that is with respect to its imported charac-
teristics, [ e. g. administration, legal structure] as against 
the relative underdevelop ment of its indigenous class 
structure (Shanin , 1982:315 ) . 
A key factor contributing to the formation of a strong 
state is the convergence of interests of the dominant groups to 
form a strong ruling class and its willingness to pursue interna-
tional political and economic objectives. These conditions were 
realized in the process of the core states ( cf. Rubinson, 1978 and 
Barrington Moore, 1967 ) . However, in the periphery, specialization 
in the peripheral type of economic activity created a liaison 
elite, whose economic and political interests were closely tied and 
dependent on those of the core capitalists. The roles of the 
indigenous and metropolitan bourgeoisie and the land-owning 
classes in the periphery are 'mutually exclusive rather than 
(1974 ) . 1. For details on this point, see Alavi (1972 ) and Saul 
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complementary... We cannot therefore think of them, together, as 
constituting a single (ruling) class' (Alavi, 1982a:298). 
Following the subjugation of the peripheral nation state, 
subsequent relations between the imperial power and the colony, 
in diplomacy or in trade, are characterized by persistent 
domination and submission. In the periphery, group interests 
were often fragmented under the colonial policy of divide and 
rule. All these factors weaken the peripheral state. Conversely, 
the strength of the state machinery in the core is a function of 
the weakness of the states in the periphery (Wallerstein, 1974: 
403). Hence intervention occurs via diplomacy, subversion and 
war. 
Once differentials emerge in the strength of states, 
system of unequal exchange favouring the stronger states is 
inevitable. It should be noted that the state is an instrument 
used by those classes controlling it to interfere and manipulate 
the world market to ensure the maximization of profits. Through-
out the history of the development of the world economy, core 
states have used economic and extra-economic power to interfere 
with the world market. The establishment of the core-periphery 
division of labour was enforced by means of the power available 
to the core states. Unequal exchange, which is an integral 
feature of the global specialization structure therefore is enforced 
by the strong states on the weak states. 
If we use the term 'imperialism' to refer to any use of 
political power by a strong state (usually a core state) 
against a weaker state (usually a peripheral or semi-peri-
pheral state) intended to alter allocation in the world market 
either directly or indirectly, then it is easy to maintain that 
this is a constant of the inter-state system as it has 
operated within the capitalist world economy (Hopkins and 
Wallerstein, 1982a:52). 
The peculiar class alliances forged between the core and 
the periphery are important factors shaping the resistance or 
collaboration of a given peripheral nation. Changes in the class 
configuration of the traditional social order in the periphery, as 
a result of incorporation, warrant special emphasis, due in 
particular to the emergence of a liaison strata whose economic 
interests are identified with the core capitalists. As Petras 
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• has observed, 
the pivotal unit which facilitates core subordination of 
peripheral society is the existence within the latter of 
collaborator classes whose function is to organize the state 
and economy in accordance with the core definitions of the 
international division of labour (Petras, 1978:36). 
The significance of this for the course of development in 
the periphery is that the conflicts between comprador and the 
national fractions of the indigenous bourgeoisie may result in 
frag mentation of the ruling group and consequently to a 
weakening of the state machinery and a lessening of its ability 
to pursue aggressive economic objectives with regard to its 
location in the world market. In times when comprador fraction 
controls or , dominates 	 the peripheral state core periphery 
relations are 	 characterized by collaboration. A convergence of 
interests among the dominant fraction may lead to resistance 
movements and •aggressive economic and political strategies. 
However, the room for manoeuvre for the peripheral state is 
limited and restricted by the economic and extra-economic 
influence of the core economies and their agents (Seers, 1981). As 
Wallerstein observed, two of the major mechanisms that 
have enabled the world system, to retain political stability, 
in terms of systemic survival itself are ... concentration of 
military strength in the hands of the dominant forces and 
the pervasiveness of an ideological commitment to the system 
as a whole (Wallerstein, 1974:403). 
The incorporation of external areas into the capitalist 
.world economy is followed by a diffusion of values and institu-
tions from the core and the creation of an infrastructure to suit 
the core-periphery division of labour. Included in this array are 
administrative, legal, political, religious and educational systems. 
The erection of these institutions furthered the integration of the 
area into the world economy, but also had a profound impact on 
the course of development which occurred in the peripheral state. 
National development strategies of the post-independence 
political regimes of the nation states in the periphery have 
ranged from state interventionist to liberal free enterprise stra-
tegies. Petras (1978:43) classifies them into three types: intensi-
fication of surplus extraction from the labour force in collabora-
tion with imperial firms and regimes (neo-colonial strategy); 
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extracting the surplus from the work force by the national 
regime and limiting the share going to imperial capital (national 
developmentalism without redistribution); and extending the areas 
of national control through nationalization, in alliance with the 
labouring population, re-investing the surplus of the national 
economy or promoting redistribution of income within the national 
class structure ( 'national popular strategy' ). 
Peripheral political regimes, depending on the class 
composition of their states, launch resistance to the core hege-
mony. De-colonization movements, cartels such as OPEC and 
demands for equality and justice in international trade as 
reflected in the movement for the 'new international economic 
order' (NIE0) are instances of such action. Within the nation 
state they may take the form of nationalism and class struggles. 
Colonial Capitalism and the Sri Lankan Pattern of Development 
It is the contention of this thesis that Sri Lanka is 
characterized by a peripheral capitalist socio-economic structure 
established during the colonial/ period and that the emergence of 
this structure is the key to an understanding of the present 
course and pattern of development in Sri Lanka. 
The process of incorporation of the island into the 
capitalist world economy, beginning with the arrival of the 
Portuguese, was completed by the British and by the dawn of the 
present century, Sri Lanka was well integrated into the capitalist 
world economy as a peripheral society. The pattern of develop-
ment in Sri Lanka since then is peripheral capitalist, resulting 
in uneven and dependent development, poverty and increasing 
social and economic inequality. The specificity of the ensuing 
social formation rests on its 'dependent' links with the 
metropolitan economies. This fact gives rise to the perpetuation of 
a 'dependent' as opposed to an 'autonomous' pattern of deve-
lopment. 
The making of Sri Lanka as a peripheral society meant 
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a profound transformation of the pre-colonial -social formation. 
The pre-colonial social formation, described in chapter three, 
came into contact with the colonial capitalism and underwent 
massive changes. 
Firstly, the colonial transformation entailed a. restructu-
ring of the physical as well as social organization of production. 
It meant the restructuring of the traditional economy to institute 
the specialization in 'peripheral' types of economic activity as 
part of the international division of labour imposed by the core 
economies. The process of establishing a new form of production, 
the plantation system, is detailed in chapter four. The 
establishment of the export-oriented plantation system as the 
dominant economic activity, coupled with the neglect of other 
economic sectors, resulted in barriers to diversification, and in 
the extraversion of the economy. 
Secondly, the restructuring of the economy entailed the 
transformation of production relations from pre-colonial to capita-
list. The increasing penetration of capitalism intensified the 
process of commodification of the means of production, especially 
land and labour. Following the breakdown of the traditional 
economy and the imposition of the new economic structures, the 
direct producers were transformed into wage labour and wage 
labour equivalents. In this process the colonial state policies 
played a major role, as also shown in chapter four. 
Thirdly it entailed the erection of a bourgeois state and 
state apparatus including legal institutions, administrative 
structures and mechanisms of government capable of maintaining 
and controlling national social and economic organization to the 
benefit of the core-periphery relationship. These structures are 
integral to, and compliment, peripheral capitalism. 
Fourthly, parallelling these developments was the trans-
formation of the class structure. The rural population became 
more differentiated. Intensified commodity production in rural 
areas saw the emergence and growth of categories such as petty 
traders, usurers, and capitalist landowners to form dominant 
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groups. The process of rural class formation is spelt out more 
fully in chapter five where the process of subsumption of rural 
producers under capital and the consequent marginalization of 
sections of the contemporary peasant population is illustrated. 
At the top of the socio-economic hierarchy, the impact of 
colonization on the development of an indigenous bourgeoisie and 
a politico-administrative elite is no less pervasive. As shown in 
Chapter Six the indigenous elite succeeded the colonial rulers at 
the time of independence and consolidated their power and 
position. Besides the liaison or comprador fraction of the 
indigenous bourgeoisie a 'national' fraction with no direct links 
with metropolitan capital has grown since independence. This 
section, having 'national' bourgeoisie interests and obejctives, 
has entered into popular alliances from time to time with various 
strata to pursue popular national development strategies. The 
power-structure at national• level is analyzed more fully in 
Chapter Six. 
Finally, these alliances - the confrontation and compro-
mise between the 'national' and 'comprador' fractions of the 
indigenous bourgeoisie, politico-administrative elite and the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie - bring about different strategies of 
capital accumulation or 'development'. These alliances, it is 
argued, are in turn influenced by external forces. Changing 
trends in the world economy, and reactions and ajustments by 
metropolitan economies to their periodic crises, have witnessed 
shifts in alliances between the indigenous and metropolitan bour-
geoisie, with consequent shifts in 'development' strategies and in 
the international division of labour. These processes are spelt out 
in detail in Chapter Seven where the change in Sri Lanka from 
an import-substituting to export-oriented industrialization strategy 
is analyzed. By means of these 'development' strategies and 
associated policy programmes, the persistence of poverty, uneven 
patterns of development and the failure of reform measures can be 
adequately explained. 
CHAPTER 3 
PRE-COLONIAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 
The major features of pre-colonial socio-economic forma-
tion in Sri Lanka are described in this chapter to provide a 
background for an analysis of the societal changes which followed 
colonial penetration. The chapter begins with a brief note on the 
debate about the nature of pre-capitalist Asian social formation. 
It discusses features of Sri Lankan society during the Dry Zone 
civilization and during the Kandyan period in detail. 
Pre-capitalist Social Formations in Asia 
The exact nature of pre-capitalist social formations in 
Asia is a topic of much controversy. ' One view widely held by 
nineteenth century writers was that there is no private property 
in the Orient. Of recent times this view has come to be associated 
with the writing of Karl Marx on the Asiatic mode of production. 
Among Marxists, this viewpoint has not always been accepted. 
Nonetheless, the view has been influential. Not the least among 
those influenced by Marx's writing on the Asiatic mode of 
production was Karl Wittfogel. Wittfogel held that social formation 
in pre-capitalist Asia took a distinctive form whereby hydraulic 
agriculture gave rise to what he called 'oriental despotism'. This 
social formation was characterized by a despot who ruled by 
means of an agro-managerial bureaucracy and whose power was 
based on the control, construction and maintenance of a large 
scale system of irrigation. The debate surrounds the questions 
whether the pre-capitalist Asia was feudal or a formation distinct 
from feudalism, as Marx and Wittfogel believed. 
Influenced by the works of pre-nineteenth century 
writers such as Bernier, Marx formulated the concept of the 
1. Among the important contributions to this debate are 
Chandra (1981), Gunawardana (1976), Hindess and Hirst (1975) 
and Lichtheim (1973). 
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Asiatic mode of production to capture the essential elements of 
pre-capitalist Asian society. According to this viewpoint, the major 
elements of Asian society distinguishing it from other societies 
were: 
a despotic hypertrophied state based on artificial irrigation; 
absence of private property in land and presence of commun-
al and state property in land; existence of self-sufficient, 
isolated village communities; virtual absence of internal 
commerce, independent merchant capital and exchange, and 
stagnant, stationary and changeless character (Chandra, 
1981:36). 
Writing on India, Marx asserted that British colonial 
rule fulfilled both positive and negative roles at one and the 
same time. On the one hand, it undermined the traditional social 
and economic structure, while on the other he considered it would 
create possibilities for the establishment of the progressive capi-
talist mode of production by breaking the 'stasis' of traditional 
social formation. This type of view gives support to the ' deve-
lopmentalist ' belief that 'underdevelopment' is an original or 
primordial state rather than a process. 
There are several problems with Marx' s conception of the 
Asiatic mode of production. Typically, objections fall into either 
of two categories, - one historical, the other theoretical. 
Alavi (1980), Chandra (1981) and Gunawardana (1976) 
have pointed to historical evidence which does not correspond to 
Marx' s conception of ancient Asiatic society. Alavi (1980:391) 
identified five 'properties' of feudalism: unfree labour; extra-
economic coercion in the extraction of• surplus; fusion of economic 
power at the point of production; self-sufficient (subsistence) 
economy of the village (or the manor) and simple reproduction. 
He presents evidence from the North Indian society to show the 
correspondence between that society and the above elements of the 
Marxist concept of the feudal mode of production. He not only 
argues that North Indian society was 'structurally feudal' but 
suggests that perhaps there were tendencies (though in their 
infancy ) towards the transition to a capitalist mode of produc- 
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tion. Chandra (1981 ) also presents evidence to prove that 'Marx ' s 
basic notions regarding Indian society were essentially incor-
rect ' . He points to historical evidence from Indian society, for 
instance, to show the emergence of private property in land and 
to show the absence of irrigation-based despotism. In addition to 
presenting historical data both from India and Sri Lanka, to 
confront Marx's conceptions, Gunawardana (1976 ) point s to the in-
sufficiency of Marx's knowledge of Asia, his reliance on faulty 
sources of information, and the incompleteness of his analysis of 
Asian society. 
This evidence may be utilized to support the view that 
'underdevelopment' in Asia was not an original state but a result 
of disruption and interference by the colonial rulers in the 
process of societal evolution. , 
For Hindess and Hirst (1975:180) the question of the 
existence or non-existence of the Asiatic Mode of production is a 
'strictly theoretical question', hence it cannot be settled 'by 
reference to concrete social formation'. The concept of the Asiatic 
mode of production can be constructed only if it fits into Marx 's 
general theory of modes of production. The mode of appropriation 
of surplus-product, according to them, is an index of the exis-
tence or non-existence of a mode of production. As Marx believed, 
the absence, in Asia, of private property in land and of 'any 
ruling class which is not subsumed within the state', meant the 
state extracted the surplus-produce. The state stood over direct 
producers as their 'landlord and simultaneously as sovereign ' . 
'The state extracts the surplus-produce in the form of taxes 
which simultaneously are payments for the right of possession and 
use of land, that is, rents' (Hindess and Hirst, 1975:192). Thus 
in this case the tax and rent coincides. This mode of extraction 
Hindess and Hirst called 'the tax/rent couple' and they sought a 
corresponding mode of production. They concluded: 'Elements of 
social relations that are deducible from the tax/rent couple do 
not correspond to features of Asiatic mode of production' Hindess 
and Hirst (1975:200) . There is no Asiatic mode of production 
because no mode of production can be formed corresponding to 
tax/rent couple. 
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Finally, Marx's assertion that colonialism would break 
the stasis of traditional social formation and create the condi-
tions which would result in capitalist development, basically 
similar to that which occurred in the West, appear not to have 
been borne out. It is clear that European colonial rule has not 
transformed India or Sri Lanka into capitalist mode of production 
similar to the European archetype. 
Wittfogel ' s (1957 ) concept of 'oriental despotism' is a 
second attempt to capture the essential character of pre-capitalist 
Asiatic social formation. According to him, in arid zones where 
permanent agriculture is possible only with artificial irrigation, 
a pre-modern, distinctive form of state emerged. Based largely on 
evidence generated from China, Wittfogel argues that in order to 
construct, maintain and manage elaborate irrigation structures, 
there evolved an a gro-managerial bureaucracy supporting despots 
with total concentration of power. This interlocking set of 
institutions he named 'oriental despotism ' . 
The accuracy of Wittfogel ' characterization has been 
questioned, among others, by Gunawardana (1971 ) , Hindess and 
Hirst (1975 ) and Leach (1959) . Criticism of his work has largely 
been on empirical grounds. His formulations, based largely on 
his knowledge of China, overlook the case of Dry Zone 
civilization in Sri Lanka. ' This civilization was among the 
most important of the 'hydraulic civilizations' in Asia, yet 
Gunawardana and Leach present historical evidence to show that 
there were many irrigation works which were not backed by the 
state in this Dry Zone civilization. As Leach (1959 ) points out, it 
is possible for irrigated agriculture to exist and produce social 
formations other than those which take the form of Wittfogel ' s 
'oriental despotism ' . For his part Gunawardana argues that 
a multi-centered society with power devolving on the gentry 
and the monastic institutions in particular, appears to be 
more true of the social structure of Ceylon than the concept 
1. This civilization which was located in the region 
generally known as the dry zone, existed from about 6th century 
B.C. until 1293 A.D. 
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of a centralized bureaucratic system of despotic rule (Gu-
nawardana, (1971:26). 
The question of whether or not there was private 
property in land in ancient Asiatic formation was at the centre of 
the debate for both Marx and Wittfogel. For Marx the absence of 
private property in land was to be explained by reference to 
communal and state property, while for Wittfogel there was 
private property but it was 'weak' and 'consistently eroded by 
fragmentation...' (Gunawardana, 1971:18). Neither of these views 
is entirely satisfactory. 
Individual as well as communal property in land and in 
irrigation works were reported to have existed during the Dry 
Zone civilization (Gunawardana, 1971 and 1976; Paranavitana, 
1959). There is evidence to confirm the presence, during this 
civilization, of both 'weak' types of private property ownership, 
such as property granted to state functionaries and monasteries, 
and 'stronger' types such as ownership derived from purchase of 
land and irrigation property by private individuals and 
monasterieS. However, it should be noted the 'stronger' types do 
not necessarily imply absolute ownership. This evidence suggests 
that it is inaccurate to assert 'no private property exists in the 
Orient'. 
Moreover, historical sources refer to the use of hired 
labour, slave labour and the labour of tenants in addition to 
communal labour in the construction of irrigation works (Guna-
wardana, 1971:16). Again, this is an indication of beginnings of 
a process of social differentiation based upon a system where 
property rights are a major consideration. This study does not 
attempt to contribute to the debate on the Asiatic mode of produc-
tion. Further research is needed before the exact nature of 
pre-colonial Asiatic social formation is determined. On the basis 
of evidence presented in the above discussion, it can be conclu-
ded both Marx and Wittfogel's characterizations are inaccurate. 
As will be shown in the remainder of this chapter, pre-colonial 
Sri Lankan society appears to have had some features associated 
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with feudalism. They were in an embryonic stage during the Dry 
Zone civilization and appear in a more mature form by the 
Kandyan period. Although similarities between classical feudalism 
and the pre-colonial Sri Lankan social formation can be observed, 
these two are not identical because there were distinct features 
(such as caste) which were associated with the latter. Indeed it 
is dangerous to mechanically equate Sri Lankan, or other Asian 
social formations, to European feudalism. What is attempted here 
is to capture major elements of the pre-colonial Sri Lankan 
society. This social formation appears to be a form of 
'feudalism'. 
The Dry Zone Civilization 
The recorded history of Sri Lanka begins with the 
arrival of a North Indian prince named Vijaya with his followers 
in the fifth century B.C. They first established settlements in the 
north-western region of the island. This civilization known as the 
Dry Zone civilization lasted until the thirteenth century A.D., 
and was based on an agricultural economy devoted to paddy 
cultivation under artificial irrigation. Unreliable seasonal rains 
in the dry zone made it imperative to build artificial irrigation 
structures in order to grow paddy. In response, a highly 
sophisticated man-made irrigation network was erected demonstra-
ting a capacity for advanced hydraulic engineering and 
construction. The most sophisticated of the irrigation structures 
occurred in the 'nuclear areas' around Anuradhapura and 
Polonnaruwa. Here the irrigation complex was backed by the 
state. In the rest of the island, particularly in the North and in 
Ruhuna region, a vast number of village tanks were built using 
less sophisticated technology. These were commonly sponsored both 
by monasteries and individuals, contrary to Wittfogel. 
The Dry Zone civilization and its social structure 
represent the oldest of what is known about Sri Lankan society. 
In this society, right to land and labour was vested in the 
ruler. However, the monasteries and the gentry were groups upon 
which power devolved. The Dry Zone social organization may be 
considered as the precursor to the Kandyan 'feudal' system. 
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Unlike the village level irrigation works which supported 
little more than a subsistence economy, the vast irrigation 
structures of the 'nuclear areas' would have created a large 
agricultural surplus both by extending the area under cultivation 
and by facilitating intensive crop cultivation (Gunawardana, 
1971:17). There is evidence of rice exports to India during the 
Dry Zone civilization (Paranavitana, 1959). These exports indicate 
a significant surplus production during the period. 
The wealth created by this increased surplus made 
possible the maintenance of a large section of' population not 
engaged in food production and in the building of elaborate 
religious structures, notbaly 4t..upa4 , and other religious architec-
ture and sculpture in Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa. Most 
notable among the non-food producing segment of the population 
were nobles and clergy. Central to the ancient social formation 
was the existence of the 4ang.ha or Buddhist religious order and 
the gentry, comprised largely of high caste state bureaucrats. 
Paranavitana refers to a class of chieftains associated with the 
management of irrigation works in the Dry Zone civilization 
(Paranavitana, 1959:23). The 4an.gha and the gentry were econo-
mically and politically powerful groups and their power has 
persisted into the modern period. Gunawardana reveals that by 
the ninth century A.D., monasteries had come to own, apart from 
movable possessions, vast estates, irrigation works and even 
salterns (1971:19). The monastic estates in some ways resembled 
the social and economic organization of the classical feudal 
manors. The lands were cultivated by tenants and various types 
of artisans such as potters, weavers and washermen were 
assigned to the monastic estate. 
The power of the monasteries was considerable. For 
instance, withholding irrigation water and the threat of depriving 
tenants of their lands upon failure to pay their dues, were 
among the coercive means employed by the monasteries in the 
ancient period to enforce its property rights and to extract a 
surplus (Gunawardana, 1971:20). Further, the monastery was 
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able to exercise• control over the direct producers insofar as it 
owned the implements used by tillers, as well as those used by 
artisans. This indicates a well-developed tendency towards the 
separation of the means of production from those who laboured. It 
should be recalled that partial separation of the direct producer 
from the means of production is a characteristic of the feudal 
mode. 
The resemblance with European feudalism goes further, 
insofar as the monarch had instituted the rudiments of a system 
in which land was sometimes granted to the state functionaries 
and nobles for services rendered in lieu of a state salary. In 
their turn, the gentry assigned arable land to tenants and ser-
vicemen in exchange for services and rent. 
From the earliest times, two broad divisions were pre-
sent in the Dry Zone civilization: namely the majority who were 
tillers of land, and a class of nobles. The nobles manned the 
high positions in the state departments and received a share of 
the surplus produce appropriated by the 
the high dignitaries such as military 
courtiers were drawn from high caste 
1959:231). At the village level, village 
function of collecting the dues owed to 
times, the courtiers who were sent to the 
collect dues were reported to have had 
king. For the most part 
chiefs, treasurers and 
families (Paranavitana 
headmen performed the 
king. From the earliest 
villages by the king to 
'ample opportunities to 
add to their personal gain' by oppressing villagers (Parana-
vitana, 1959:232). This evidence suggests a degree of differentia-
tion in the social system. 
Although the monarch was theoretically the 'absolute 
ruler', the devolution of power on groups such as monasteries 
and the gentry set effective limits to his power. Gunawardana 
(1971) has noted it is the presence of these power groups which 
analytically allows the society to be described as having elements 
of feudalism. However, Roberts (1982:6) doubts whether the Dry 
Zone civilization can be described as a feudal order. He asserts 
that the aristocracy of the Dry Zone civilization received legiti-
macy from its connection with the king. Unlike feudal Europe it 
'did not bestow authority on the king'. 
- 6 6. - 
The 'feudal' forms which were at embryonic stage in the 
Dry Zone cilivization can be observed in a mature form in the 
later Kandyan period. 
The utility of the ' feudal ' model, however, has- other 
limits. At best it applies only to the 'nuclear areas ' . Elsewhere 
the lack of developed transport and communication facilities 
resulted in the emergence of village communities with a high de-
gree of autonomy. Communities at Nuwarakalawiya , described by 
Pieris (1956) are examples of villages distant from the capital 
which enjoyed a high degree of autonomy due to weaker central 
authority. Collective construction and management of irrigation 
structures and village level self-administration through village 
councils (gam4abava) are characteristics of these villages. The 
feudal model is inappropriate to the analysis of the social orga-
nization of these villages. They seem to fit somewhat closely to 
the description by Marx, because isolation, self-sufficiency, 
self-administration and possibly communal 'ownership' of village 
lands and irrigation works were features of these communities. 
From about the eleventh century, the Dry Zone civiliza-
tion declined until it was abandoned in the thirteenth century. 
The population centres shifted to the wet zone of the island, 
notably in the central• and south-western parts of the island. 
There is little concensus as to the causes of the decline and the 
collapse of the Dry Zone civilization. Important among the 
multitude of factors that seem to have contributed to the decline 
and the abandonment are: the destructive effects of frequent wars 
with foreign armies ; internal strife ; climatic changes and 
exhaustion of soil fertility; famine and pestilence caused by crop 
failures; epidemics of malaria making the region uninhabitable, 
and damage to irrigation structures. ' 
Two fundamental changes that accompanied the shift of 
population from the dry zone to the wet zone were the change 
1. See Murphy (1957) for details. 
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from irrigation-based paddy cultivation to rain-fed paddy 
cultivation and the increased emphasis which began to be placed 
upon trade. As K.M. De Silva notes, it is during this period of 
transition that 'cinnamon emerged as the main export with the 
increased demand for spices in Europe after the Crusades as a 
basic element in the ruler's revenue' (1977:46). 
The shift of population from the dry zone to the wet 
zone had profound economic and social consequences. The absence 
of evidence of rice exports from Sri Lanka after the collapse of 
the irrigation-based dry zone economy suggests a decline in the 
levels of agricultural production and a reduction in state revenue 
from this traditional source. The growing export trade in 
cinnamon assumes the dominant role in state revenue. The 
significance of the shift in the source of state revenue from 
agricultural to trading activity lies not so much in the changes 
directly brought about to traditional social organization, because 
the beneficiary under both systems was the state, but more in the 
fact that the growth of trading activity provided the incentive 
for penetration by European powers. For instance, as in western 
feudalisms, a significant social group based on mercantile 
activities did not emerge in Sri Lanka following the increased 
trading activities. It was colonialism, rather than the shift from 
dry to wet zone agriculture and the consequent method of surplus 
generation, that was to have a more profound impact on society. 
Kandyan Social Organization 
Following the abandonment of the dry zone, the site of 
power of the Sinhalese kings moved from the dry zone centre of 
Polonnaruwa to Dambadeniya in the late thirteenth century and 
later to Yapahuwa, Kurunegala and Gampola throughout the 
fourteenth century. At the time of the arrival of the Portuguese 
in 1505, there were three separate seats of power. The Tamil seat 
of power was located in the North at Jaffna. There were two 
Sinhalese sites at Kotte in the west and Kandy in the central 
hill-country. Of the two Sinhalese kingdoms, Kotte was eclipsed 
as the result of the arrival of the Portuguese. Jaffna held, but 
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eventually succumbed to Portuguese influence by the end of the 
sixteenth century. Kandy held until 1815, despite repeated 
attempts at subjugation by European powers. 
Two centuries elapsed between the collapse of the Dry 
Zone civilization and the arrival of the Portuguese. In this 
period a form of social organization evolved which can be seen 
as a direct successor to the ancient civilization. The distinctive 
• elements of 'Sri L ank an feudalism', into which the colonizing 
powers intruded, are best exemplified in Kandyan social organiza-
tion at its height in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 
Modern Sri Lanka owes much to the interplay between the social 
organization of Sri Lankan 'feudalism' and the social and econo-
mic diffusion wrought by the colonizing powers. The nature of Sri 
Lankan 'feudalism' is best revealed by an examination of the 
Kandyan economic and social organization. 
As in the earlier Dry Zone civilization, Kandyan social 
organization derived from paddy cultivation. Features of the 
classical 'feudal' mode of production were present in a stronger 
form than in the ancient Dry Zone civilization. In fact, the fea-
tures of the social organization of this period have been compa-
red by Reimers (1928) with European feudalism. A general caution 
for equating Asian pre-modern social formations with the European 
feudalism must be issued. 
The tendency on the part of some historians and social 
anthropologists to see the western European model of feu-
dalism replicated in all pre-capitalist settings... had led to 
the extreme reaction of rejecting 'feudalism' as a useful 
category for comparative study (Bagchi, 1982:7 ). 
Thorner for instance, claimed there was no feudalism in India 
because India lacked basic elements of feudalism ' (Clarkson, 197V 
:214). Against Thorner, Bagchi argues that 
some at least of the divergences between the archetype of 
western feudalism and the political organization of Rajput 
states and of Mughal India can be accomodated in the vary-
ing patterns of western European feudalism in its different 
phases of evolution and in the different areas under its 
sway (Bagchi, 1982:7). 
1. cf. Alavi (1980) who argued that North Indian society 
was structurally feudal. 
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With these cautions in mind, the 'feudal' character of 
the Kandyan society can be outlined. Like the Dry Zone, Kandyan 
society was founded on an agricultural economy devoted largely 
to paddy cultivation. An important difference between the two was 
that, unlike in the dry zone, the Kandyan cultivator did not 
require elaborate artificial irrigation structures because rain-fed 
cultivation was possible in the region. 
The layout of the Kandyan village differed from the 
villages of the dry zone. In the Kandyan region paddy fields 
were located in the valley floor. The village itself perched on 
the valley walls above the paddy fields. Above the village the 
upper slopes of the hillside formed a 'reserve' which was used 
for chen.a or slash and burn cultivation as well as for pasture, 
timber and firewood. The paddy fields, the home garden and the 
forest reserve were the essential components in the economy of the 
Kandyan village. As Pieris noted: 
The paddy land and its appurtenance provided the basic 
domestic requirements of a family: rice, coconuts, vegetables, 
betel and arecanuts, firewood, pasture, honey and game... 
lowland and highland were therefore considered as complimen-
tary and inseparable elements of village holding, since they 
made a village household self-sufficing in all but few items 
such as salt and clothing (Pieris, 1956:41). 
This settlement pattern of the Kandyan region needs special 
mention. As will be discussed in the next chapter, the claim that 
opening up of cash crop plantations deprived the peasants of the 
use of the forest reserve and consequently led to landlessness, 
aroused considerable controversy in the modern history of Sri 
Lanka: 
Theoretically the king was the 'lord of the soil'. He 
'farmed out' or distributed lands to his subjects and in return 
was entitled to a share of the produce. Every holder of land was 
liable to n.a.i.ahan.i.ga or obligatory service to the king. This 
Kandyan system of land tenure is the key to an understanding of 
the social formation which was legitimised by caste and religious 
ideology for the effective appropriation of surplus by the 
aristocracy. 
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Yalman summarizes the elaborate Kandyan system of land 
tenure: 
All the land was •considered to belong ultimately to the king. 
On this principle, the king allowed aristocrats of the Radala 
subcaste to hold large estates, but the lords were expected 
to supply feudal services and payments as token of their 
vassalage. The estates of the aristocrats were in turn held 
under fief by persons of other castes, again in return for 
hereditary services and payments. The tenants in return 
could have sub-tenants of their own. The same hereditary 
lords were also appointed by the king as provincial 
governers, and in their capacity as civil servants the lords 
appointed officials of lower ranks from various castes. In 
lieu of salary, all officials received the right to the dues of 
various lands belonging to the king. In this fashion the 
pattern of feudal services (rajakariya), which were attached 
especially to the tenure of paddy lands, formed both the 
basis for the organization of the kingdom and the mainstay 
of the caste hierarchy (Yalman, 1967:16). 
The n.aiakailiva obligation was determined by each per-
sons caste position. The n.ad.akaniy.a services were of two types, 
namely the labour provided by subjects for construction and 
maintenance of public works and the services customarily attached 
to one's caste. 
On the basis of differences in land tenure arrangements, 
four major types of villages may be identified. gabadaganz 	 were 
those villages whose produce was assigned for the royal use. 
Nindaganz villages were those villages granted to political 
overlords and which were worked by tenants as well as free 
holders. The villages granted to religious institutions were known 
as vihan.again and devalaganz and were worked by tenants under 
somewhat similar arrangements to nindagam 
The receiver of a aindaganz a was called gcun.ladda. The 
9.anz2adda was entitled to receive the services and the dues which 
were owed to the crown by the individual tillers in return for 
the granted lands. A nindagama sometimes comprised a whole 
village. The gam2adda perfor med his official duties and paid 
annual homages to the crown in return for the mindagam. ffirzda-
ganz4 , Knox wrote, 'are composed of all sorts of Trades and 
people that are necessary for his [gantladda ] service to whom 
the king hath given them a potter, a smith, a washer' (1681:80). 
In nindagam a a plot of land, often not exceeding one fifth of the 
estate, was set aside, the produce of which was reserved for the 
gam-Ladd a' s personal use. This portion of the estate was called 
mu.tetuwa. The mutetuwa was worked by 'tenants' known as 
niiakaizaga as part of their service obligations. 
For the most part the 9.anz2.adda4 belonged to an aristo-
cratic group who were drawn from the 4adala 'subcaste' of the 
go y-i.gara al caste. The members of this group peopled the top 
ranks of the social hierarchy. They became officials of the royal 
palace, provincial governers, and occupied positions of importan-
ce in the bureaucracy. 
It is evident that tributory forms of surplus extraction 
were central to pre-colonial Sri Lankan society, insofar as the 
tillers' surplus was always extracted in the form of 'rent' by 
the non-producing classes. Some have made the point that for the 
most part, the relationship was benign. According to Pieris, 
the odium attached to 'one tied to soil' was unknown among 
the Sinhalese. Therefore it is necessary to disabuse our 
minds of the modern notion that the servile position of the 
rti.l.akaAga4 hinged on the fact that he was 'tied to soil' 
(Pieris, 1956:63). 
Pieris further points out that ni.2akalLga4 , 	 having served 	 the 
grantee of an estate for a lengthy period of ti me, probably 
generations, often developed a friendly relationship with the 
gamladda. The ni1akarzya4 could not be ejected as long as they 
abided by the stipulations attached to service relationship and 
customary practices. However, none of these observations deny the 
fact that tillers' surplus was extracted by the grantee. 
1. goyiganz a is considered to be the highest ranking 
caste in the Sinhalese caste hierarchy. it ada-ta is the aristocratic 
subgroup which formed top layers of the go yigcurta caste. As 
Roberts states, ' go yigcun a. . . not only commanded the highest 
ritual status among the Sinhalese, but also enjoyed a numerical 
superiority and a monopoly of access to the highly. influential 
Buddhist monastic order, the S an9.he (1982:1). See Pieris (1956) 
for caste in Kandyan society; Roberts (1982) caste during colonial 
rule and Ryan (1953) caste in modern Sri Lanka. 
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This land tenure system was supported by caste and 
religious ideology. It was pointed out above that from ancient 
times, the monastic institutions held considerable wealth and 
power. As in 'model' feudal societies, the prevailing religious 
ideology contributed to the acquiescence of the population in the 
'feudal' order. Ironically the support, or sanction for the feudal 
order came from an 'egalitarian' Sri Lankan Buddhism and 
hierarchical caste system. As a result of this strange association 
between Buddhism and the 'feudal' system based on caste, the 
monasteries were able to reap immense economic benefits, 
privileges and power. In a social formation where a surplus was 
extracted by means of non-economic coercion, the ideological 
support of the religious system was invaluable. 
The Kandyan administrative system, manned by high 
caste functionaries, was directly linked with the service tenure 
system. The administrative system consisted of officials of the 
royal palace or the king's retinue and officials of the admini-
strative service. In return for their services these officials were 
granted lands. The administrative service was headed by officials 
called adhaaitanz4 . In terms of authority and prestige they were 
second only to royalty and they were reported to have enjoyed 
enormous privileges and public respect. 
The kingdom was, for administrative purposes, divided 
into provinces or di.44avan.i4 and they were headed by provincial 
governers called diA4ave . The provinces in turn were divided 
into divisions known as /La& and to each was appointed a 
divisional head or /Luta nala . Below the divisions were admi-
instrative levels known as kona-le , then pattu and at the bot-
tom, the gatna or the village. The principal duties of the heads 
of the t err itorial levels was the collection of revenue and 
regulation of naiakcvliga labour. Administrative officials exerci-
sed judicial powers relative to their rank or official status in 
the administrative hierarchy. 
At the village level, alongside the king's administrative 
officials, existed a local government body called garn4abhava or 
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village council. The village council was composed of the 
'principal and experienced men of the village ' . It was mainly an 
institution of arbitration and conciliation rather than of 
punishment. The villagers could appeal to higher state officials 
if they were dissatisfied with the decisions of the village coun-
cil. 
It is evident from the above account that pre-colonial 
Sri Lankan society shared many attributes associated with 
'feudalism ' . Again, it should be stressed that it was not identi-
cal to European archetypes. Any attempt to equate it mechanically 
with the European context is a fruitless task. Pre-colonial Sri 
Lanka was characterized by a non-capitalist mode of production. 
The reality of non-capitalist Sri Lankan mode of production fits 
neither Marx's concept of Asiatic mode of production nor 
Wittfogel ' s contruct of oriental despotism. 
The shape of pre-colonial Sri Lankan society closely 
approximates the 'feudal mode of production' which McEachern 
schematised as follows: 
Under feudalism, the ownership of the means of production is 
divided between the direct producers and a landed ruling 
class. The direct producers enter into a relationship with the 
means of production, take part in the production process on 
the basis of rent relations with the landed class. Surplus 
production is taken by the landed class in the form of rent 
either labour time, produce or money. Such rent relations 
may be enshrined in custom and law and backed by religious 
argument or legitimation, though the basis for extraction lies 
in the situation of divided possession and control of the 
means of production (McEachern, 1982:8) . 
Important additions to this scheme are that under feuda-
lism surplus extraction was perfected by means of extra-economic 
coercion; the labour was 'unfree' from feudal obligations to 
service; the labour was not completely separated from the 
possession of major means of production and the economy was at 
the level of simple reproduction. In fact, unfree labour and the 
absence of wage-labor are often taken as major defining 
characteristics of 'feudal mode of production ' . 
The peasant in Kandyan society enjoyed or possessed 
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the hereditary right of 'occupancy' or the right to till the land. 
Hence the degree of separation of the peasant from the land 
cannot be said to be complete. However the concept of 'absolute 
ownership' of property, in the sense that the concept was being 
used in Europe, did not exist in Sri Lanka. As Pieris noted, 'the 
Sinhalese conception of property in land always assumed that 
title was contingent on the performance of service' (1956:44). The 
basis of access to land was payment of the 'rent'. Thus, the 
direct producer .possessed  the land but custom and ideology and 
law ensured the transfer of surplus to the aristocracy. 
The aristocracy consisted of the high caste nobility who 
manned the bureaucracy. Both caste and religious ideology 
supported or legitimised the functioning of the 'feudal' system. 
The surplus was extracted commonly in the forms of labour rent 
under ActiakaAiya and also in the form of produce, and to a 
lesser extent in cash. Means employed to appropriate the surplus 
were political, legal and ideological. It should be recalled that 
the aristocracy manned the state bureacracy and even enjoyed 
judicial powers. Thus the state and the aristocracy were closely 
interconnected. 
In pre-colonial Sri Lanka, as in traditional, non-market 
economies elsewhere, the surplus extracted by 'force or custom, 
through taxes or tribute, was used for infrastructure projects 
such as irrigation works, religious buildings and for the 
consumption by the non-producing classes' (S.B.D. De Silva, 
1982:451). The economy was based on simple reproduction where 
the surplus was largely consumed and not accumulated in the 
form of expanded production. This appears to be especially true 
of the post-Dry Zone period, which was marked by political 
instability and repeated foreign invasions. After the fall of the 
Dry Zone civilization, it is plausible to assert that Sri Lankan 
civilization was not able to restore a level of economic prosperity 
to match that of the earlier period. Significant developments in 
the forces of production are not evidenced in the post-Dry Zone 
period. 
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The colonial penetration disrupted the societal evolution 
and brought about profound changes in this traditional socio-
economic formation. The process of colonial transformation forms 
the subject of the next chapter. 
CHAPTER 4 
COLONIAL RULE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
This chapter focusses on the process of social and 
economic transformation in Sri Lanka under European colonial 
rule. It examines the nature and the significance of this process 
as an explanation for the present structure of social organiza-
tion. 
It was through European colonial domination that Sri 
Lanka was incorporated into the capitalist world economy. The 
incorporation involved profound changes to pre-colonial social 
formation, notably economic structure, and social and physical 
arrangements of production. The process transformed the pre-colo-
nial social formation into what may be described as a 'peripheral 
capitalist social formation'. 
The incorporation of hitherto 'external' societies in the 
capitalist world economy entailed imposition of an international 
divison of labour, that is, the restructuring of the newly 
incorporated region's economy to institute specialization in 
'peripheral' type economic activity. It also entailed the esta-
blishment of ancillary legal, political and administrative struc-
tures to propagate structural relationships and conditions which 
in turn perpetuated mechanisms of 'unequal exchange' and conse-
quently 'underdevelopment' in the periphery. It was noted in 
chapter one that world systems theory does not adequately 
theorize the nature of transformation of internal structures in the 
peripheral societies under the impact of colonial domination. 
Among others, Alavi (1980 and 1982) and McEachern (1982) have 
attempted to capture the structural specificity of the process of 
transformation of internal structures in colonized societies. 
It is argued that under the impact of colonial domina-
tion in Sri Lanka, the pre-colonial 'feudal' social formation was 
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transformed into 'peripheral capitalism ' . The structural conditions 
both of the feudal mode of production and peripheral capitalism, 
as outlined by Alavi (1982a) are useful in analysing the nature 
of this social transformation. In the transformation the structural 
conditions of the feudal mode of production, namely unfree labour 
and extra-economic compulsion in the extraction of surplus, are 
replaced by conditions of 'free labour' and economic coercion in 
the extraction of surplus. The ensuing social formation, as 
evident in the latter two conditions, is characterised by 
structural features specific to peripheral capitalism. Colonial 
domination broke down the localized self-sufficiency of the 
pre-colonial formation and set in motion generalized commodity 
production - but a generalized commodity production different 
from that in metropolitan capitalism. In contrast to ' autocentric ' 
or ' integrated ' form of generalized commodity production in 
metropolitan capitalism, the internally disarticulated form in the 
periphery makes the periphery dependent on its links with the 
metropolitan economy. The circuit of generalized commodity 
production in the periphery is 'completed only by virtue of [ its ] 
links with the metropolitan economy, by production for export, 
and as markets for colonial imports' ( Alavi , 1982a :181 ) . Further, 
in peripheral capitalism, surplus value generated by the 
peripheral society through the process of 'extended reproduction 
of capital' is appropriated by the metropolitan capital thus 
leading to growth of productive forces in the latter instead of the 
former. 
This process of transformation, it is argued, is crucial 
in determining the pattern of development in Sri Lanka. It is the 
nature and the impact of this process which is analysed in the 
following pages. 
Of the three European powers which occupied Sri Lanka, ' 
1. The Portuguese (1505-1656) were the first European 
powers to occupy the coastal regions of Sri Lanka. They were 
followed by the Dutch (1656-1796 ) . The British arriving in the 
island in 1796 administered the Dutch possessions in Sri Lanka 
until 1802. A British crown colony was established in the coastal 
regions of Sri Lanka in 1802. With the cession of the Kingdom in 
1815 the British established their control over the whole island 
and ruled until Independence in 1948.   
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it was the British who exerted the greatest influence and who 
brought about the most profound changes in the society. The 
present discussion reflects this fact, giving relatively greater 
emphasis to the impact of British rule. Its influence was 
greater for several reasons. Of the three powers only Britain 
succeeded in taking the whole island under its control. The 
Portuguese arrived in 1505 but their direct rule, which was 
restricted to the maritime regions, was established only in 1593. 
As their influence was lost to the Dutch in 1656, their role 
covered only a little more than half a century. Like the 
Portuguese the sphere of influence of the Dutch was limited to the 
maritime regions. Similarly the interests of both in the island did 
not extend much beyond obtaining monopoly of the cinnamon 
trade. In contrast the British enjoyed a position of prominence in 
the world economy at that time and were experiencing rapid 
industrialization. Hence their interests in geographical expansion 
went far beyond mercantilist interests of the Portuguese and the 
Dutch. The British embarked on a programme of enveloping 
colonies which were then integrated into their imperial economic 
policy. Their colonies primarily were sources of raw _materials, 
market outlets, and receptacles of investments. Therefore the 
British colonial rulers had deeper interests in the colonies. This 
is reflected in the nature and magnitude of change in Sri Lanka 
under the British. However the greater emphasis on the British 
rule is not a denial of the impact of its predecessors. The 
diffusion of Christian missionary education, the introduction of 
Roman-Dutch law, a canal transportation system, which exerted an 
influence particularly on Sri Lankan society , in the maritime 
regions and marked the beginnings of the integration of Sri 
Lanka into the emerging European-centered world economy, all 
testify to this fact. The point is made that it was the British 
who contributed most to the completion of the rudimentary 
structures begun by their predecessors. 
The methods introduced by the colonial rulers to effect 
changes were twofold, namely 'adoption' and 'replacement' of 
traditional ideas, practices, and institutions. These methods 
reflected their economic• goals. 
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The use of Jtadakcvliga labour is a prime example of the 
technique of 'adopting' traditional institutions. The British used 
44.akcvaga labour for the construction of roads linking , the 
plantation areas, the ports and commercial capitals. This use of 
itaiakairiga labour for public works was somewhat different to the 
traditional use. In traditional society it was mostly used in the 
construction and maintenance of economic and religious infrastruc-
tures such as the irrigation system, 4.tupcm , and temples, in 
which the labouring population participated in the sharing of 
benefits. But under the British , 4cliakcvz4a labour was used for 
projects which were hardly beneficial to the labouring villagers. 
As a contemporary writer, Forbes (1841),  commented: 
The great lines of road in the interior of Ceylon were made 
prior to 1833, and principally at the expense of the lives of 
the native proprietors of the rice land. But the greatest 
benefit of these roads is derived by those British capitalists 
who in no way contributed to their formation (Ludowyk, 
1966:48). 
The extensive use of 4421.aka/ri4a labour for work in cin-
namon plantations by the British early in their rule is also 
reported. The exaction of itaiaka44ta labour was often unmerciful. 
It was reported for instance, in 1827, that of 2,100 cinnamon 
peelers employed by the state, 300 died of endemic fever. Often 
the peelers returned empty-handed after several months' work, 
having even sometimes pawned or sold their belongings (Colvin R. 
De Silva, 1942:391). According to Forbes 'the compulsory labour 
as exacted by the British amounted virtually to a subversion of 
the ancient Kandyan system' (Ludowyk, 1966:48). 
Traditionally, land rights were vested in the monarch 
under the theory which considered the king as the 'lord of the 
soil'. This traditional view was adopted by the British in order 
to lay claim to 'uncultivated' land in the colony. On the basis 
of this traditional 'theory', the British, as successors to the 
monarch, passed ordinances to vest uncultivated lands in the 
crown. However in so doing, the colonial government did not 
recognize the customary usufructory rights, enjoyed by villagers 
to forest and highland reserves, which were part and parcel of 
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the traditional theory. 
Examples of the 'replacement' of traditional institutions 
are many. Among them are the introduction of alien legal, admi-
nistrative and political systems, and western education. But it is 
pertinent to note as Ludowyk (1966:33) observed: 'European 
colonists were there as rulers who would change the existing 
social and political structure only so far as it suited them'. 
The Advent of Plantations and the Peripheralization of the 
Economy 
The most significant net effect of the colonial domination 
of Sri Lanka can be said to be the restructuring of the 
pre-colonial economy to create • a peripheral type of economic 
structure integrated to the capitalist world economy. In the 
process of transformation, Sri Lanka was converted into an 
economy specializing in the production of a few primary 
agricultural commodities for the world market in return for the 
manufactures of the metropolitan economies. The establishment of 
export crop plantations of coffee, followed by tea, rubber and 
coconut was pivotal in the process of restructuring the economy. 
This process toward specialization in a 'peripheral' type 
of economic activity began with the increase in the importance of 
long distance trade in the Sri Lankan economy. The fall of the 
dry zone civilization and the drift of population centres to the 
south-west of the island accompanied the increase in importance 
of external trade as a source of state revenue. Cinnamon became 
the most important export commodity by the fifteenth century and 
it attracted colonial powers such as the Portuguese and the Dutch 
to the island. These two powers had little interest in Sri Lanka 
beyond the cinnamon trade. With the cinnamon trade and the 
institutionalization of the rudiments of an export economy it is 
possible to see the beginning of distortions in the economic 
structure that were later to result in a lopsided economy. While 
the Portuguese and the Dutch both encouraged the cultivation of 
cinnamon by Sri Lankans, the Dutch not only 'encouraged the 
Sinhalese to form an infinite number of small gardens' (Mills, 
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1964:203), but also opened up several cinnamon plantations. 
However the most rapid growth of the export economy was seen 
following the expansion of coffee, tea and rubber plantations on 
a massive scale by the British. 
After the decline of world market prices for cinnamon 
around 1835, coffee became the dominant export crop from Sri 
Lanka. The period from 1833 to 1886 is known in the literature as 
the 'coffee era'. With the patronage, total support and assistance 
of the British colonial administration, vast acreages were rapidly 
converted to coffee cultivation during this period. The plantation 
coffee acreage (excluding peasant and small-holder coffee hold-
ings) increased from 4,000 acres in 1836 to 249,604 acres in 1871 
Perera, 1968:44). A contemporary writer, Tennent (1859), 
described this period as follows: 
The coffee mania was at its climax in 1845. The governor 
and the Council, the military, the judges, the clergy and 
one half the civil servants penetrated the hills and became 
purchasers of crown lands. The East India Company's 
officers crowded to Ceylon to invest their savings, and 
capitalists from England arrived by every packet... The rush 
for land was only paralleled by the movements towards the 
mines of California and Australia... (Tennent, 1859: 231). 
The early years in the coffee era witnessed the erection 
of an infrastructure essential to the commercial plantation 
industry. This included a road building programme and also the 
changes brought about in the administrative structure following 
the Colebrook commission in 1833. 
Tea and rubber filled the vacuum created by the 
collapse of the coffee industry due to a plant disease in the last 
decade of the nineteenth century. State assistance and patronage 
continued in the same vein. Since then tea, rubber and coconut 
cultivation have become the dominant economic activity in the Sri 
Lanka's economic structure. The rise of a plantation and export 
oriented economy fundamentally, altered the pattern of development 
in Sri Lanka. 
Firstly, it created a peripheral type of economy charac-
terised by 'extraversion'. It also meant the integration of Sri 
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Lanka into the capitalist world economy as a peripheral economy 
by instituting peripheral specialization within the core-periphery 
division of labour. 'Extraversion', according to Amin (1976), is 
characterized by the 'quantitative predominance of the exporting 
activities' in the economy. 
The distortion toward exporting activities in the allocation of 
financial resources (direct investments, the infrastructure 
created to serve the exporting areas and sectors, etc.) and 
human ones (orientation of training and education in 
accordance with the needs of integration into the world 
capitalist market, etc.) gives extraversion a qualitative 
dimension and asserts the dominance of the exporting sector 
over the economic structure as a whole, which is subjected to 
and shaped by the requirements of the external market 
(Amin, 1976:203). 
Following colonial domination, Sri Lanka has become an 
archetypal extraverted export economy. This fact is acknowledged 
by many leading observers of Sri Lanka's economy. Snodgrass for 
instance observed that in the export economy established by the 
colonial rulers, 'productive activity is heavily oriented toward 
supplying a few primary commodities to the world market and 
consumption is largely made up of imported goods' (Snodgrass, 
1966:16).
1 
 He further elaborates: 
An 'export economy' can be defined as one with not merely a 
high ratio of imports and exports to national income, but one 
in which all the important macro-economic quantities 
government revenues and expenditures, private investments, 
imports, and national income itself - possess a strong func-
tional dependence upon the level of export receipts. This 
Ceylon very clearly became during the decade of the 1840s 
and remained, certainly throughout the rest of the colonial 
era, and in some respects to the present day (Snodgrass, 
1966:17). 
A distinctive feature of the plantation industry in Sri 
Lanka was its high dependence on metropolitan society. 
Snodgrass itemises the characteristics basic to the plantation 
system in Sri Lanka as: 
1. Similar observations have been made by Wickremeratne 
(1977a:131) and Gunasekera (1977:172-173). 
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British ownership and management of most estates, including 
almost all the largest ones; provision of finance by British 
Banks and'Agency Houses' ; large scale, factory-style opera-
tion of estates using massive forces of Indian labour espe-
cially imported for the purpose; control of the import-export 
trade by British; virtually complete reliance on imported 
supplies of capital equipment, estate supplies and even food 
for the labour force; virtually complete reliance on foreign - 
especially British - markets for the products (Snodgrass, 
1966:21). 
This phenomena of extraversion leads to the emergence of 
a lopsided externally-dependent economy specializing in a 
peripheral type of economic activity. Greater control and owner-
ship of productive activities by foreign capital in turn results in 
the transfer of capital out of the peripheral economy and its 
accumulation in the metropolitan economies, thus contributing to 
the growth of productive forces in the latter. 
Secondly, the colonial policy of de-industrialization 
associated with the peripheralization of the colony further aggra-
vates and reinforces extraversion of the peripheral economy. 
De-industrialization is related to the internally disarticulated 
nature of the generalized commodity production in peripheral 
capitalist societies where the production of capital goods and 
consumer goods is not integrated with industrial and agricultural 
production. This structural feature both defines and reinforces 
the core periphery division of labour which is integral to the 
current pattern of development in the periphery. 
Finally, the restructuring of the economy involved 
changes in the labour process and the social organization of 
production. In order to analyze these changes attention must be 
focussed on the mechanisms of change, particularly colonial land 
and taxation policy. The colonial land policy was primarily 
designed to nurture the establishment and expansion of export 
crop plantations and the taxation system as well was tailored to 
the needs of a commercialized export economy. 
These policies were instrumental in breaking down the 
local self-sufficiency of the pre-colonial village economy and 
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instituting conditions of peripheral capitalism such as the dispos-
session of• peasants from the means of production, and the gene-
ralized commodity production. 
The Impact of Colonial State Policies 
The consequences of the British land sales policy in Sri 
Lanka has been a topic of controversy. During the early stages 
of the establishment of the plantation industry the British enacted 
several ordinances to appropriate 'uncultivated lands' which 
could then be converted to cash crop plantations. Vast tracts of 
'Crown Lands' - as the lands vested in the state were then 
called - were sold to speculators and investors. For instance, 
sales of crown lands increased from 483 acres in 1833-34 to a 
peak of 127,220 acres in 1841-42. As shown in table 4.1, during 
the period 1833 to 1866 a total of 1,149,873 acres were sold. 
Some (Ceylon, 1951; Vanden Driesen, 1956; Wesumperuma, 
1969) argue that this appropriation and subsequent conversion of 
'uncultivated lands' into plantations resulted in landlessness 
among the peasantry due to loss of a resource traditionally used 
by them for their subsistence. 
K.M.De Silva, among others, does not share this view 
and challenges the above causal connection between landlessness 
among the peasantry and the British crown land sales policy. He 
suggests that, 
in the coffee era (1830-1880) there was an adequate supply 
of land in the periphery of the villages for the potential 
cultivation needs of the immediate future. More important, 
peasants and smallholders had converted lands in their 
control for the production of coffee, and one-third of the 
acreage under coffee was held by them. Indeed it was with 
the devlopment of rubber and coconut cultivation in the last 
quarter of the 19th century, and the expansion of plantation 
agriculture into the low country, which was more densely 
populated than the Kandyan areas, that the ratio of peasant 
and indigenous landholdings to population became increas-
ingly unfavourable. If, at the end of the 19th century, this 
ratio was unfavourable, it was not in the Central Province 
and Uva, but in the plantation districts in the low country 
(KM.De Silva, 1977:68). 
These arguments however do not invalidate the fact that the 
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TABLE 4.1: Crown Land 	 Sales Under British 
Colonial Rule in Sri Lanka Between 1833 and 1886 
Period 	 Acreage Sold 
1833-1834 	 483 
1835-1836 	 4,354 
1837-1838 	 14,063 
1839-1840 	 52,152 
1841-1842 	 127,220 
1843-1844 	 80,215 
1845-1846 	 not available 
1847-1848 	 7,269 
1849-1850 	 2,468 
1851-1852 	 2,787 
1853-1854 	 7,592 
1855-1856 	 18,942 
1857-1858 	 35,547 
1859-1860 	 57,107 
1861-1862 	 53,631 
1863-1864 	 66,689 
1865-1866 	 86,696 
1867-1868 	 68,511 
1869-1870 	 65,379 
1871-1872 	 45,056 
1873-1874 	 53,745 
1875-1876 	 43,241 
1877-1878 	 59,518 
1879-1880 	 58,357 
1881-1882 	 49,264 
1883-1884 	 47,042 
1885-1886 	 42,545 
Total 	 1, 149,873 
SOURCE: Vanden Driesen (1956) 
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peasants lost lands which they traditionally used for their sub-
sistence, or that plantations also hemmed in villages thereby 
contributing to the deterioration of the peasant land to population 
ratio by blocking the expansion of villages. Further, the 
small-holder sector which accounted for over one-third of the 
acreage under coffee, was comprised of 'local capitalists, small-
holders and peasants' (K.M.De Silva, 1977:67). Indeed, as shown 
below, wealthy social groups emerging in the villages during the 
colonial period benefitted from the colonial land and tax policies 
often at the expense of sections of peasantry. In the absence of 
data disaggregating the small-holder coffee acreage into owner-
ship by different social groups, it is at least plausible to 
suggest it was the wealthier groups who controlled larger 
holdings while the poorer peasants' coffee holdings amounted to 
few bushes in their home gardens. The crucial issue, however, is 
not what the peasants did to lands in their control under duress 
but the loss of control of lands which the peasants had customary 
usufructory rights, thereby creating conditions of peipheral 
capitalism. In fact the compulsion of peasants to produce 
commodities led them to take up coffee cultivation. 
The colonial land policy was tailored primarily to en-
sure a supply of lands suitable for cash crop cultivation for the 
foreign investors storming into the island. This policy was 
translated into action through an assortment of ordinances of 
which the Crown Lands Encroachment Ordinance no.12 of 1840 was 
among the most notorious and controversial.
1 
Utilizing the tradi-
tional Sri Lankan belief that the monarch is the 'lord of the 
soil' or. the 'owner of all lands', the British colonial government 
legitimized its claim and right to appropriate lands.
2 The Crown 
Lands Encroachment Ordinance declared: 
1. Parallelling this was the Crown Lands Bill 1894 of 
Ghana, introduced by the British, which declared all 'unoccu-
pied' lands as Crown lands and vested all 'waste', forestlands 
and minerals in the Crown (cf. Howard, 1978:40). 
2. Vanden Driesen (1956) examines the colonial govern-
ment's attempts to argue in favour of the Ordinance by trying to 
justify their claims for land on the basis of this traditional 
belief. 
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All forest, waste, unoccupied and uncultivated lands shall be 
presumed to be the property of the Crown until the contrary 
thereof be proved, and all chen.a4 and other lands which can 
be only cultivated after intervals of several years shall...be 
deemed to belong to the Crown and not to be the property of 
any private persons claiming the same aginst the Crown, 
except upon proof...(0beyesekere, 1967:99). 
The lands vested in the crown under this ordinance were sold to 
investors often at a nominal price. The provisions in the above 
ordinance which purported to enable the peasants to protect their 
land from being appropriated, by proving their proprietorship or 
the customary usufructory rights, were inadequate for this task. 
On the one hand, peasants were unable to comprehend 
alien concepts of land rights and judicial processes. On the 
other, it was extremely difficult for the holders of chena lands to 
prove their usufructory rights as the title deeds of these 
traditional land grants were often written on fragile palm leaves 
(0204) which did not survive for long. The payment of taxes and 
dues, or. services rendered by the holders which would serve as 
proof of proprietory or usufructory rights, were neither recorded 
nor preserved. Besides, 
it was unlikely that the people would have taken particular 
care of these ala4 , for they were unaware that the preser-
vation of receipts would years later be deemed necessary to 
prevent what seemed like a confiscation of their property 
(Vanden Driesen, 1966:41). 
The British land sales policy, was disastrous to whole 
sections of the peasantry. It led to the appropriation of lands 
which were essential components of the subsistence package of the 
peasantry: namely the highland reserves which they utilized for 
chum cultivation, pasture, timber, game, honey and firewood. 
This loss of a significant source of subsistence undoubtedly 
forced them to look for substitutes. The taking up of coffee 
cultivation in home gardens by some peasants is partly explained 
by this fact. 
It is not possible to quantify the magnitude of loss of 
peasant lands and other resources as a result of colonial policies 
due to non-availability of statistical data. Yet according to 
P.D.A. Perera (1968:47), for instance, '99% of the ken in 
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Kandyan province lapsed to Crown' as a result of the enactment 
of the Crown Lands Encroachment Ordinance. Further, extensive 
clearing of uncultivated land and the loss of pasture resulting 
from the expansion of plantations, is argued to have resulted in 
a massive decrease in the number of cattle in 'Kandyan 
country' - from 258,147 cattle in 1828 to 126,744 in 1919. This 
decrease in the number of cattle meant a loss of milk, manure, 
and draught power, thus lowering the level of highland sub-
sistence. 
Statistics on various aspects of peasant agriculture 
during the colonial period are not available. The census of 1946 
provides some statistical information from late in the period 
which gives a rough indication of the problems in peasant agri-
culture which resulted largely from the increased pressure on 
land particularly in the plantation areas. As shown in table 4.2 
in the predominantly plantation districts of Kandy, Nuwara Eliya 
and Badulla, the average size of a4weddumiged1  paddy holdings 
were significantly lower than in all other non-plantation 
districts. In each of the four plantation districts the acreage 
under paddy was less than the acreage under tea (see table 
4.3). A total of 631,349 acres were devoted to the cultivation of 
tea, rubber, coconut, cocoa and paddy in the four districts in 
1946. Of that acreage 63.6% was under tea, 13.9% was under 
rubber and only 14.2% was under paddy. 
Kelegama (1959:352) estimates that the population in the 
rural sector increased from about 2,710.000 in 1901 to about 
6,037,200 in 1954 or by about 123%. During the same period, 
while the area under estates (plantation crops) increased from 
about 460,000 to 1,380,330 acres or by about 200%, the area under 
peasant cultivation increased only slightly. According to Sarkar's 
estimates it fell from 1,788,000 in 1901 to 1,710,000 in 1946. 
1. Lands which are ridged and bounded in preparation 
for the cultivation of paddy. 
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TABLE 4.2: Average Size of A4weddunz.iged Paddy Holdings 
in Various Districts, Sri Lanka 1946 
District Average Size 
(Acres) 
Kandy 0.6 
Matale 0.6 
Nuwara Eliya 0.7 
Badulla 0.8 
Colombo 0.9 
Kalutara 1.5 
Galle 1.5 
Matara 1.8 
Hambantota 3.7 
Jaffna 0.9 
Mannar 2.6 
Vavuniya 2.7 
Batticaloa 6.9 
Trincomalee 4.6 
SOURCE: Ceylon (1951:91). 
TABLE 4.3: 	Extent 	of Land Under Tea, Rubber, Coconut, Cocoa and Paddy 
in the Central and Uva Provinces, Sri Lanka 1946 
District Extent Acres 
Tea 
Acres 
Rubber 
Acres 
Coconut 
Acres 
Cocoa 
Acres 
Paddy 
Acres 
Kandy 584,680 183,182 34,925 20,886 13,827 36,789 
Matale 557,552 20,800 32,098 10,641 3,752 17,123 
Nuwara Eliya 303,280 105,687 464 641 18 14,626 
Badulla 2,096,416 92,236 20,575 1,479 - 21,600 
Total for Central 
and Uva 3,542,128 401,905 88,062 33,647 17,597 90,138 Provinces 
Total for 
the Island 14, 023,229 533,830 573,243 920,093 19,700 620,683 
SOURCE: Ceylon (1951:408). 
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As a consequence, the peasants were compelled to take 
up wage labour, to engage in cash crop cultivation, to intensify 
the exploitation of those lowlands left to them, to enter into 
exploitative labour relationships with wealthy social groups 
and/or to settle at a lower standard of living. Moreover the sur-
rounding of the villages by plantations restricted the capacity of 
the villages to expand with any increase in population, thus 
increasing the pressure on existing village lands, fostering 
fragmentation and subdivision, and further lowering the standard 
of living. 
The disturbance of the balance between people and land 
was particularly immense in the plantation areas. In pre-colonial 
society, land was not scarce so that when the population 
increased new villages were opened up in areas where land was 
abundant. Thus the villages expanded and the population/land 
balance was maintained (Obeyesekera, 1967). With the hemming in 
of villages by plantations the pressure on• existing village lands 
increased. 
In the non-plantation areas the Final Village Plan of 
1915 imposed by the colonial government determined the bounda-
ries and limits of villages and demarcated private and crown 
lands thereby restricting the capacity for village expansion. This 
further increased pressure on land in the non-plantation areas. 
The introduction of the plantation economy was accompa-
nied by the establishment of private ownership of land in the 
sense of the capitalist legal concept, monetization of exchange 
relationships, and commodification of labour. The abolition of 4a-
jakwa4a and the commutation of service tenures contributed to 
the process of commodification of labour. Another requirement of 
the plantation economy was clear title to private land which was 
fulfilled by the universalization of the concept of private 
property in land. Since then, land increasingly entered into the 
market. As seen above, the land policy of the British exerted 
duress on sections of the peasantry while at the same time provi- 
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ding a vehicle of mobility for other social groups. This aspect 
cannot be fully understood without examining the colonial taxa-
tion system which was closely related to the land policy and 
which exacerbated the changes wrought by the former. ' 
British tax policy in Sri Lanka from the 1830 ' s showed a 
'distinct preference for money payments and a desire to increase 
the use of money in the country' ( Roberts , 1968 :823 ) . Payment of 
taxes in money makes the collection of taxes and the transfer of 
capital overseas easy as opposed to payments in kind which pose 
collection, transport and storage problems. In addition to the 
changes in the form of payment, the colonial rulers introduced a 
variety of new taxes. Among them were the Coconut Tax (1807 ) , 
the Joy Tax (1800 ) and the •Bazaar Tax (1807 ) . Of the British 
colonial taxes the grain taxes (1840-1892) were the most contro-
versial. The colonial taxation system contributed in no little way 
towards the commodification of labour and intensification of 
commodity production. 
Traditionally the taxes were collected by state officials. 
The Dutch introduced to Sri Lanka the method of collection known 
in Europe as the 'renting system ' . Under tax renting the right to 
collect taxes was farmed out to the highest bidder in a public 
auction. The successful bidder or the ' renter ' was then appointed 
the collector. To the system of tax renting the British added 
another method of collection, namely the 'commutation system ' . 
The commutation became the sole mechanism of collecting the grain 
tax after 1878. Under the commutation system the cultivator pays 
the tax at a rate fixed by the government for each administrative 
district. The land of defaulting cultivators was seized by the 
state and sold. 
The replacement of taxes paid in kind by monetary 
payment brought the indigenous population further into the realm 
1. See Obeyesekere (1967 ) , Wesumperuma (1969 ) , Roberts 
(1968 ) and Colvin R . De Silva (1942 ) on the taxation system I 
under the British, and its consequences on the peasantry. 
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of capitalist relations. It encouraged the production of cash crops 
and wage labour. Colonial taxation practices also contributed to 
the emergence or rural capitalist groups based on money lending, 
mortgaging, trading and other usurious activities. Taxation 
practices opened up lucrative avenues of social mobility. These 
opportunities took two forms namely the oppression of the 
duressed sections of the rural population through usurious 
activities and amassing wealth through participation in the 
collection of taxes for the colonial government. This emerging 
rural elite was largely drawn from among members of the 
traditional rural elite such as village headmen. Later new groups 
also joined these ranks. 
The tax renters were almost always wealthy persons in 
the village such as village headmen, or traders. Malpractices 
such as over-assessment of peasants' land and under-assessment 
of their own land were commonplace. As they had a vested inte-
rest in the collection of taxes, renters resorted to these 
malpractices in order to increase the collector' s share. The 
colonial government' s policy of sale of land belonging to defaul-
ting cultivators was yet another opportunity for the emerging 
rural capitalist groups, while causing hardships for the sections 
of peasantry. 
The grain tax varied from one-half to one-twentieth of 
the crop of a paddy holding. The ability of peasants to pay the 
grain tax varied according to the degree to which: assessment of tax 
was excessive (worsened by the corruption of the collectors ) , the 
precarious nature of paddy cultivation (the vageries of which 
were increased by lack of institutional support by the colonial 
government ) , the crash of the coffee industry (and the consequent 
loss of a source of supplementary cash income ) , miscalculations 
in the commutation registers due to lack of data and finally, the 
lack of provisons for years of crop failure ( Wesumperuma , 
1969:19 ) . 
The sale of land belonging to defaulting cultivators 
contributed to the increase in the numbers of landless. The fear 
of defaulting intensified the dependence of the poorer sections of 
the peasantry on the usurers. Striking examples of sales of 
peasant lands in default of grain tax and eventual evictions by 
the government are reported in the administrative Divisions of 
Udukinda and Walapane. During the period 1882-1885, 221% of the 
total area of land in Udukinda is reported to have been sold in 
default of tax, depriving 2,930 heads of households, representing 
14,650 persons or 49% of the population of the Division, of a 
means of livelihood. Of these persons 599 were compelled to leave 
their homes, 2,000 became tenants and 127 were 'absolutely 
destitute'. In Walapane, during 1882-1886, 15% of the total 
number of fields were sold for default of tax (Obeysekere, 
1967:119). In the Central province 10,093 parcels of land were 
sold by the government for the recovery of private debts between 
1881 and 1885. According to Obeyeskere (1967:121) 'the likelihood 
is that most of these debts were incurred in attempting to pay 
the paddy tax'. As the above estimates do not include those 
private land sales that had taken place in attempting to pay tax 
it is reasonable to believe that they do not indicate fully the 
magnitude of the hardships caused by the grain tax. Therefore it 
is reasonable to believe that a very large number of peasants 
lost their lands, became indebted, mortgaged their lands, or 
became destitute as a result of the grain tax. 
The net effects of the taxation policy was the impove-
rishment of sections of the rural population, thus intensifying 
commodity production, increasing differentiation of the rural 
population and contributing to the breaking down of the local 
self— sufficiency. With respect to differentiation of the rural 
population, the increase in the incidence of wage labour, the 
emergence of various new forms of tenancies and the increase in 
the incidence of landlessness were major consequences at the 
lower rungs of the social hierarchy. At another level, social 
groups based mainly on usurer capital emerged in the villages. 
Colonial land policy therefore led to an alteration in the rural 
social hierarchy. 
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Changes in the Labour Process 
Changes in the labour process were affected also by the 
colonial policy towards the 4cziakwaya system. The abolition of 
4aiczka/U4a following the recommendations made by the Cole-
brooke-Cameron Commission in 1832 was a significant turning 
point in the transformation of Sri Lankan social formation. The 
universalization of the concept of private property in land, the 
measures taken to monetize the economy, and the abolition of ita-
jakcvz.i4a are the key factors in breaking up the feudal elements 
in the pre-colonial social formation. In addition to the rising 
popularity of humanitarian ideas in England, the need for a 
labour force created by the growing plantation industry was the 
compelling reason for abolition of the it aik cuziy a system. The abo-
lition of the itajahcolga system was expected to release indigenous 
labour for work in the plantations by eliminating the barriers to 
mobility erected by the feudal obligations which bound people to 
traditional caste based occupations and customary services. Alavi 
(1982:178) argues the general case that with the transition from 
feudalism to capitalism extra-economic coercion in the extraction 
of surplus is replaced by economic coercion. In Sri Lanka under 
the izajakcvulya system the surplus of the direct producers had 
been extracted by extra-economic coercion through a system of 
obligations legitimised by caste and feudal ideology. Colonialism 
meant the end of this feudal system. The economic necessity 
arising from the burdens of heavy taxation, the reduction in 
customary rights to land traditionally used by the peasants, and 
the 'undervelopment' of the forces of production in peasant 
agriculture now compelled direct producers to intensify, commodity 
production, sell their labour to the new landowning class 
emerging in the villages or to surrender the surplus to usurer 
capitalists. In this way economic coercion replaced the extra-  • 
economic coercion of the feudal system. 
However a mass of 'freed' indigenous labour did not 
take up plantation wage labour as anticipated by the colonial 
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government. 1 The size of the workforce taking up plantation work 
was inadequate to meet the demand created by the growing 
plantation industry, though the number of Sinhalese taking up 
plantation labour increased as follows: 1891 - 19,307 persons; 
1911 - 393,903 persons; 1921 - 54,576 persons and in 1931-75,786 
persons (P.D.A. Perera, 1968:48). The precarious working condi-
tions and low wages in plantations were considered to offer fewer 
prospects than the already stagnating peasant agricultural 
sector. 
S.B.D.De Silva (1982:204-235), in refuting conventional 
explanations which attribute the peasant's refusal to take up 
plantation employment to a 'peasant value system which did not 
accord with modern ethos; their lack of "economic maturity"; lack 
of acquaintance with a money economy and Western culture and 
their aversion to wage work', argues that the 
Sinhalese were not averse to wage labour as such but to 
their being absorbed into the plantation system where labour 
was held virtually under duress, and where for several 
decades the planters defaulted on wage payments, the labor-
ers were subjected to the fraudulent practice of the kanga-
nies or labour contractors, and, finally, the wage level 
itself was usually lower than the rate of earnings in the 
peasant sector (S.B.D.De Silva, 1982:210). 
While a number of peasants took up wage labour in 
plantations many peasants, adversely affected by colonial econo-
mic policies, entered into tenancy and sharecropping arrangements 
which now took on more exploitative forms. This change 
strengthened the grip of emerging merchant capital, of usurers, 
and of money lenders in the villages on the impoverished peasan-
try. Instead of economic development the peasant economy, as 
S.B.D. De Silva suggests, settled at a 'lower equilibrium'. 
The spread of the plantation economy witnessed the 
creation of the branch of that sector called the 'small-holder 
sector'. Reference to this development goes back to the coffee era 
1. In order to meet the labour shortfall, the colonial 
government brought indentured labourers from the southern parts 
of the neighbouring British colony India, to work in the 
plantations. 
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when sections of the indigenous population took up coffee 
cultivation on a scale smaller than that of the 'large 
plantations'. In official statistics the small-holder sector is 
usually defined as comprised of holdings below 10 acres. As noted 
earlier, the progressive reduction in traditional usufructory 
rights to highland reserves, which came with the spread of 
plantations and increasing tax burdens, compelled sections of the 
rural population to intensify lowland cultivation and to take up 
alternative sources of subsistence. The monetization of the tax 
system and the need to pay for cash imports also led to the 
cultivation of coffee by peasants. It was reported that one-third of 
the coffee acreage during the coffee era was held by peasants 
and by small-holders (K.M.De Silva, 1977:68). For instance, 
117,401 cwt. or 35% of the total volume of coffee exports during 
the years 1849 and 1853 was categorized as 'native coffee' while 
the balance consisted of 'plantation coffee'. Although a slightly 
higher volume of 'native coffee' was exported during 1869 and 
1879 (143,193 cwt.) the proportion was less having fallen to 15% 
of the total volume (P.D.A. Perera, 1968:44). 
While the scale of 'peasant coffee' production was minu-
te (often only a few bushes) the small-holder sector consisted of 
wealthy rural landowners, traders, and money lenders who 
emerged in the villages. As the Sri Lankans who took up coffee 
cultivation came, as Lal Jayawardena argued, out of the 
'middling lower strata', there emerged a 'highland peasant pro-
prietors' group (Bandarage, 1982:9). However the majority of the 
people who emerged as wealthy small-holders had been members of 
the traditional rural elite. They appropriated the changes 
wrought by colonialism by buying up village lands (Obeysekere, 
1967:128) and engaging in usurious activities. The well-known 
novelist and colonial administrator, Woolf, recorded in his diaries 
, for instance, the •oppression of peasants in the Hambantota 
district in 1909 by usurers, money lenders, boutique keepers (m u-
dcbtali) , and tavern keepers. He also described the corruption of 
the village headmen (Barron, 1977:56). Following the coffee-crash 
about 1886 the small-holder sector moved into the production of 
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tea, rubber and coconut. For instance in 1935 tea small-holdings 
accounted for 11.8% of the total acreage and in 1936 the rubber 
small-holdings accounted for 21.3% of the total acreage (Snod-
grass, 1966: Table A-39). Referring to a survey of the 
Kurunegala district in 1939, Das Gupta revealed the 'expropria-
tion of small owners by the lesser Ceylon capitalists, Indian 
Muslim Traders, local boutique keepers and money lenders'. He 
also noted the process of the 'swallowing up of village lands' by 
absentee capitalists (Kelegama, 1959:355). In contemporary Sri 
Lanka, the small-holder sector still holds a significant portion of 
the cash crop acreage and comprises the rural elite. For 
instance, the rubber small-holder sector holds about one-third of 
the total rubber area in the island (Jayasuriya, Barlow and 
Shand, 1981:48). Besides the intensification of commodity produc-
tion in the economy the net effect of the emergence of a 
small-holder and peasant cash crop sector was the differentiation 
of the rural population and the emergence of 'petty capitalist' 
groups in the village society. 
The traditionally dominant socio-economic groups in the 
villages, such as village headmen and similar state func-
tionaries, and the families of high caste notables advanced their 
socio-economic position during the colonial period. They were 
absorbed into the village level administration by the colonial 
power appointed as tax collectors and tax renters, and used 
every avenue for their upward social mobility. By means of 
buying the land of peasants who sold in distress, by vying for 
receipts of land grants from the colonial government, by engaging 
in fraudulent practices in tax collection and administration, and 
by usurious activities, self-advancement came to these groups. By 
such means, members of the traditional rural elite were transfor-
med into landlords, rich peasants, traders and usurers. 
The non-settler nature of the colony of Sri Lanka is a 
factor which influenced the pattern of social change immensely. It 
resulted in foreign investors not transferring their economic and 
political allegiance to the colony. Their interests in Sri Lanka 
were transient. Because of this, there was little demand 
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from this quarter for economic and political independence and 
autonomy from the mother country, or moves to set the colony in 
motion on the path of self-development. 1 The transient interests of 
the colonial investors led inevitably to the dominance of merchant 
capital over production capital in the colony. This dominance of 
merchant capital, as S. B.D. De Silva argues, is not conducive to 
the development of productive forces nor to an increase in the 
organic . composition of capital (1982:416 ff) . This line of argument 
attributes ' underdevelopment ' to the dominance of merchant 
capital in the colonies. It is argued that merchant capital which 
is based in the sphere of circulation does not bring about 
economic transformation as does the production capital, which is 
based in the sphere of production. In the case of the colonies 
where it is dominant, the merchant capital 'throttled the 
development of indigenous productive capital' (S. B.D. De Silva, 
1982: 426 ) . 
In the case of Sri Lanka the plantations were operated 
using an immigrant labour force paid at barely subsiste.nce 
rates. The plantations thus concentrated on labour intensive 
methods. Further the labour force remained unskilled and could 
not 'acquire the special skills that corresponded to a capitalist 
division of labour ' (Ranasinghe , 1982:67). Improvements in the 
labour productivity through improvements in the forces of produc-
tion was not the concern of the plantation investor. The agency 
houses which managed the plantation businesses on behalf of the 
foreign owners also acquired exclusive control of trading 
1. Barratt Brown (1982:168) contrasting the experience of 
development in settler colonies such as Australia and the United 
States with the ' under-development ' of non-settler colonies such 
as India points out the significant role played by the ruling 
class of settler capitalist for the success of the former group of 
colonies. 'These people were... closely linked to the centre of' 
capital accumulation in Britain, but gained the power to 
establish their independence from kith and kin at home. They 
were thus able to hold on to an increasing proportion of the 
profit of the investment by British capital in primary production 
in their lands and to generate their own industrialization and 
independent capital accumulation ' . Their diversification of 
economic activities in the colony into wider range of manufac-
turing industry gave them "cumulatively more freedom from de-
pendence on the capital and technology of the home country '. 
enterprises related to plantation industry, such as supply of 
plantation machinery and equipment, shipping and insurance. 
Through them the metropolitan production capital acquired raw 
materials and access to markets in the periphery. But the mer-
chant capital in the periphery failed to 'transform itself into 
industrial capital' 1  thus, •according to S.B.D . De Silva, retarding 
the growth of capitalism. 
A further distinctive feature of the colonial situation 
was the dominance or the primacy of the colonial state. The 
incorporation of Sri Lanka into Britain's colonial empire funda-
mentally changed the political structure of traditional society by 
introducing a state apparatus which served not Sri Lankan but 
British imperial interests. The dominance of the colonial state in 
the colonial period had several implications. It played a crucial 
role in the subordination and the transformation of the 
pre-colonial Sri Lankan social formation into a peripheral 
capitalism by ruling in the interests of British merchant capital. 
This outcome was inevitable insofar as the colonial governor, the 
military officials, officials in the colonial bureaucracy and even 
the judiciary were also the investors in the plantations, hence 
had vested personal interests in the well-being of the colonial 
economic structure. The British in early nineteenth century Sri 
Lanka have been typified as a single 'planter official' class 
(Bandarage, 1982:3) . She reveals how the British colonial bu-
reaucracy was manned by an oligopoly of a few notable families 
and that the involvement of these officials in the plantation 
industry led to the neglect of their official duties. In such a 
situation the indigenous groups who were adversely affected by 
certain colonial policies had no independent means of redress and 
the impartiality even of the judiciary was questionable. 
According to Alavi , the predominance of the state is a 
feature of peripheral societies both in colonial and post-colonial 
1. Kay (1975 ) is a leading proponent of this view. 
McEachern , criticising the primacy given to merchant capital in 
explaining ' underdevelopment ' of colonial societies, argues that 
'colonial state and the merchant capital provide a potent context 
within which pressure to transform production relations become 
effective' (McEachern , 1982:17) . 
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phases. With the imposition of colonial rule, metropolitan 
bourgeoisie established a bourgeois state and attendant legal and 
institutional framework. The metropolitan bourgeoisie's task 
in the colony is not merely to replicate the superstructure of 
the state which it had established in the metropolitan 
country itself. Additionally, it has to create state apparatus 
through which it can exercise dominion over cUl. the indi-
genous social classes in the colony (Alavi, 1972:6). 
The colonial state was therefore equipped with powerful bureau-
cratic and military apparatus and mechanisms of government. The 
institution of Roman-Dutch law, the concepts of private property 
in the capitalist sense, and a bureaucracy and a judiciary to 
regulate and oversee the functioning of these structures in Sri 
Lanka were examples of domination. The presence of a military 
force and the barring or restriction of the indigenous classes 
from the political process, further strengthened the colonial 
power. 
During the colonial period metropolitan capital was not 
only directed away from economic activities which would have 
competed with the metropolitan economy but indigenous capital 
was similarly barred from independent industrial entrepreneurial 
activities and British firms retained monopolistic control of 
finance, banking, shipping, trade and insurance (S.B.D. De 
Silva, 1982:430; Shanmugaratnam, 1981:74). This inhibited the 
growth of an independent, indigenous, industrial capitalist class 
and resulted in the emergence of a subordinate comprador elite 
based largely on investments in plantation and related enterpri-
ses. Also witnessed was the emergence of rural merchant and 
usurer capitalists. As Shanmugaratnam summarized: 
the increasing circulation of commodities and monetization of 
exchange bred a class of people whose activities were cen-
tered on trade, usury, and acquisition of parcels of paddy 
land and highland, through money lending to peasantry who 
invariably lost their mortgaged land by default (Shan- 
rnugaiatnam, 	 1981:76). 
Colonial Rule and the Emergence of an Indigenous Elite 
The colonial period saw the emergence of, what is 
called in Sri Lankan literature, an indigenous elite linked to the 
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structure of perpheral capitalism in Sri Lanka. The members of 
this colonial elite consisted partly of the traditional aristocracy 
and partly of a new colonial elite. 
Dominant social groups in pre-colonial society were integrated 
into the colonial structure. Some members of the traditional 
aristocracy, such as high officials in the feudal order, 
transferred their loyalty and allegiance to the colonial ruler and 
became absorbed into the colonial socio-economic structure. This 
was particularly true in the case of maritime regions of the 
island which were subjected to Portuguese and Dutch rule long 
before the Kandyan region fell into the hands of the British. As 
a result of early exposure to a colonial system, traditional 
aristocrats and enterprising elements in the maritime regions of 
Sri Lanka had the comparative advantage over the peoples of the 
Kandyan region in participation in the colonial social and 
economic system. The indigenous elite participated in three major 
areas of the colonial economy: administration, plantations and 
related business enterprises and professions. 
From the early nineteenth century the aivtack trade, 
transport, the servicing of plantations, the export trade, the 
coffee, cinnamon, coconut, tea, rubber, graphite and gem trade, 
urban property and renting of grain taxes were channels of mobi-
lity under European rule (Roberts, 1974:565). The Portuguese and 
Dutch Company rulers and early British rulers utilized the method 
of indirect rule in Sri Lanka. Problems of language and the 
complexity of the traditional tenurial system prompted them to 
absorb the traditional chieftains into their administrative 
machines which were designed to serve the purpose of extracting 
the maximum possible wealth from the colony through trade, 
taxation and revenue. 
During the Portuguese and Dutch rule various methods 
were used by the alien rulers to recruit the traditional chieftains 
to their sphere of influence. Aggressive campaigns of religious 
proselytism were one such device. Presentation of honorific titles 
such as muhandiAcznz and rnuda24taz, generous land grants, and 
sometimes allocation of revenues of entire villages to the 
chieftains recruited in advisory and administrative capacities, 
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were other methods. ' As Arasaratnam (1971) pointed out, mobi-
lization of labour for the cinnamon industry and the collection of 
taxes and revenues through tax farming, gave ample opportunities 
for the chieftains to exploit the peasants and amass wealth 
during the Dutch rule. 
The wealth amassed by these means was later invested 
in export crop plantations, transport, the liquor trade and other 
commercial enterprises by these groups. According to Arasaratnam 
these chieftains became westernized and began to lead a 'more 
sumptious way of life'. He concludes: 
the element of change introduced by commerce and enterprise 
tended in fact to confer more power and status on the tra-
ditional ruling groups and by their enrichment gave them an 
additional lever of authority in society (Arasaratnam, 
1971:70). 
Following the rebellion in 1818 the colonial policy gene-
rally shifted from 'indirect rule through native officials' to the 
institution of a colonial bureaucracy 2 . Colonial administration 
began to be manned increasingly by British officials and trained 
and English-educated Sri Lankans were recruited to colonial 
bureaucracy in place of traditional chieftains. The English-educa-
ted Sri Lankans were largely the progeny of the traditional 
aristocrats who collaborated and were earlier absorbed into the 
colonial structure. The British policy was to produce personnel to 
man the bureaucracy, commercial, trading and plantation 
1. Peebles (1976) traced several families who later 
became 'big plantation owners' both by purchase of Crown lands 
and receipt of land grants from the British. Those Sri Lankans 
who most closely collaborated with the British received generous 
grants. For instance Solomon Dias Bandarnanaike (who was titled 
as muda2La1z , and knighted and appointed aide de camp by the 
British) was granted 500 acres (Peebles, 1976:70). 
2. As Pieris observed the 'British rulers were divided in 
opinion as to the wisdom of undermining the ascribed status of 
the old nobility. Even in the 1870's Governor Gregory favoured 
the selection of native officers from families of ancient lineage' 
(Pieris, 1964:296). 
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enterprises, and a 'body of men, respectable from superior 
education, and property... as a means of good government' 
(Pieris, 1964:297). 
The change of policy from the employment of traditional 
chieftains as administrative officials to the recruitement of 
trained and educated personnel must be seen as a response to the 
needs of the changing economic strategy of the colonial power. 
The use of traditional chieftains during Portuguese Dutch and 
British Company rule was suitable and adequate for their 
economic needs, involving the crude plunder of wealth through 
trade. But the British colonial administration required a sophis-
ticated administrative apparatus for the systematic exploitation of 
the colony. The British opened up plantations, attracted foreign 
investors and established commercial, trading and financial 
structures in the colony. The smooth functioning of these ventures 
required a modern bureaucracy and skilled personnel. They were 
also drawn from among the Western educated locals. 
Following the Colebrook Commision (1832) recommendations 
the training of English educated Sri Lankans was expedited. By 
the 1840's a number of English schools were established to cater 
for three different social categories. These were the higher class 
of Europeans and Westernized Ceylonese who required a superior 
education for higher levels of employment, 'the middle class' who 
were trained for lower rung positions, and the 'poorer sections of 
the society which were trained to occupy minor white-collar jobs 
with some knowledge of English (Fernando, 1968:70). These 
categories were treated differently. Schools modelled on British 
Grammar Schools were provided for the upper class, and poorer 
groups had schools providing written and spoken English. As 
Jupp (1978:3) sums up: the use of English in business, govern-
ment and law encouraged growth of a replica of the English 
Public Schools system with its pinnacle in Oxford or Cambridge'. 
Children of the traditional aristocracy, and, as Pieris (1964:297) 
observed, the 'sons of Modtixvi4 1 were the beneficiaries of these 
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schools. The prohibitive school fees charged in these schools 
restricted access to superior English education to the wealthy. 
The upper class schools produced the professional and adminis-
trative subgroups of the indigenous elite. 
Thus the emergence of English-educated groups within 
the indigenous elite was an outcome of a deliberate colonial 
policy designed to cater for the needs of the colonial economy. 
Not surprisingly those who received the superior English educa-
tion in the island and in London were a highly westernised 
group. Their life style and values were very much different from 
the masses and closer to those of the Europeans. 
For example, Obeysekere (1967) observes the formation of 
a socially and economically powerful elite in a southern Sri 
Lankan village during the colonial rule. The type of elite group 
formed is known as pekuttiga and is comprised of closely-related 
kin. The processes involved in the formation of pelarbtiga are the 
acquisition of offices such as police officer, tax collector, 
registrar of marriages and village headman; the changing of 
names from low subcaste to higher with the acquisition of office; 
the giving up of direct involvement in agriculture by employing 
tenants or labourers to work their lands; strategic marriages 
between families of 'notables' ; the buying up of village lands 
and establishment of control and power over villagers (Obeyese-
kere, 1967:231). 
The pelantlya of the Wijenayakes in the Hinidum Pattu 
area is a clear example of the occupational diversification of 
elite families over several generations. In this pelanti.ga the 
'founder' acquired the prestigious office of the chief tax collec-
tor, of Hinidum Pattu and subsequently the offices of tax 
collectors, 	 Vidane Aitaci. and Police Officer were held by his 
lineal descendants for six generations. In the 1960's, the pe-Can.- 
ti.ga members entered into diverse professions and white-collar 
occupations such as teacher, university lecturer, pianist, planter 
and forest officer. The accumulation of wealth by way of owning 
vast areas of land in the area enabled them to give their .  
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children an education in 'good public schools' in the urban 
centre 'which would fit them for important bureaucratic posts in 
the government' (Obeyesekere, 1967:241). According to Obeyese-
kere, the petan.tiya formation was not a process unique to 
Hinidum Pattu region: 
Historically we believe that the major portion of the 
so-called 'Sinhalese urban middle class' manning white-collar 
bureaucratic jobs in government and mercantile employment 
and constituting a national eli,te originated from pelamt4ta4 
of the type we described for our region. (Obeyesekere, 1967: 
242). 
This is particularly so because the entry into this elite was 
based on expensive English education in expensive urban elite 
schools, access to which was a 'financial impossibility' for most 
of the population except the pelarztiga members. 
Thus three broader categories can be identified in the 
Sri Lankan society under colonial domination. The highest 
positions in terms of economic, social and political power were 
held by the European planters, entrepreneurs and officials in 
colonial state apparatus such as the military, bureaucracy and 
the judiciary. A second category in the hierarchy was comprised 
of the indigenous colonial elite which consisted of plantation and 
mine owners, other related entrepreneurs, professionals and 
bureaucrats. Below these two categories was a differentiated 
peasantry and rural petty capitalist group. The gap between the 
indigenous elite and the rest of the population in terms of wealth 
and life-style was enormous (Pieris, 1950). 
In summing up, colonial domination saw 
fundamental changes in the socio-economic structure of Sri Lanka. 
The incorporation of the society into the world capitalist economy 
primarily entailed the creation of a peripheral type of economy 
characterized by its specialization in the production of primary 
agricultural commodities for the world market in return for 
manufactured goods. A strong and dominant colonial state was 
instrumental in  executing these changes by subordinating the 
indigenous social groups. Apparently the pre-colonial feudal 
elements were not entirely dissolved to be replaced with a full 
generalization of capitalist relations of production. For instance 
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the rural society is not characterised predominantly by the 
formation of a rural capitalist class and a proletariat separated 
from the means of production. Rural petty commodity production, 
peasant family labour farming, and various forms of apparently 
'feudal' or 'semi-feudal' relations persist in the rural society. 
Hence in many third world societies the 'agrarian transition' is 
said to be incomplete. This specificity can be theorised as a 
transition to 'peripheral' capitalism which is distinct from 
'metropolitan' capitalism. 
Following colonial domination, production relations took 
different form. As Alavi argued, 
Capitalism does not erase societal, institutional and cultural 
products of the past totally and substitute new social 
institutions brought out of nowhere. It takes the legacies 
from the past as the raw materials for building its society 
of the future, combining them with new societal and cultural 
realities that it also creates. This often results in an 
illustion of continuity, where profound changes have occured, 
when social phenomena are looked at in an empiricist way, 
disregarding underlying structural discontinuities and new 
significance and meanings that are infused into old forms 
thereby (Alavi, 1982a:174). 
Structural conditions defining feudal society have been transfor-
med and the ensuing social formation bears the structural featu-
res of peripheral capitalism. 
The process of social transformation under colonial 
domination in Sri Lanka witnessed the replacement of extra-econo-
mic coercion in the extraction of the surplus, and the 'unfree 
labour' of the feudal formation, by a system of 'economic compul-
sion' and 'free labour', which are conditions defining the 
capitalist mode of production. While the abolition of the feudal 
1mialtaA4a system 'freed' the labour, hardships imposed by the 
colonial economic policies compelled the peasants to engage in 
commodity production. The colonial state, bureaucratic apparatus 
and legal framework replaced the political role and the localized 
power structure of the feudal lords. The destruction of both local 
self-sufficiency and conditions of reproduction of the direct 
producers brought about the change from localized simple 
circulation of commodities in the pre-colonial formation into 
increased generalized commodity production. As demonstrated, loss 
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of sources of subsistence of the direct producer, increased tax 
burdens, monetization of transactions and the increased importa-
tion of consumer goods pushed the economy towards generalized 
commodity production. However as the economy was 'internally 
disarticulated' this condition took a distinct form where it was 
realized only by virtue of the econo my's link with the 
metropolitan economy. The geographical split of the process of 
accumulation saw the appropriation of surplus value by the 
metropolitan economy. 
It has been shown that this structural transformation 
altered the social class configuration. It caused an increase in 
the differentiation of the rural population. The peasantry became 
differentiated into landless agricultural wage labourers, and 
tenant cultivators. The emergence of a rural 'petty capitalist' 
group based on antediluvian forms such as usurer and merchant 
capital was demonstrated. At the national level an indigenous' 
colonial elite linked closely to the peripheral economic structure 
emerged. As Fitzgerald stated: 
Capitalist expansion on the world scale has engendered the 
existence of collaborative strata in the Third World which 
both orient production outwardly and exploit internally 
(Fitzgerald, 1981:15) . 
It was this indigenous colonial 	 elite which inherited political 
power from the colonial powers at the time of independence. This 
process is discussed more fully in chapter seven. 
This economic formation and class structure, created and 
articulated into a world capitalist econo my do minated by 
metropolitan economies, set in motion the current pattern of 
development in Sri Lanka. The pattern of development is charac-
terized by the absence of self-sustaining growth as a result of 
constraints posed by the. persistence of the structural relations 
and conditions of peripheral capitalist formation. 
CHAPTER S 
CONTEMPORARY RURAL SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
It was argued in chapter four that the conditions of 
reproduction of the pre-colonial village economy were transformed 
under the impact of the penetration of colonial capitalism. State 
policies with regard to land, taxation and industry were the 
primary forces instrumental in this process. Colonial land and 
taxation policy dispossessed the peasant of his land and compel-
led him to take up commodity production. As a consequence, agri-
cultural producers now needed to earn cash incomes and 
exchange-value production gradually eclipsed use-value produc-
tion. It was noted that the peasantry settled at a, lower 
equilibrium, forging those arrangements which would secure for 
them a basic minimum subsistence such that they could survive 
the changes which were taking place. 
The advent of peripheral capitalistm saw the increased 
differentiation of the agrarian population and the rapid impove-
rishment of certain sections of the peasantry, hand in hand with 
the emergence of a wealthy dominant stratum. The penetration of 
capitalist relationships into the rural society, the progressive 
subordination of the actual producers by capital, and the 
increasing integration into the world capitalist economy, and 
consequent dependence of Sri Lanka, all contributed to the 
pauperization of a significant portion of the rural population. 
Thus at the end of direct colonial rule, there had emer-
ged a rural population differentiated into structurally distinct 
social groups. In the present chapter these social strata in the 
contemporary rural society are identified, their livelihood 
patterns and strategies examined and processes of social repro- 
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duction are discussed in order to bring to light the shape of 
contemporary rural social formation under peripheral capitalism. 
Agrarian Classes 
In contemporary Sri Lankan rural society, landlords and 
rich peasants can be identified as the dominant agrarian 
classes. 1 Both these groups own large amounts of land relative 
to other agrarian classes. They do not engage in labour and 
employ others to till their lands. The form of access to the 
labour of others can be either through sharecropping or an.de or-
through wage labour. Those who employ wage labour are custo-
marily categorized as 'rich peasants' and those employing tenants 
as 'landlords'. 
Although the form of surplus extraction differs between 
wage labour and sharecropping, both are based on capitalist 
conditions. Sharecropping today is based on capitalist conditions 
of separation of the actual producer from the means of production 
and economic compulsion in the extraction of surplus. It is a 
transitory form and compatible with capitalist production (Pat-
naik , 1983:81). Underlying the sharecropping relationship is 
differential access to the ownership of land between the 
sharecropper and the landlord. The sharecropping relationship is 
one mechanism through which the tenant gains access to the 
means of production and the landlord acquires a share of the 
1. The categories used here closely follow Lenin-Mao 
scheme of agrarian classes. Mao Tse Tung (1955:137-140), utili-
zing the possession or non-possession of means of production 
-land; engagement or non-engagement in labour; and employment 
or non-employment of labour as distinguishing criteria identified 
five classes in rural China. They are: landlords, who own large 
amounts of land who do not engage in labour and who live by 
exaction of land rents from peasants; rich peasants, who as a 
rule possess land and hire in farm workers; middle peasants, 
who own or rent land, rely mainly or wholly on their family 
labour, who (thus) do not hire in or hire out labour; poor 
peasants, many of whom own no land, who as a rule rent land 
and many of whom sell part of their labour; and agricultural 
workers, who possess no land or implements and live mainly or 
wholly by selling their labour. 
produce and access to the tenant's labour (Pearce, 1983 :63 ) . 
Therefore landlords as well as rich peasants can be grouped 
under the category of 'agrarian capitalists ' . The land owned by 
rich peasants and landlords is not limited to paddy but a 
considerable portion is held in the form of cash crop small-
holdings in which wage labour is employed. 
Middle peasants or independent farmers own relatively 
small parcels of land and ideally work their lands with family 
labour and exchange labour. ' They may however hire in some 
labour in peak periods of the cultivation cycle. Peasants in this • 
category normally do not hire out their labour. Ideally, middle 
peasants are not exploited and they do not exploit others. As 
Alavi stated, the structurally descriptive term 'independent 
small-holder' should be used to identify this category because the 
independent small-holder sector is characterized by its economic 
independence from landlords and capitalist farmers ( Alavi , 1973: 
294 ) . While middle peasants or independent farmers appear not to 
be exploited ( because generally they do not hire out their 
labour) , they are actually being exploited in the exchange net-
work ( Gunasinghe , 1975b ) . The middle peasant is vulnerable to 
debt and mortgage in the case of crop failures, personal 
disasters, and in attempting to intensify cultivation. This is 
largely because the middle peasant does not produce as large a 
surplus as the rural capitalist. Because of subdivision and 
fragmentation of their lands through the system of inheritance, 
their descendents are liable to be forced into the ranks of the 
poor peasants by being compelled to take up wage labour or 
sharecropping. As Gunasinghe (1975b :117 ) correctly pointed out, 
the middle peasants 'do not control means of exchange; here 
surplus is realized in labour but it is extracted through 
exchange networks ' . Lack of alternative employment opportunities, 
population growth and consequent pressure on land threatens the 
independence of the middle peasant from the rural capitalists. 
1. In McEachern ' s (1982:15) view, however, 'those that 
own their own land and work it with household or family labour 
form a rural petite bourgoisie ' . 
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The division between the poorer middle peasants and 
tenants and wage labourers is often fluid and complex. Some 
researchers refuse to distinguish between the middle peasants and 
the poor peasants, arguing that the former are exploited by and 
dependent on the landlords and rural capitalists just as much as 
the latter. Hettige (1980:120) shows the economic dependence of 
middle peasants on capitalist farmers in his study village of 
Nilatenne. 
Poor peasants are those who may own a minute plot of 
land yet supplement their subsistence by sharecropping or by 
wage labouring.1 Most of the sharecropping poor peasants own no 
land. The sharecroppers' dependence on landlords, insecurity of 
tenure and rack renting makes their situation precarious. They 
are as underprivileged as the wage labourers. While wage 
labourers do not have any claim or rights to the lands they 
labour on, tenants seemingly have the right of cultivation of 
their tenanted land and therefore there is theoretically a degree 
of security of tenure. In addition, sharecroppers are usually in 
receipt of patronage from their landlords while wage labourers do 
not receive such assistance. For instance, tenants may receive an 
occasional meal from the landlord, a distress loan, or political 
influence to advance tenants' interests. But the tenant usually 
has to work in the landlord's garden and assist in the life-cycle 
ceremonies of the landlord's family in return for similar favours, 
whereas the wage labourer is free from such obligations. Further, 
under sharecropping, the landlord assumes only minimal risks. 
For instance in the case of a crop failure, the tenant receives no 
payment for his work. 
1. 	Roemer's 	scheme can 	be 	applied to 
data in order to classify agrarian populations. The 
classes are characterized by: 
SE=0; HI>0; H0=0 	 - Capitalist Landowners 
SE>0; H1>0: H0=0 	 - Rich Peasants 
SE>0; HI=0; H0=0 	 - Middle Peasants 
SE>0; HI=0; HO>0 	 - Poor Peasants 
SE=0; HI=0; HO>0 	 - Landless Labourers 
rural 
]Exploited 
household 
five agrarian 
Exploiters 
where SE = self employment; HI = hiring in other's labour; and 
HO = hiring out oneself (Bardhan, 1982:74). 
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The and system in Sri Lanka has several variations in 
the arrangement between the landowner and the tenant. Generally 
the landowner provides whole or part of inputs such as seeds, 
draught animals and implements) The landlord's share of produ-
ce or the rent payable by the tenant varies between half or 
three-quarters of the produce (Wickramaratne, 1977c :248)
2 . Since 
many tenants are unable to afford agricultural inputs, landlords 
usually lend seeds, draught animals and fertilizer and these 
loans are recovered after the harvest with interest. The interest 
rates on paddy seeds in some locations are reported to be as 
high as 150% (Gold, 1977:20). Thus in addition to the rent, a 
portion of tenant's share of produce is extracted by the landlords 
as interest on input loans. The landlords also extend consumption 
and distress loans to tenants. 3 Roles of moneylender, mortgagee 
and buyer of lands represent additional sources of landlords' 
income and economic power. 
Rack renting is the simplest form of exploitation of 
tenants. In addition to rent, in some localities, sharecroppers 
are required to make a payment known as nu:Ida/tang to the land-
lord for the privilege of becoming a tenant. Often the amount 
payable as nzadaAang is determined by bidding among prospective 
tenants (Gold, 1977:10). Another form of madcmang is reported in 
a village in Kegalle district. In that village, landlords offered 
1. According to Rastiannikov (1962:15) the form in which 
the landowner provides only the land and the tenant supplies 
labour and other inputs is a classical form of sharecropping. In 
the process of formation of capitalist mode of production this 
classical form changes into forms where the landowner provides 
land and greater or small part of other inputs are shared by 
both parties. The sharecropping relation may either evolve into a 
form where the sharecropper becomes capitalist tenant or a hired 
worker. 
2. The Paddy Lands Act of 1958 stipulates the maximum 
rent payable by tenants as 10 bushels per acre of paddy or 
one-quarter of the produce, whichever is less. Despite this 
regulation a significant portion of tenants in major paddy 
growing districts in Sri Lanka continue to pay rents above the 
rate fixed by the Act (see chapter 8, table 8.1). 
3. Landlords were the source of 8% of the total rural 
loans in 1957 (Sanderatne, 1972a:126). 
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the tenancy rights for the season to the farmer who offered the 
highest cash gift to them. ' 
Relations between landlords and sharecroppers are 
essentially antagonistic, although this character may be obscured 
by 'patron-client' type of relationships whose apparently 
complimentary nature is often over-emphasised. The sharecropping 
tenant may often be drawn from among the landlord's poorer 
relatives; the tenant may enjoy tenancy for a considerable length 
of time uninterrupted; the tenant may receive 'handouts', politi-
cal patronage and loans at times of distress from the landlord. 
Yet these do not negate the underlying exploitative nature of the 
sharecropping relationship which is based on unequal control and 
ownership of primary means of production - land. The share-
cropper's acquiescence does not prove the relationship is compli-
mentary either. For it is the lack of bargaining power, despera-
tion and political and economic weakness that prompts the ratio-
nal tenant to acquiesce (Herring, 1981). Competition for tenancy 
by the prospective tenants, lack of alternative employment oppor-
tunities and absence of legal claim to right of cultivation lead to 
the growth of dependency by tenants on landlords. In all, the 
bargaining position of tenants is extremely weak. It should be 
added that in Sri Lanka there is no peasants' organization or 
movement with the potential for strengthening the bargaining 
position of the peasants and protecting their rights. The above 
factors in turn contribute to the strengthening of landlords' 
position in the rural power structure. 
Both tenants and wage labourers belong to underprivi-
leged strata of the agrarian power structure. They are under-
privileged in terms of economic and political power because of 
their economic dependence on their masters. Consequently they 
1. Prior to beginning of cash payments, mada/tang was 
paid in the form of gifts. Prospective tenants offered a giftbox 
called dekum pettiga to the landlord. The dekum pettiga consisted 
usually of rice, fish, sweet meats and a sheaf of betel 
(Wanigaratne, 1977:8). Sarkar and Tambiah (1957:23) report the 
shift from payment of madaitang in kind (usually betel and 
arecanut) to compulsory payments of cash. 
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form the poorest strata in rural society. Although some poor 
peasants own land, such land is usually of a scale insufficient 
to serve as a sole source of subsistence. Hence they are 
compelled to sell their labour as tenants or wage labourers. It is 
estimated that about 40% of the households in the 'rural wage 
earning class in Sri Lanka fall below the poverty line' (Perera 
and Gunawardena, 1980:1). The members of the lowest group, 
consisting of poor peasants, landless tenants and wage labourers, 
are all extremely vulnerable to the activities of usurers who are 
prepared to mortgage their meagre assets. 
An arrangement known as the garnbaitaga system observed 
in Hambantota district is described here to illustrate a network 
of exploitative ,agrarian social relationships in operation. gantba-
/taga4 are the agents or tenants in the villages appointed by 
absentee landowners to manage and supervise the working of their 
lands. The gam bcvtaita4 manage absentee owner's lands either in 
return for a share of the produce or in some cases the lands are 
leased out to ganzba1taga4 for a fixed rent for a fixed period. 
The leasees in their turn either employ artde cultivators or wage 
labourers, or work the lands themselves, or opt for a combination 
of these. While some gam baizaga4 control relatively small holdings 
of 25-50 acres, others control holdings of up to 300 acres (Dias 
and Wickremanayake, 1977:145). 
The gam baitaga4 exploit their tenants in a variety of 
ways. The gambaiwitga4 are commonly engaged in trading and 
usury and tenants are compelled to borrow seeds, hire implements 
such as tractors and sprayers, and raise consumption loans all 
from the enterprising 9.ambcvtcuja4 who charge a high interest 
rate. The tenants in turn are obliged to patronize gamba/ulga4 1 
enterprises due to their economic dependence on them. Further the 
gam baitaga4 have infiltrated and managed to exercise control over 
co-operatives, cultivation committees and other organizations 
which are intended to safeguard the interests of small cultiva-
tors. Thus the gain ba/taga4 in Hambantota district, through the 
exercise of economic and political power over poor peasants, have 
managed to 'siphon off a high proportion of the surplus that the 
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cultivators generate' and, according to the authors 'in an area 
where eviction could result in having no land to cultivate, it 
becomes rational to suffer exploitation in silence' (Dias and 
Wickremanayake, 1977:145). Although the •ganzbaitaga system is 
unique to Hambantota district, they believe that 'the relationship 
between the gam bcutaga4 and cultivators is in general terms 
similar to the patron-client relationship that exists between the 
landlords and sharecroppers'. 
In addition to the agrarian social classes identified 
above, urban workers living in the villages form a distinct 
group. Persons in this group work in public sector agencies such 
as transport, telecommunication, public works, ports and other 
state corporations, as well as in private sector enterprises. These 
workers enjoy greater job security than the non-unionized casual 
agricultural worker and the tenant. Yet within the urban worker 
group a lumpen proletariat of hawkers, street vendors who are 
not unionized, who belong to the so-called 'informal' sector of 
the urban economy, do not enjoy the same security as the other 
workers. The urban workers residing in the villages may own 
some land in the villages. 
In the village he studied, Gunasinghe (1975b) found that 
most urban workers held some property in the village. Thus the 
urban worker residing in the villages and his family is partly 
supported by productive activities in the village economy. As 
Wallerstein (1978) argued, they are therefore part-life-time 
proletarians and are in a position where they can be exploited 
by their employer because a portion of their reproduction is not 
borne by the employer. The large number of workers commuting 
from villages to the Export Processing Zone factories located in 
the metropolitan area are a case in point. The rural residence of 
these workers obviates the necessity for the employer to provide 
urban housing for the workers and, the other family members of 
the workers' households may well engage in supplementary 
income-earning activity or in child-minding or minding the aged. 
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Thus the village economy or the so-called 'noncapitalist' sector 
subsidizes a part of the cost of production or reproduction of 
labour power. Following Meillassoux, Frank (1981:160) argues that 
those who work in these 'world market factories' are 'super-ex-
ploited '. 
The other strata in the rural society are rural merchant 
capitalists, bureaucratic, salaried and professional strata. The 
merchant capitalists referred to here are traders, entrepreneurs, 
money-lenders and usurers who are not directly living off the 
land, although they may own substantial amounts of land. The 
salaried class of occupations such as teachers, clerks and other 
bureaucrats form a category whose members commonly own some 
lands in the villages. Often these strata overlap for they combine 
landholdings with merchant capitalist activity and some of them 
also acquire salaried employment. 
Livelihood Strategies of the Rural Social Strata 
As the conditions of existence of sections of the peasant-
ry is being progressively threatened by the subsumption under 
capital, they are compelled to seek and compete for supplementary 
or alternative sources of subsistence. These livelihood patterns 
and strategies of the different strata are being examined. 
The livelihood strategies and instruments of mobility 
adopted by each stratum depend on the position of each within 
the agrarian power structure. Access to extra-village resources 
such as tenured, secure and no-risk salaried employment in the 
public sector, outside contacts with those who wield political 
power, and superior educational facilities, is positively related 
to the degree of possession of resources such as land, wealth, 
political power and prestige in the village (Moore and Wickra-
masinghe, 1980:159). 
Morrison (1980) revealed some of the income earnings 
strategies pursued by different social groups in his study village 
in the Kandy district. Income-earning strategies are restricted for 
tenants and landless labourers. Obtaining off-farm employment 
and increasing production and productivity of both highland 
crops and paddy are the primary means of offsetting the 
villager's economic burdens. Some social groups in the village 
find it extremely difficult to achieve these ends due to their 
underprivileged position in the power structure. The number of 
the unemployed and under-employed in the rural sector have been 
on the increase and employment generating ventures, such as 
light industries to absorb the excess village labour, do not exist 
in the rural sector ( International Labour Office, 1971 ) . An 
instance where a household with 13 members deriving income from 
7 sources and another with 11 members deriving income from 6 
sources was reported. The sources of income in the former case 
were: operation of 0.4 acre paddy land; casual labour in road 
construction; labour in a rubber sheet factory ; toddy tapping and 
jaggery making ; mat weaving by female members ; carpentry and 
masonry; and seasonal migration to the Dry Zone seeking work 
(Rosenberg and Rosenberg, 1978 :8 ) . These income-generating 
activities in the villages are however extremely limited in their 
capacity for employment generation for large numbers. 
Another potentially income-augmenting strategy for 
villagers is intensification of agricultural production by increa-
sing the productivity of existing landholdings and by expanding 
the area under cultivation. Bringing more land into cultivation is 
not an opportunity equally available to all, because poor 
peasants, landless tenants and farm labourers do not have suffi-
cient capital with which to buy land. Increasing productivity 
could be achieved by adoption of improved technology and impro-
ved agricultural practices. The so-called 'green revolution' which 
began in the 1960s brought this option to the paddy producing 
sector. in Sri Lanka. Yet the adoption of High Yielding Varieties 
of paddy involved substantial capital investment because it 
demanded the use of expensive inputs such as inorganic fertilizer 
and agrochemicals . 1 Poorer peasants were thus prevented from 
1. See chapter seven for details. 
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benefiting from the 'green revolution'. 
The poor peasants' opportunities and access for supple-
mentary sources of income are exceedingly limited. In addition to 
selling the family's labour (including that of children), the 
migration of the family into cities and the exploitation of 'margi-
nal and illegal ways of earning money' are adopted as income 
earning strategies by the landless and poor tenants (Morrison, 
1980:444). This mass of unemployed in the rural hinterland has 
become a cheap labour supply for the factories in the industrial 
enclaves known as, in Sri Lanka's case, the Free Trade Zone. 
Competition for salaried jobs, particularly in the state 
corporations and the bureaucracy, is high. Entrance into coveted 
jobs in state bureaucracy, the liberal professions, and executive 
jobs in the trade and commerce sector require higher educational 
qualifications. Higher education, particularly in medicine, en-
gineering, law, accountancy and• architecture, despite universal 
free educational facilities extended by the governements, are more 
readily accessible to the wealthy as the elite schools in• the 
cities are relatively expensive. Although institutional barriers to 
education for the underprivileged have ostensibly been removed 
by a universal, free education system, middle peasants, poor 
peasants' and agricultural labourers' children generally do not 
achieve superior higher education due to their parents' financial 
constraints, because of early withdrawal from the education 
system in order to supply labour needs and because of the uncer-
tainty of securing a well paid job even if qualifications are 
gained (Moore and Wickramasinghe, 1980:61). The limited number 
of high ranking public sector jobs are virtually closed to all but 
the wealthy who can afford superior education and who have 
social and political' connections with the authorities. Superior 
education in elite schools, located in the urban centres, increases 
one's chances of entering into the professions listed above and to 
the civil service. Entering into lucrative professions and high 
ranking positions in - the state •bureaucracy are common mobility 
paths for the rural elite. The accessibility of extra-village 
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resources through superior education is thus determined by one's 
socio-economic position in the villages. 
Entering into professions and obtaining white-collar 
employment in the state sector in turn, contributes to the advan-
cement of one's position in the village. The 'salaried groups' are 
better able to understand and manipulate government regulations; 
have better and easy access to state agencies; have closer 
relationships with the officials of the various government 
departments and agencies; have access to politicians and there-
fore are able to enjoy privileges for themselves and also to 
extend patronage to others. Obtaining licences, permits, and 
approvals for various projects ranging from purchasing subsidized 
fertilizer and agricultural equipments to obtaining an approval 
for an agricultural or housing loan from state agencies can be 
done more conveniently, circumventing red tape for the salaried 
and the professionals who have access to, and connections with, 
state agencies and are familiar with bureaucratic procedures. 
Since Independence, state agencies have been involved in the 
implementation of a large number of development programmes 
directed to the rural sector. The wealthy social groups have 
immensely benefited from the opportunities associated with these 
government programmes. 
The rural elites are important power brokers in the 
villages. The rural elite's ability to manipulate in the urban 
sphere serves to reinforce their position in the rural power 
structure. For instance their ability to extend patronage to 
poorer villages by acting as informal agents for the politicians 
and by mediating between the bureaucracy and the poor rural 
clients helps increase their power and prestige. Even if the 
professionals and bureaucrats shift their residence to urban areas 
they continue to wield influence in the village sphere. As Jupp 
wrote: 
It is almost invariably true that the higher professionals are 
also landed estate owners and it is this which gives them a 
rural political base. The lawyer, teacher or public servant 
is thus not simply a urbanized salary earner but may still 
exercise some political authority on his estate (Jupp, 
1978:42). 
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Infiltration of village level organizations such as 
co-operatives, Rural Development Societies, Cultivation Comittees 
and political party organizations by the rural elites consisting of 
the landlords, rich peasants, merchant capitalists and the 
salaried, contribute to strengthen their power and influence in 
the village arena. The domination of rural organizations by the 
elite has been observed frequently (Wanigaratne, 1977; Wanigara-
tne, Gooneratne and Shanmugaratnam, 1979; Yalman, 1967). 
Wanigaratne's (1977) study • of the village of Mahantegama 
provides a clear example of the process whereby the rural elites 
have infiltrated and gained access to strategic positions in rural 
organizations. In another context - that of neighbouring India - 
Barrington Moore (1977:394) aptly remarked: 'to democratize the 
village without altering property relations is simply absurd'. 
As seen in the preceeding discussion, the rural popula-
tion faces the challenge of maintaining and improving its 
economic position within the village economy and obtaining alter-
native and/or supplementary income earning opportunities outside 
the village. The rural capitalists, landlords, and the salaried 
are better able to face up to these challenges due mainly to their 
advantageous position in the rural power structure. Land, which 
provides the most important basis of power, is distributed in 
favour of these groups. As they do not solely depend on land as 
a source of income, they have a superior risk-taking capacity 
and can use the financial surplus generated elsewhere to invest 
in augmenting incomes from the land. In addition these groups 
almost invariably combine landholdings with trade, moneylending, 
hiring of agricultural equipment and machinery, white-collar 
employment and other non-farm sources of income. 
The poorer groups consisting of landless tenants, poor 
peasants, agricultural labourers and sections of the middle pea-
sants do not face up to these challenges successfully. A team of 
researchers having studied social change in rural Sri Lanka 
concludes: 
On the debit side, more regretful than the decline of the 
traditional order is perhaps the failure of a substantial 
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section of the rural population to find an adequate place in 
the new. We refer to the category which we have called 
'marginals' - those who have no land, no patrons, no edu-
cation and resources. They are rarely able to command the 
attention of the politicians at any level, and are condemned 
to lead a life of poverty and insecurity moving from here to 
there in search of scarce and ill-paid daily work (Morrison 
et al., 1979:2). 
The dynamics of rural class formation giving rise to inequality 
are discussed in the next section. 
Trends of Change 
Turning towards dynamics of the rural class configura-
tion, the major trend to be observed is the swelling of the ranks 
of the poor peasants and the wage labourers, resulting in 
marginalization of a significant section of the rural population. 
More and more rural dwellers are becoming landless tenants and 
agricultural labourers. Growth of population and the penetration 
of capitalist relations in the form of money and commodity 
relations are major factors contributing to this process. It was 
shown in the preceding discussion how the peasantry was 
differentiated and how they struggled, particularly the poor 
peasants, to secure employment outside the village economy, and 
to obtain a supplementary source of income to subsidize their 
livelihood. While tenure reforms such as the Paddy Lands Act of 
1958 and various government social welfare and subsidy pro-
grammes might have slowed down and cushioned the process of 
deterioration of poor and middle peasant classes, the penetration 
of capitalist relations, for instance via the so called 'green 
revolution' and accompanying changes in the forces of production, 
have contributed to impoverishment by subordinating actual 
producers under capital. Proletarianization of peasants and 
polarization of rural classes are twin processes that are taking 
place. 1 
1. Proletarianization can be conceptualized as the move-
ment of peasants from direct producers to part-life-time proleta-
rians, to full-life-time proletarians. Full proletarian is primarily 
a landless wage labourer and his wage needs to be sufficient to 
reproduce his labour power and his family. 
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Sufficient statistical data covering the whole island is 
not available to show these trends. Comprehensive studies on 
class formation in Sri Lanka are scarce. However information from 
scattered sources, such as several village studies, and various 
estimates about the use of hired labour in peasant agriculture in 
Sri Lanka, throw light on the situation. 
In 1927, the Interim Report of the Land Commission 
identified the sale of land to capitalists at the suit of mortgages 
as the main way that small-holders could become landless wage 
labourers (Perera and Gunawardena, 1980:42). This shows the 
movement towards dispossession of direct producers and pro-
letarianization early in this century. Sarkar and Tambiah's 
survey of the Pata Dumbara region reaffirms the progress of this 
process. They stated that: 'proletarianization of rural families 
has gone far indeed and it is labour, and unskilled manual 
labour, which now provides succour to the majority of them' 
(Sarkar and Tambiah, 1957:32). More recently, research from the 
same region led Gunasinghe (1975b:138) to assert that a trend of 
'uninterrupted and inevitable expansion of the number and 
proportion of rural workers' could be observed in rural society 
in the Kandy district. 
On the basis of data from the Economic Survey of Rural 
Ceylon 1950/51, and from the Survey Indebtedness 1957, Kelegama 
(1959:436) estimated that the proportion of rural families who 
derived their principal income by selling their labour power 
increased from 35% of all rural families in 1950-52 to approxima-
tely 44% in 1957. Accordingly the rural proletariat was the lar-
gest single 'group' in the rural economy in 1957. 
Although not comparable directly with the above, due to 
differences in the definition of categories and the methods of 
collection of data, recent estimates record that the proportion of 
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landless and near-landless rural households was 76.4% of the 
total rural households in Sri Lanka in 1973. At the same year the 
nonagricultural workers and tenant farmers together accounted for 
39.8% of the total rural households (Rosenberg & Rosenberg, 
1978: 4 ) . The fact that hired labour is a major component in 
paddy production in the island can be demonstrated by reference 
to the ratio of hired labour to total labour inputs in selected 
areas. This ratio is 78% for Polonnaruwa, 86% for Hambantota, 
59% for Kandy and 56% for Colombo district. The importance of 
hired labour is further reflected in the proportional cash outlay 
per acre for hired labour in the total cost of production of 
paddy. This proportion was 44% in Kandy, 41% in Hambantota, 
61% in Polonnaruwa, 42% in Amuradhapura and 47% in Colombo 
district (Perera and Gunawardena 1980:16). While these indicators 
point to the vital role played by hired labour the lack of time 
series data hinders the ability to plot trends. 
Mechanisms of the process of dispossession of the direct 
producers and proletarianizing them are varied. Changes in the 
forces of production, for instance those accompanying the 'green 
revolution', contribute to the polarization of classes. The 
lessening of the risks involved in paddy farming due to the 
advent of improved technology leads to the increased use of wage 
labour by landowners, because landowners now no longer have to 
share the risks with sharecroppers. Also the capital intensive 
nature of the new technology makes the rural capitalists, who 
have a greater capital investment capacity, richer while the poor 
peasants miss out on the benefits of the new technology. 
The increase in commodity production over this century 
has weakened the sharecropping relationship. For instance in the 
village of Weliwita in Kandy district, Silva (1979) reported that 
increased commodity production by the villagers was accompanied 
by eviction of sharecroppers by the landlords and their 
replacement with wage labour. The landowners' increasing 
preference for wage labour, weakens the sharecropping form of 
production relationship. Also reported is the disintegration and 
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disappearance of traditional forms of exchange labour known as 
at:tam . 1 Hettige (1980) also observed the twin process of con-
centration of means of production and the growth of wage labour 
in his study village in the Northcentral Sri Lanka. 
Evidence from fishing villages show trends similar to 
those described above in the paddy producing villages. Data from 
a fishing village in Southern Sri Lanka which is subjected to 
penetration of capitalist relations over the years suggested that 
'the community is rapidly polarizing into two opposed classes: a 
small capitalist elite and a large mass of poor peasants' 
(Alexander, 1982:61). Further the independence of the middle 
peasants is being threatened and they are rapidly becoming 
impoverished. According to Alexander (1982:38) the middle peas-
ants - men who are making a living by fishing with their own 
gear - 'in their own eyes are a threatened and diminishing 
group'. He found that the middle peasants in his study village 
albeit owners of means of production (fishing gear), were forced 
to mortgage or sell their assets when faced with protracted ill-
ness, a poor year's fishing or a court case. 
The predicament of the poor peasant is similar in both 
fishing and paddy cultivating communities. Although most poor 
peasants own some fishing gear, the return is insufficient for 
subsistence and therefore they are forced to sell their labour to 
others, or to seek supplementary sources of subsistence. In the 
fishing villages too therefore, a process of class polarization is 
taking place. Another study of a fishing community called Mirissa 
brings evidence to support this claim. In Mirissa, shifts in class 
positions are reported, involving the marginalization of poor 
fishermen and the upward mobility of 'big capitalist fishermen', 
due largely to technological changes (Marga, 1981:4). 
1. For an analysis of the process of disintegration of 
the attain system, see Gunasinghe (1975a). 
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In summary, the village studies indicate that downward 
mobility of the middle peasant forces him to seek supplementary 
sources of subsistence. It may be that the majority of the middle 
peasant category will eventually join the ranks of the wage la-
bourers, landless tenants and poor peasants. The poor peasant in 
the mean time is being rapidly forced out of the village economy 
and compelled by circumstances to join the rural wage labour 
class or the urban lumpen proletariat. In recent times the sect-
ions of the poor peasantry desperately looking for outside em-
ployment have become subjects of 'super-exploitation' by the 
'world market factories' in the industrial enclaves. 
Although the survival of the sections of the middle and 
poor peasantry are being progressively threatened they have 
shown a remarkable degree of resilience. Therefore capital has 
not yet completely pauperized the peasantry in Sri Lanka. The 
populist policies of the post-independence regimes have been a 
contributory factor in containing or slowing down the process of 
capital taking over from the peasants. As seen by Alavi: 
given the ability of the poor peasant to survive on his bit 
of land, supplemented possibly by outside employment, it is 
necessarily a slow and difficult process for capital to take 
over from the peasant... Peasants by contrast to urban petty 
commodity producers are able to survive a little longer 
because of the logic of their economic situation ... Peasants 
may not disappear overnight. But the conditions of their 
existence are being progressively undermined. That is an 
aspect of the dyng.mics of peripheral capitalist development 
(Alavi, 1982a:190). i 
At the other end of the spectrum, the emergence of what 
is called the 'second division' elite, aided by programmes such 
as the 'green revolution', is also observable in the villages. The 
traditional rural elite is typically high caste, descended from the 
'notable' families of the past and their economic strength is 
mainly based on ownership of land. In contrast the 'second 
1. This view of the inevitable demise of the peasantry 
with the development of capitalism and the ideology behind this 
view is exposed by Giner and Sevilla-Guzman (1980). They argue 
that research on the peasantry had been adversely biased by the 
assumption of necessary disappearence of peasantry held both by 
the 'liberals' and the 'Marxists'. Also see Muller (1979). 
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division elite' may be described as merchant capitalists emerging 
in the villages investing in trade, agricultural machinery and 
equipment, rice mills and the like and engaging in usury. Many 
descendants of the traditional elite have moved into urban 
residence following entry into the professions or state sector 
employment. They may either sell their lands in the villages or 
employ leasees (such as ganzbcutaga4 in Hambantota ). The so-call-
ed 'second division' or 'new elite' seem to fill the vacuum created 
by the traditional elite. For instance so me village studies 
revealed how the members of this new elite dominate village level 
organizations by holding strategic positions in them (Morrison et 
al., 1979:33-35). This second division elite is none other than the 
rural capitalists emerging following the rapid spread of capitalist 
relations in the 1960s. 
For instance, Alexander (1981) interprets the April 1971 
revolt in Sri Lanka as 'the product of the competition between 
the landlord class which dominated rural Sri Lanka since the 
middle of the nineteenth century and the class of rural 
capitalists which emerged after the World War II. According to 
Alexander, in 1970 the landlord class or the petamthia 	 members 
which emerged in the British period were the dominant group in 
the villages, particularly in the low country, in terms of wealth 
and the control of electoral organization of both the United 
National Party and Sri Lanka Freedom Party, access to local 
agencies of central government, control of goods and services 
provided by the central government and in terms of access to 
white-collar employment. The rural capitalists or the m adala2i4 
emerged from peasant families and their economic activities were 
concentrated in transport, rice milling, fish and vegetable 
wholesaling and retailing through village shops. (Alexander, 
1981:118). 
CHAPTER. 6 
THE POWER STRUCTURE AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL 
This chapter focusses on the structure of power at the 
national level. The emergence during the colonial period of 
dominant indigenous professional, bureaucratic and entrepreneu-
rial groups was discussed in chapter four. The groups which 
emerged and came into prominance during the colonial period 
(described in Chapter Four collectively as the 'colonial indige-
nous elite' ) have formed into distinct power groups and classes 
in post-independence Sri Lanka. Led mainly by the professional 
and buraucratic groups and backed by the entrepreneurial group, 
a movement demanding self-governement was launched which 
culminated with the gaining of independence from British rule in 
1948. Since then the leading activists behind the independence 
movement have been consolidated into a 'ruling clique' and have 
been exercizing dominance and control of politics and government 
in post-independence Sri Lanka. This chapter is concerned to 
outline the consolidation of their position following independence, 
to analyze the characteristics and composition of the contemporary 
power groups and to identify their alliances and political and 
economic strategies. 
In Chapter One the conceptual issues involved in analy-
zing economic and power structures were clarified and the major 
groups making up the dominant power group coalition in the 
peripheral capitalist social formation were identified. The 
politico-administrative elite, and the idigenous bourgeoisie (with 
its comprador and national fractions) have been identified as the 
dominant indigenous groups. 
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The Independence Movement and the Consolidation of the 
Politico-Administrative Elite 
The participation in the movement for self-governement of 
the dominant indigenous groups which emerged during the colonial 
period was motivated by a number of social, political and 
economic factors. Their relations with the British, particularly 
towards the latter part of the British colonial rule in the island, 
was of an ambivalent nature. Whilst the dominant indigenous 
groups desired the economic, political and social benefits and 
privileges which could be generated from their liaison with the 
British, certain restrictions and exclusions imposed by the 
colonial rulers led to discontentment among them. Thus sections of 
this selfsame indigenous group which aped western social and 
cultural values and lifestyle also championed movements for the 
revival of indigenous religion and culture and fought to protect 
the Sri Lankan culture from alien western influences. These 
movements subsequently merged and were transformed into the 
nationalist movement which campaigned for self-government. 
Sources of discontent were many. For the bureaucratic 
section of the colonial elite the major sources of discontent were 
to be found in the denial of access to the top positions in the 
state apparatuses (the top positions were dominated by British 
officials) (Fernando, 1968:409); Pieris, 1964:300), salary discr-
mination through payment of higher salaries and pensions to 
British officials who held qualifications comparable to Sri 
Lankan bureaucrats, and the practice of employing more aliens 
ahead of Sri Lankans in the Civil Service. 
The entrepreneurial sector, or the prospective indigenous 
bourgeoisie, expressed discontent with the restrictive trade, 
shipping, finance and insurance policies of the British. Virtually 
all shipping, insurance, finance and trading establishments, as 
well as majority of large tea and rubber plantations were owned 
by European capitalists. Hence the metropolitan capitalists were 
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able to restrict the participation of the Sri Lankan entrepreneurs 
in the most lucrative of ventures and so to discriminate against 
them. As Oliver (1957:19) pointed out the local entrepreneurs were 
'especially enraged by the colonial government's investing its 
surplus funds outside the island instead of lending those funds to 
Ceylonese interests'. The Local elite also complained about 
British trade monopoly in the island. 
Besides these employment and business related sources of 
resentment the dominant indigenous groups had had many bitter 
social and cultural experiences during the colonial period. 
Although they adopted a highly westernized lifestyle and dis-
played a 'fervent xenophilia ' they were not treated as equals by 
the British officials and the European business community and 
planters in social and cultural activities. For instance some 
recreational clubs fromed by the British expatriates denied 
membership to the Sri Lankans. As Fernando points out, the often 
obsessional and 'awkward attempts to imitate dress, speech and 
behaviour of "English gentlemen" by the Asian and African elites 
appeared comical and earned the ridicule of the Europeans' 
(Fernando, 1973:362). Their frustration also resulted from status 
inconsistency. They were deprived of the political power and 
participation 'appropriate' to their superior social and economic 
position among the Sri Lankan masses. Their Westernization also 
denied them their roots in traditional society. 
A new class had come into .- existence in Ceylon by 1900. 
Educated in the - language and traditions of the colonial mas-
ter and skilled in the use of his tools, yet deprived of 
social status both by the traditional aristocracy of the 
culture he had forsaken and by the Western master whose 
skills he had acquired, the new middle-class man no longer 
was content with supplication and began, vociferously though 
peacefully, to demand his rights (Singer, 1964:34). 
A distinguishing feature of the nationalist movement was 
that it was comprised almost exclusively of the colonial elite. The 
participation of the mass of the population in the movement for 
self-govenement was minimal; therefore it cannot be considered as 
a broadly based anti-colonial struggle. It should however, be 
noted that activities of the growing trade union movement , of the 
urban workers led by militant Marxists played an important role 
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in the agitation against colonial rule l . Although the peasant land 
question was raised in propaganda against the colonial rulers the 
large mass of Sri Lankan peasantry was not mobilised for 
collective action by the leaders of the nationalist momvement. 
Further, the leadership was largely an urban-based one. 
The political arm of the colonial elite was the Ceylon 
National Congress which was formed in 1919 to carry out the 
campaign for self-government. It was practically an extension of 
the Low Country Products Association which was comprised of 
plantation owners and businessmen and the Chilaw and Jaffna 
Associations. The latter associations consisted mainly of professio-
nal and business interests in respective areas. In short, 
the Ceylonese nationalist movement, unlike its counterpart in 
India, was confined almost exclusively to a middle class 
intelligensia of professional, commercial and proprietary 
folk. But it is necessary to be quite clear on this point: the 
men being discussed here were extremely wealthy by 
Ceylonese standards (Singer, 1964:37). 
Thus the movement for self-government was a vehicle 
which united the indigenous colonial elite against the colonial 
rulers, cutting across caste, ethnic and religious divisions. 
Following independence they came virtually to monopolize the 
political sphere. 
Independence can be seen as the formal event which 
marked the consolidation of the groups which were prominent in 
the nationalist movement as the politico-administrative elite of 
post-independence in Sri Lanka. Independence gave them a 
monopoly of government and of political control, and exclusive 
and indiscriminate access to top positions in the state apparatus 
including the judiciary, bureaucracy, and the military vacated 
by the departing British officials. Independence also placed them 
on the top rung of the social ladder which was earlier the 
domain of the colonial planter-official aristocracy. The poli-
tico-administrative elite grew in power and prestige over the 
(1972). 
1. On the role of the labour movement see, Jayawardena 
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years as the state assumed an increasingly dominant role in the 
peripheral capitalist economy. 
Significant changes in the structure of the politico-
administrative elite said to have been taken place in the post-
independence period. Singer (1964) has argued that in the late 
1950 ' s a 'new synthesizing elite' emerged in Sri Lankan politics. 
The new, emerging political elite was to be distinguished from 
the Westernized indigenous elite who replaced colonial rulers at 
the time of independence. 
More parochial and more bound to traditional values than 
their earlier counterparts, this emerging elite attempts to 
synthesize the values 1 of the past with the values of the 
future (Singer, 1964:7) . 
The socio-economic characteristics of the many members 
of the post-1948 national legislatures - particularly the large 
number of members representing rural constituencies - only 
loosely approximate those identified by Singer. However, it cannot 
be argued that the socio-economic characteristics of the political 
leadership wielding effective power or the decision-making elite 
ranks have significantly changed. Prime ministers, political party 
leaders and cabinet ministers holding strategic portfolios in the 
post-independence period have tended to be drawn from a 
relatively small circle of interrelated families which often claim 
1. He argued that the Westernized elite - 'the group to 
whom the British first began to transfer political power were: 1. 
Broadly Ceylonese, 2. Largely Christian, 3. Mostly high-caste 4. 
Highly urbanized, 5. Highly Western-educated, 6. Largely, 
engaged in Western-type occupations and 	 7. Of the highest 
economic and social class' 	 whereas the emerging political elite 
is '1. Overwhelmingly Sinhalese, 2. Heavily Buddhist, 3. Largely 
rural, 4. Generaly less educated but more Swabasha -educated, 5. 
Engaged in more traditional occupations and 6. Very largely 
drawn from the middle economic and social classes' (Singer, 
1964:49). 
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descent from the elite which emerged during the colonial period. ' 
Yet the lower and middle ranks of the political elite have been 
made open to the members of the 'non elite' in the post-inde-
pendence period by the extension of educational facilities to rural 
areas, aided by the universal franchise and with the growing 
intensity of mass politicization ( Fernando, 1973 ) . 
According to Singer when any definitive study of the 
new civil service is made 'it will show that the civil servants 
recruited in recent years possess all of the "intermediate" quali-
ties displayed by their counterparts in the emerging political 
elite" (Singer, 1964: 123 ) . Again, the enlargement of the state 
sector and consequently, the civil service over the years, the 
spread of educational facilities to rural areas, and the opening 
up of university education to students of vernacular languages, 
have no doubt contributed to the recruitment of civil servants 
and professionals from the rural elite families thus broadening 
the spectrum. Nevertheless, the top ranks of the civil service and 
state apparatus, such a study will show, is dominated by persons 
from wealthy families who have access to the superior educational 
facilities of the elite schools in the urban centres and by persons 
who have connections to the elite. Some confirmation of these 
claims may be found in the work by Jiggins (1979) which, whilst 
not a study of composition of civil service, points to the fact 
that many of the top positions in the state apparatuses are held 
by close relatives of the political elite. 
A more important development over the years is the 
rapid growth of the politico-bureaucratic elite or the 'state bour- 
1 . All but one prime minister of Sri Lanka between 1948 
and 1970,  for instance, belonged to one of two elite family 
groups. Fernando observed that the 'Cabinet, Courts, Central 
Bank, Planning Ministry, Permanent Secretaries of Ministries, 
Heads of Government Departments, and other crucial decision-
making areas' are the monopoly of the elite ( Fernando, 1973 : 378 ) . 
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geoisie ' in Sri Lanka. ' The relatively weak position of the in-
digenous bourgeoisie and the massive expansion of state sector in 
the post-independence period saw the bolstering of their power. 
The number of state enterprises has continually increased since 
1956. This has meant 
not only an enlargement of the bureaucracy but increase in its 
power. Thus state-guided capitalism has contributed to the 
consolidation of the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. Members of this 
salaried middle class 
play an active and vigorous role in the politics of periphe-
ral Societies and much of the thrust of their political de 
mands is directed towards positions of power in the state 
apparatus as such. The state is their biggest and most 
remunerative employer - and, given corruption and nepotism, 
for their kin ( Alavi , 1982b : 300 ) . 
Their political and economic role has increasingly be-
come crucial in Sri Lanka. Because of their exposure to alien 
language, culture and ideas, and consequent influence exerted by 
this exposure, and their position as holders of top echelons of 
bureaucracy, military and state sponsored or state-owned 
enterprises, the politico-bureacratic elite is strategically im-
portant for the metropolitan powers. 
Growth of the Indigenous Brougeoisie 
Paralelling the growth of the politico-administrative elite 
is the rise of the indigenous bourgeoisie. Most researchers have 
grouped dominant entrepreneurial, professional, political and 
bureaucratic groups in post-independence Sri Lanka together 
under the category of 'elite' and have given relatively scant 
attention to the formation of an indigenous bourgeoisie out of the 
entrepreneurial groups. Therefore material on the indigenous 
bourgeoisie is scarce and calls for fresh research. 
1. The emergence of a state bourgeoisie is observed in 
other third world societies - for instance in Tanzania ( Shivji 
1976 ) , and Latin America ( Roxborough , 1979; Petra s , 1978 ) . 
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The dominant position of the politico-administrative elite 
over the indigenous bourgeoisie is due to the formation and 
growth of the latter under the shadow of colonial domination. The 
close interconnections forged by ties among the different dominant 
groups have given them an oligarchic character and further leads 
one to see them all as a single elite group. However it is very 
important to make the analytical distinction between politico-
administrative elite and the indigenous bourgoisie and within the 
indigenous bourgeoisie between the comprador and the national 
fractions in order to fully explain the course of peripheral 
capitalist development in post- independence Sri Lanka. 
As for the indigenous bourgeoisie Independence marked a 
beginning of an era which saw an increase in their strength. For 
instance a progressive process of Sri Lankanization of 
foreign-owned plantations took place since the 1950's transferring 
the ownership to local capitalists. The Sterling Companies' share 
of ownership in the total tea crop acreage in Sri Lanka dropped 
from 46% in 1955 to 24% in 1972, while that of Rupee Companies 
rose from 11% in 1955 to 25% in 1972 (Bansil, 1971:183; Pieris, 
1978:615). Also conducive to their growth are the policies of 
import-substituting industrialization, the 'green revolution' 
programme, and the current economic policy of export led indus-
trialization. Policies of both the major political parties, which 
held parliamentary power alternatively since 1948, have generally 
been favourable to the indigenous bourgeoisie. This will be 
elaborated in Chapter Seven in the discussion of post-independ-
ence economic policies. 
While the entrepreneurs in the import-export business, in 
plantations and in mining played a comprador role on behalf of 
metropolitan capital, a national fraction within the indigenous 
bourgeoisie began to emerge during the late 1950's. The 
import-substituting industrialization policy, curbs and controls on 
metropolitan influence in the economy (such as the nationalization 
of foreign oil companies) imposed by governments led by Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party was especially conducive to the growth of 
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this fraction. The political attitude of the national fraction has 
been 'nationalistic' and they demonstrated their willingness to 
enter into anti-imperialist political coalitions. Their rallying 
around the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna, and the coalitions led by 
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party in the 1960's that propagandised an 
anti-imperalist platform, is a case in point. 
Cohesion and Division among the Dominant Groups 
As noted above the close interconnectedness of the domi-
nant power groups has been highlighted by researchers (Jiggins, 
1979; Fernando, 1973). Indeed kin and family ties often cut 
across these groups and give the impression of an exclusive elite 
group. It is this aspect which is discussed in the following 
pages. However the oligarchic character of the dominant power 
groups must not be so overemphasized as to mar the analytical 
distinctions drawn in the preceeding discussion. 
Further the 'secondary' lines of conflict such as race, 
religion and language are important in Sri Lanka in shaping up 
the power structures. The cleavages derived from non-property 
based structures, according to Roxborough (1979:73) are an 
important factor influencing class structures in the Third World 
countries. 
Religion and ethnicity have resulted in some rivalry 
within the politico-administrative elite particularly in the 1950's 
and 1960's when extreme nationalists among the Sinhalese elites 
whipped up sentiments of the Sinhalese. However, despite recur-
rent anti-Tamil violence by the Sinhalese since May 1958, the•
elites representing the Tamil community have enjoyed significant 
political power, sometime in coalition with the Sinhalese political 
parties, without effective opposition until the 1970's when the 
militant Tamil youth embarked on a struggle for separatism and 
self-determination in a manner which by-passed the leadership of 
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the elites . 1 The political leadership of both the Tamil, the 
Sinhalese and other ethnic communities comes from the politi-
co-administrative elite ranks of the respective communities. 
Caste has been a factor relevant in faction formation. 
As Roberts (1982 ) argued, the subordinate and low caste status of 
Ka/taw a, Salaganza, and Diviava castes relative to the gogigcuna 
provided both the 'incentive and leeway for some families of 
these castes to make use of new economic and political opportu-
nities for self-advancement and consequently [ they joined ] the 
indigenous elite in the colonial period ' . He too, agrees that the 
dialectics of caste competition cannot be regarded as the key 
phenomena determining the power structures today. 
Of the cohesive factors, the family and kinship ties 
(irrespective of ethnic, religious or caste groups) have clearly 
illustrated the oligarchic nature of the dominant groups and it 
has been frequently observed and documented by researchers: 
An observable fact is that caste and family ties, of whatever 
political hue, act as political solvents because of close links 
among the islands' well knit elitist middle class. The elite 
is therefore all-pervasive and capable of influencing policy 
decisions ( Wilson , 1979 : xviii ) . 
Jiggins found that 'power at the elite level is derivative of fami-
ly and caste...' Further, she wrote: 
...despite universal franchise, parliamentary procedures, 
frequent transference of power at peaceful elections in an 
increasingly two party system, and the emergence of the 
populist policies of post-1956, the grip of a few families on 
place and power. in Sri Lanka has been diluted only 
marginally ( Jiggins , 1979:96 ) . 
1. The movement for separatism led by Tamil youth who 
resort to non-parliamentary methods to achieve their , objectives 
parallels the April 1971 revolt in that both are largely the 
results of discontent of youth over the elite leadership's inability 
to bring about satisfactory solutions to the country's economic, 
political and social problems. 
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Yet another researcher remarked: 'A common style of life, marria-
ge alliances and kin networks cut across political factions of the 
elite(Obeyesekere, 1974:382). The leadership of Sri Lanka's 
political parties, according to Fernando (1973:372), 'has been 
more a family affair than a matter decided by the party organi-
zation' . Thus the Sri Lankan politico-administrative elite is 
undoubtedly a group inter-connected through family ties. This is 
true not only of the political leadership but also of business, 
military, religious as well as bureaucratic sectors (see Jiggins, 
1979). 
Common style of life and a common educational back-
ground exhibited by the Sri Lankan elite further enhance their 
solidarity. Members of the strategic politico-bureaucratic elite are 
products of select urban elite schools established during the 
period of colonial rule to cater for 'upper class natives'. 
Fernando (1973:378) has investigated the role of the five leading 
elitist schools 1 in the making of people's representatives in the 
parliament. In the 1956 parliament, 38 members, constituting 38% 
of the total number of members, were educated in these five 
schools. In the 1970 parliament, 48 members, constituting 31% of 
the total, were products of these schools. Further, 11 out of a 
total of 20 total of 20 cabinet ministers in 1970 were products of 
these five schools. It is well known in Sri Lanka that one's 
chances of joining the elite ranks are considerably increased if 
educated in these schools. This common educational experience 
contributes to a similar socializing influence and fosters 
homogeniety of the dominant groups. It is true the high level of 
integration among them is fostered by common education and 
socio-economic background and the operation of kinship networks. 
These factors have produced a common lifestyle sufficient to give 
an oligarchic nature to the dominant group coalition in Sri 
Lanka. Due to strategic marriage alliances among the members of 
the dominant .groups, there is an overlap and inter-connection 
among them. 
1. The five elite schools are Royal College, St. Thomas's 
College, Ananda College, St. Joseph's College and Trinity College. 
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Although the ' secondary ' lines of division or ' subsi-
diary ' lines - those based on non-property factors such as reli-
gion or ethnicity - are important, they are not the sole pheno-
mena determining power structures. While the above factors are 
important in understanding their integration, they do not fully 
explain the power structure in Sri Lanka. The class origin, class 
affiliation and common economic interests are crucial in explain-
ing the power structure, the alliances among different factions, 
and the relationship between these groups and the psot-colonial 
state. 
As the politico-bureaucratic elite are recruited from the 
land-owning and property-holding families, their interests 
overlap with the indigenous bourgeoisie. Hence the government 
policies are formulated not to clash with those interests or, when 
such policies are formulated, not to be effectively implemented or 
enforced. ' This is not surprising : 
for the class that is affected is directly represented within 
the state apparatus by virtue of the class origins of its 
officials, and is able thereby to undermine the implementa-
tion of measures directed against itself. Likewise we encoun-
ter cases of cla44 al filiation, irrespective of the class ori-
gin , of officials who acquire close links with either the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie or the local bourgeoisie, whose 
interests they pursue vigorously and usually effectively 
(Alavi , 1982b :300 ) 
The Dominant Groups and Their Alliancesand Strategies 
The relationship between the dominant groups, the 
nature of the state and policies, cannot be understood simply by 
describing post-independence politics as faction-fighting between 
family groups. The politico-bureaucratic elite, the land and other 
property owners ( indigenous bourgeoisie ) and the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie represented by the multinationals, are three strategic 
groupings present in peripheral capitalist societies. 
1 .See , for example, the Paddy Lands Act in Sri Lanka 
discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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The end of direct colonial rule did not end the presence 
and influence of metropolitan capital in colonized societies. As 
Alavi pointed out: 
foreign capital - the metropolitan bourgeoisie on its own - 
has a structural presence in post-colonial societies and their 
state apparatus - its hand is not removed with independence 
any more than it is absent in those countries that have not 
been subjected to direct colonial rule. It is represented in 
peripheral capitalist societies and the state doubly. It is 
represented in the first instance through its own local 
presence, organization and resources. But this direct 
presence is greatly reinforced through the mediation on its 
behalf of the respective metropolitan states in their dealings 
with states in peripheral capitalist societies (Alavi, 1982b:- 
297 ). 
Obtaining political independence from colonial rule did not end 
the presence or influence of the metropolitan capital in Sri 
Lanka. For instance Sterling Companies (companies registered in 
United Kingdom) owned 29% of the total tea acreage in Sri Lanka 
in 1968 and 24% in 1972 (Bansil, 1972:183; Peiris, 1979:615). 
Further, even in the 1960's when the import-substituting 
industrialization policy was in vogue, foreign private liabilities 
in the manufacturing sector in Sri Lanka were considerable (see 
Balakrishnan and Gunasekera, 1977:272). The stopping of aid to 
Sri Lanka from the U.S.A. in retaliation for the nationalization of 
foreign oil companies in 1964, is an example of mediation by 
metropolitan states on behalf of metropolitan capital. 1 Today, 
with the opening up of Free Trade Zones and the policy of 
inviting foreign investment by offering generous incentives, the 
presence and influence of metropolitan capital in the country has 
escalated. 
1. Seers (1981) discusses the ways in which metropolitan 
states mediate on behalf of the multinationals, giving examples 
from Chile, during Allende's government, and other third world 
countries. Also of relevance is Petras' (1978:52-56) analysis of 
the imperial states' role in sustaining amd destabilizing social 
regimes in the periphery. In Sri Lanka, for example •the 
multinational pharmaceutical firm Pfizer Ltd. 'foiled a nationa-
lization threat by the Sri Lankan government in 1973 by exerting•
political pressure through the United States government'. (S.B.D. 
De Silva, 1982:488). 
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The alignment between these dominant groups is crucial 
in determining the pattern of development in peripheral capitalist 
societies such as Sri Lanka. As Shanin pointed out, the ways in 
which capitalism in a 'developing society' is run depends, among 
other factors, 
on the confrontation and compromise within a 'triple alliance 
of local property owners, multinational companies and those 
who control the state economy in its indirect and direct 
sense (Shanin , 1982:317). 
The competing interests of the dominant groups and 
alliances forged with the other social strata largely explain 
different strategies and the pattern of capitalist development in 
the post-independence period. The post-independence national 
regimes in Sri Lanka have adopted economic and political strate-
gies ranging from the ' neo-colonial ' to the 'national popular 
strategy ' . The neo-colonial strategy is characterized by a closer 
alliance between the local entrepreneurs and the metropolitan 
bourgeoisie in order to extract surplus from the labour force 
while the 'national bourgeoisie development strategy' attempts to 
limit the share going to imperial firms. The national popular 
strategy is characterized by popular and broad alliances of 
dominant strata with labouring populations .
1 
The analytical distinction between 'comprador ' and 
'national' fractions of the third world's indigenous bourgeoisie 
aids an understanding of class structure, its economic and politi-
cal stratgeies and class alliances in the post-independence natio-
nal regime. Within the Sri Lankan bourgeoisie these groups 
which have direct links with the metropolitan capital - part-
owners, executives and managers of foreign-owned plantation 
companies, agency houses, finance and insurance firms, and 
multinationals present in the country - can be regarded as the 
comprador fraction. Those groups which do not have direct links 
with the metropolitan capital and are adversely affected by the 
presence of metropolitan capital ( the group of entrepreneurs who 
invested in import-substituting industries in the 1960 ' s , 
indigenous entrepreneurs investing in domestic industries indepen- 
1 . See Chapter One, p.39 for the classification of these 
strategies. 
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dent of metropolitan capital ) , fall into the national fraction. 
While the compra dor bourgeoisie is ancillary to foreign capital, 
the national or industrial bourgeoisie 's relationship with foreign 
capital is ambivalent (Alavi , 1982b :297 ) . 
The compra dor fraction has traditionally rallied behind 
the United National Party. The United National Party at its 
inception in 1945-46 was comprised mainly of the members of the 
Ceylon National Congress ( Wriggins , 1960:106) and therefore was 
'little more than the Ceylon National Congress with a different 
name' (Singer, 1964:44 ) . The Ceylon National Congress, it should 
be recalled, comprised mainly of the entrepreneurs based on the 
export economy, and professionals. 
The United National Party programme in 1947 was not 
antagonistic to metropolitan capital. What the United National 
Party sought was increased collaboration between the local and 
foreign capital and increased participation of Sri Lankans in 
foreign ventures. Although the United National Party wanted 
'substantial transfer of income and economic power from foreign 
hands to the Ceylonese ' , it also encouraged 'foreign capital to 
bring new enterprises and techniques to the island' and required 
the foreign business 'to take larger numbers of Ceylonese into 
their employment and into corporate responsibility' ( Wriggins , 
1960: 117 ) . Moreover nationalization of foreign plantations and 
business was not in their programme. Thus the United National 
Party has been serving the interests of metropolitan capital and 
the compra dor fraction of the indigenous capital. In contrast, in 
its 1952 programme Sri Lanka Freedom Party appealed to the 
nationalist fraction ( in addition to promise to promote indigenous 
Sinhalese culture and religion denouncing Western influences ) by 
emphasising the nationalization of foreign plantations and banks. 
That the Sri Lanka Freedom Party - led regimes had 
forged close alliances with the national bourgeoisie interests, is 
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evident from their economic and political strategy. The United 
National Party generally represented the comprador interests. It 
should be noted there has been considerable overlap of interests. 
However the stronger commitment of past Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
regimes to state capitalist policies, and nationalization program-
mes, was very favourable to the national bourgeoisie and 
the -politicwadministrative elite. Conversely, the United National 
Party regimes have shown a tendency to forge strong links with 
metropolitan capital and comprador interests. 
These class alignments of the United National Party and 
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party are reflected in their economic and 
political strategies throughout the post-independence period. The 
United National Party •has shown preference for a neo-colonial 
strategy mixed with national bourgeoisie developmentalism, while 
the Sri Lanka Freedom Party has adopted a national bourgeoisie 
development strategy mixed sometimes with national populism. 
Before examining these strategies it should be noted that 
National bourgeoisie developmentalism overlaps considerably 
with the neo-colonial approach in some cases; in other in-
stances it approximates the national popular approach 
(Petras, 1978:46). 
Further the relationship between the metropolitan capital and the 
national fraction of the local bourgeoisie has not always been of 
a rivalist nature: 
Foreign capital opposes the development of this local rival 
but at the same time, insofar as it does develop, certain 
sections of foreign capital (especially those engaged in high 
technology industries) will seek collaborative relationships 
with it (Alavi, 1982b:297). 
Therefore strict stereo-typing of the United National Party as a 
party of 'compradors' and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party as a 
party of 'national bourgeoisie' is misleading. 
As noted above the United National Party generally has 
been collaborative with metropolitan capital. During 1948-1956 
they placed greater emphasis on foreign enterprise. Subsequently 
1. It can be argued that this has been taking place . 
since the opening up of the Free Trade Zone in Sri Lanka in 
1978. 
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the United National Party, in its term of office from 1965-1970 
welcomed the 'green revolution' programme, and the multinational 
corporations were among the principal beneficiaries of that 
programme. The liberalization of trade, the establishment of Free 
Trade Zones, and the invitation of foreign investors (to whom 
were given generous tax concessions and incentives) and the 
enforcement of laws to discipline the labourers have all been 
policies of the United National Party since 1977. They clearly 
indicate a preference for a strategy of development responsive to 
forces from outside. Thus, under the United National Party, the 
policy of establishing symbiotic relationships with the metropoli-
tan bourgeoisie which began in 1948 with the inflow of foreign 
investments, continued in the 1960's through the 'green revolu-
tion' and has culminated in an export-led industrialization policy 
after 1977. 
The national developmentalist strategy of the third world 
national regimes was informed by and reflected the influence of 
United Nations-Prebisch development thinking of the 1960's. The 
stated objective of the strategy was to initiate autonomous 
capitalist development by minimizing the control of, and the 
benefits flowing to, hegemonic centers of the world economy. State 
intervention in the form of provision of subsidies, tarrif 
protection, provision of low-cost finance and import-substituting 
industrialization were the policies based on this strategy. Sri 
Lanka pursued this type of strategy vigorously in the 1960's. 
The import-substituting industrialization policies of the 
Sri Lanka Freedom Party in early 1960's indicate support for the 
national bourgeoisie over the comprador fraction. The Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party policy was that of increased state participation in 
the economy. The magnitude of the expansion of public sector 
activity is indicated by the rise in the number of public 
corporations. 1 In 1956 the number of semi-autonomous public 
corporations was less than 25, but by 1977 it rose to 141 
1. During the Sri Lanka Freedom Party-led parliament of 
1956-1965, the number of public enterprises increased from 10 to 
34 (Sobhan, 1979:419). 
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(Lakshman, 1980:19). This expansion of state participation 
entailed growth in the state ownership and control of the wealth 
and resources of the country. This in turn, meant an increase in 
the power of the politico-administrative elite who manage the 
state apparatus. State capitalism is beneficial not only to this 
group but also to the national fractions of the indigenous 
bourgegoisie. The growing importance of the state sector howe 
ver, as Sobhan (1979) argued, does not necessarily thwart the 
interests of indigenous capitalists. Rather the public enterprises 
provide subsidized finance, transport and key inputs to strength-
en the capitalists and the state also provides protection for them. 
When the Sri Lanka Freedom Party entered into a 
coalition with the Marxists, as occurred in the period 1970-1977, 
the pressure for a national popular strategy was far greater. In 
the United Front ,regime of 1970-1977, there was a broad alliance 
of national bourgeoisie, politico-administrative elite and sections 
of the rural and urban labouring population. However the 
coalition was short lived (the Marxist Lanka Sama Samaja Party 
was expelled from the United Front coalition in 1975). As workers 
and peasants were the subordinate partners in the coalition, 
their gains were limited and the alliance took on a national 
bourgeoisie and neo-colonial character towards the end, under 
pressure from national bourgeoisie and probably imperial forces. 
The Trotskyist minister of finance alleged that the expulsion of 
his party - the Lanka Sama Samaja Party - from the United front 
coalition was the result of a 'plot by the m udata2i4 (indigenous 
entrepreneurs) and imperialist supporters'. (Wilson 1979:xviii). 
These types of trends have been noted by Petras: 
Threats from either side may cause the national bourgeoisie 
to seek alliances: with populists if threatened by foreign 
interests, or with imperial groups if threatened by the left. 
While the rise of establishment nationalism may have been 
influenced initially by radical nationalist pressures, the 
usual tendency has been for it to dissolve in a series of 
external agreements which erode the original national 
developmental project. Similarly a national popular regime 
has a short duration and usually it is overthrown or evolves 
into one of the two other variants (Petras, 1978:46). 
In conclusion, the classical elite theory is inadequate to 
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explain Sri Lankan elite formation. Analyses should go beyond 
characterizing Sri Lankan politics simply in terms of faction 
fights between Western-educated elites. While secondary lines of 
division and cohesion among the elites are important and cannot 
be ignored, to fully explain the elite structure, property-based 
lines of conflict and cleavage should be incorporated in the 
analyses. 
The dominant groups - the indigenous bourgeoisie 
(including the 'comprador' and 'national' fractions) and the 
politico-administrative elite have been identified. Also present are 
the metropolitan capaitalists, represented by the multinational 
corporations and imperial firms in the country. The patterns of 
development in the post-independence period can be understood 
best by reference to the different alliances among these three 
groups. These alliances in turn should be viewed in the context 
of changes in the form and level of devleopment of the world 
capitalist economy. 
The strategies and selected policy programmes of the 
post — independence regimes are further examined in the next 
chapter where it is argued none of the strategies has been able 
to bring about sustained autonomous development. It is demon-
strated that they have, instead, resulted in further integration of 
Sri Lankan into the world capitalist economy, in intensifying the 
dependence of the Sri Lankan economy on the core economies, and 
in reinforcing a peripheral capitalist pattern of development. 
Consequent upon this pattern of development, it will be shown, is 
the persistence of poverty and increasing economic inequality. 
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CHAPTER 7 
POST-INDEPENDENCE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL STRATEGIES 
This chapter critically examines the economic and poli-
tical strategies of the post-independence national regimes in Sri 
Lanka. The chapter begins by outlining trends in the modern 
phase of the capitalist world economy in order to provide the 
background necessary to an understanding of the strategies of the 
national regimes. It goes on to examine the import-substituting 
industrialization policy of the 1960's and the current ex-
port-oriented industrialization strategy. It is argued that these 
strategies have deepened the integration of Sri Lankan society 
into the capitalist world economy and reinforced dependent econo-
mic relationships. Finally selected policy programmes of the post 
independence period, namely the tenure and land reforms and the 
'green revolution' are examined for their failure to achieve 
stated objectives. It is argued that the class character of the 
national regimes is central to the understanding of the develop-
ment policies and the pattern of development. 
The political and economic strategies cannot be adequa-
tely explained, as the modernization perspective would do, by 
conceiving of them as public policy or development programmes 
undertaken by the 'modernizing elites' for the good of the whole 
society. Such conceptions ignore the crucial issues of class 
interests and the nature of the state which are both key factors 
determining the pattern of development. It is argued in this 
chapter that the persistence of poverty, and increasing economic 
and social inequality are integral to the pattern of development 
of peripheral capitalist societies. 
It is essential to examine the class composition of the 
successive regimes in order to fully comprehend the nature and 
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effects of the political and economic strategies of the post-inde-
pendence national regimes and the resultant patterns of national 
development. 
The de-colonization movements in the periphery, the 
emergence of the United States and Soviet Russia as super powers, 
an increase in the number of countries experiencing a socialist 
revolution and the disintegration of European colonial empires in 
the aftermath of the world wars all marked a transformation of 
the world capitalist system. The central problem for the centres 
of imperialism since the war has been 
to keep as much of the colonial world as possible in informal 
empires, whereby the peripheral nations would be kept open 
for the exploitation of their natural resources and trade and 
investment opportunities (Magdoff, 1982:25). 
The modern phase of the development of the world economy began 
at the end of the second world war. Following the second war, 
world capitalism was revitalized by the emergence of the United 
States as the hegemonic center and the advent of the multina-
tional corporations as the organizers of capital and production 
across the globe. As S.B.D. De Silva has noted: 
The period of de-colonization between the end of the second 
world war and the advent of the multinational corporations 
in the periphery in the mid 1960's was a formative one in 
the development of the socio-economic structures and class 
relations that were to determine the politics of different 
countries in the present day (S.B.D.De Silva, 1982:483). 
The Modern phase of world capitalism is marked by the•
replacement of merchant capital by the industrial capital of the 
core, the small investor (of the colonial era) by the multinational 
giants, the internationalization of the market by the internatio-
nalization of production as a major strategy, and the replacement 
of agency houses which managed foreign interests in the colonies 
by direct investment by the multinationals or their subsidiaries 
in the periphery. In the modern phase, the periphery is 
re-linked to the world capitalist centers via the multinational 
corporations, and the multinationals have become, to borrow•
S.B.D. De Silva's phrase (1982:488), 'the institutional basis of 
centre periphery relations'. The multilaterialization of capital or 
the combination of technology, capital and market skills of 
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different nations, in the contemporary phase means that the 
periphery is not linked with any specific metropolitan country, as 
in the colonial phase, but with the centre as a whole (S.B.D. De 
Silva, 1982:497). 
International subcontracting has become a central 
feature of internationalized production as a result of the 
relocation of labour intensive and often ecologically harmful 
industries to the peripheral nations where there is an abundant 
supply of cheap labour and raw materials (Germidis, 1980). As a 
result, Frobel et al. (1980) argued that a new international 
division of labour is emerging in the world economy. They found 
that companies in the OECD countries are expanding investment, 
employment and production capacities abroad while stagnating at 
home. 
The international scatter of different stages of the 
production process creates new forms of inequality between 
nations: 
The old division of labour, in which the underdeveloped 
countries supplied the raw materials and the advanced 
countries supplied the manufactured goods, is being replaced 
by a different division, in which the former supply the 
primary products and the manufactures, while the second 
supply the equipment and the 'software' (Amin, 1976: 211). 
Gathered at the core are software or technological research, 
innovative management and the production of most complex types 
of essential equipment - those requiring highly skilled labour. 
Transferred to the peripheral industrial enclaves is the produc-
tion of those items which, 'given the help of imported equipment, 
require only ordinary labour' (Amin, 1976:211). 
Relations between the units in the world capitalist 
system are being redefined. A new symbiosis between the core and 
both the private and state capital of the periphery is formed. 
The collaboration of core capital with the peripheral state, which 
is pursuing state capitalist policies, is particularly beneficial to 
the former because it minimizes the risk of appropriation of 
metropolitan firms' interests in the periphery by the peripheral 
state. Having learnt the lessons of the de-colonization movements, 
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during which some peripheral states appropriated metropolitan 
interests within their boundaries, the present preference and 
practice is for the setting up of joint ventures between peripheral 
(both private and state) and metropolitan capital. 
With the advent of multinationals, and the subsequent 
internationalization of production, capital has assumed a 'supra-
national character' and it has prompted researchers such as 
Hopkins (1982b) to postulate an international bourgeoisie and an 
international proletariat. 
Metropolitan states and international financial institu-
tions, such as the World Bank and the IMF, are ancillary to the 
functioning of the new international division of labour and 
core-periphery structures. They play a crucial and supportive 
role in creating and maintaining conditions for capital accumu-
lation by the multinational corporations in the periphery (Petras, 
1978:48; Seers, 1981:5-6). 
Associated with these developments in the world capita-
list system are changes in the class formation and class alliances 
in the periphery. According to Petras: 
The interval variations in class development are largely a 
product of the original organization of production and 
particular moment of imperialist domination (Petras, 1978: 
35). 
In the neo-colonial phase, social strata between imperial 
capitalism and the labour force of the periphery are created. The 
existence of these 'intermediary strata' or 
collaborator classes whose function is to organize state and 
economy in accordance with core definition of international 
division of labour, is the pivotal unit which facilitates core 
subordination of peripheral societies (Petras, 1978:36). 
The types of class alliances or strategies of capital accumulation 
open to the national regimes of the periphery in the post-
independence period have been discussed in chapter five. Most 
peripheral regimes in the post—independence period . have shown a 
general • tendency to shift from an 'inward looking' import-substi-
tuting industrialization policy to an 'outward looking' export-led 
growth strategy. The so-called 'Newly Industrializing Countries' 
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(NICs) such as Taiwan and South Korea are model countries which 
have earnestly followed the latter type of strategy (see Hoogvelt, 
1982: 24-26). 
Post-Independence National Regimes in Sri Lanka 
A period of re-defining core-periphery relationships 
dawned with independence. Although the power was transferred 
from the British colonial rulers to an indigenous political regime, 
no radical change in the economic strategy took place in the 
years immediately following independence.
1 The• United National 
Party regime which came into power represented mainly the Wes-
ternized, 'comprador' fraction of the indigenous bourgeoisie 
(plantation owners, commercial and trading interests based in 
import-export economy and the Westernized bureaucratic and 
professional groups) who had close and direct contacts with the 
metropolitan bourgeoisie. They held parliamentary power from 1948 
to 1956 maintaining essentially a co-operative and collaborative 
relationship with the metropolitan bourgeoisie. 
Although the extraverted nature of the economy, and 
therefore the need for structural chanfes therein, was recognized, 
'the political leadership based on plantations and related com-
mercial interests did not seek to change the economy' (Atukora-
lage, 1981:121). There was no attempt to limit or eliminate the 
share of the surplus flowing to the metropolitan centre, nor to 
eliminate foreign exploitation, or to disengage from the core, to 
seek autonomous development, or to alter substantially the 
conditions for metropolitan capital accumulation. In contrast the 
links were maintained. As noted in the previous chapter, for 
instance, there was no attempt to indigenize the majority 
1. Petras notes:' The emergence of national movements, 
and eventually governments, sets the stage for redefining rela-
tions with the imperial power. Yet, in most instances, controlling 
the government is not identical with controlling the state: the 
critical means of production, as well as important fractions of 
the army/police/state bureaucracy remain, at least initially, still 
tied to the metropolis and serve to countermand the orders of the 
national government' (Petras, 1978-53). 
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ownership and management of the plantation industries and com-
mercial enterprises which remained in the hands of the foreign-
ers. Under the regime in question, the class alliance was thus of 
a 'neocolonial' nature where the indigenous bourgeoisie was 
allied with metropolitan interests. 
In 1952 the World Bank Mission visiting the island 
recommended that industrial development in Sri Lanka should play 
a secondary role to agriculture. Apparently influenced by this 
advice, the government allocated only 4 . 42% of the total 
investment for industry as opposed to allocation of 36% for agri-
culture in the Six-Year Programme of Investment of 1954-1960 
(Wickremeratne, 1977b:148). In Karunaratne's view: 
the landed oligarchy that dominated Ceylon politics were 
obsessed with a physiocratic premonition about the self-suf-
ficiency in food and consequently no right balance was 
struck between industrial development and agriculture (Karu-
naratne, 1972:290). 
Moreover, the processing of agricultural produce prior to export 
was not encouraged, the emphasis of the then policy being to 
increase yield and production. This policy reinforced the 'periphe-
ral economic structure inherited from the colonial days, and the 
major beneficiaries were the metropolitan capitalists and the 
indigenous compradorial strata. 
The strategy of the regime which came into power in 
1956 was markedly different to that of its predecessor. The 
coalition was more broadly based than the United National Party. 
The 'national' fraction of the indigenous . bourgeoisie (as 
opposed to the 'comprador ' fraction) joined together with sections 
of the Sinhalese-educated intelligentsia (aspiring to displace the 
westernized administrative-bureaucratic elite which dominated the 
state apparatus) and electoral support also came from the rural 
traders, peasants and the 4angha (the order of the Buddhist 
monks). The inclusion of a Marxist party (Viplavakari Lanka 
Sama Samaja Party) in the coalition increased the electoral 
support for the regime. Above all, the Sinhalese Buddhist 
nationalism of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party appealed to the 
Sinhalese voter, thus cutting across, to a considerable extent, 
class and caste divisions. The petty bourgeoisie and the 
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nationalist fraction of the indigenous bourgeoisie ( which does not 
have direct links with the metropolitan capital or with the 
plantation and mining sector) also found a representative organ 
in the Sri Lanka Freedom Party. Given these class bases, it is 
easy to understand attempts by the Sri Lanka Freedom party 
regime to limit the control of the metropolitan capital. The point 
is that the alliance and the strategy of the Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party-led regime of 1956 was of a 'national bourgeois develop-
mentalist' nature. 
The economic policies of the 1956 regime differed from its 
predecessor. Relatively greater emphasis was laid on industrial 
development than on agriculture by the new regime. For instance, 
the Ten Year Plan of 1959 earmarked 41% of the total outlay to 
industry while agriculture's share was only 22.9% (Wickremeratne, 
1977b :152 ) . State participation in industry also increased as 
indicated by the setting up of state-owned enterprises in the 
steel, tyre, hardware, sugar and salt industries. Increased 
public sector involvement in the economy through increasing the 
number of state-owned enterprises, as argued in the previous 
chapter, meant a strengthening of the economic and political 
power of the politico-administrative bureaucracy or the state 
bourgeoisie, which managed state apparatuses.' 
Further, the policy of nationalization of selected enter-
prises by the 1956 regime was not aimed at complete elimination 
of private capital but at reserving basic industries, including 
iron, steel, cement, chemicals and fertilizer exclusively for the 
public sector, and leaving light, consumer goods industries to the 
private sector ( Balakrishnan , 1977:195). The state sector played 
an ancillary role to the indigenous capitalists. The ancillary role 
of the state in relation to the indigenous bourgeoisie is best 
demonstrated in the import-substituting industrialization policy 
which Sri Lanka began vigorously to pursue from about 1960. 
Import-Substituting Industrialization 
The policy included trade and payments control, bans on 
selected imports, and generous tax and subsidy incentives for 
indigenous capitalists investing in manufacturing. Balakrishnan 
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wrote: 
Private industry responded •-well to what amounted to a 
ready-made market and the prospect of attractive returns 
partly helped by tax concessions and relatively .cheap credit 
(Balakrishnan, 1977:196). 
The protective umbrella and the generous incentives provided by 
the state created avenues of mobility not only for the aspiring 
petty bourgeoisie but also opportunities for the plantation owners 
to diversify their investments. The import-substituting industria-
lization policy was particularly attractive for the plantation 
owners, enabling them to re-orient their investments at a time 
when export crop prices were dwindling. According to Snodgrass 
the import-substituting industrialization policy 
accomplished the task of channeling the proven abilities of 
the local entrepreneurial class out of the old familiar lines 
-estate agriculture, real estate, and trade - into manufactu-
ring (Snodgrass, 1966:224). 
However the import—substituting industrialization policy 
was not entirely successful in achieving the stated objectives of 
bringing about autonomous Industrial development and structural 
changes in the economy. Neither did it succeed in eliminating the 
heavy import dependence of the Sri Lankan economy. Firstly, the 
import-substituting industrialization policy attracted criticism 
because the investment under this policy was not directed to 
'essential' industries but largely to the production of the same 
non-essential, luxury consumer items that were banned as 
imports. Secondly, the industries set up under this policy 
involved a heavy import content and production involved only 
minimum conversion of imported inputs. Thus many industries set 
up under the import-substituting industrialization policy, amount-
ed to assembly operations of imported materials (Balakrishnan, 
1977:197; Atukoralage, 1981:124). A statistical analysis of sectoral 
GDP data during the period between 1960-1965 reveals that the 
import-substituting industrialization policies 'brought about new 
and more delicate forms of trade dependence (Atukoralage, 
1981:140) thereby defeating the objective of autonomous develop-
ment. 1 
1. In 1970 about 75% of the raw materials used by local 
industry originated from foreign sources (Wilson, 1979:85). 
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The high dependence on imported inputs, and the assem-
bly, finishing and final processing nature of the manufacturing 
industries of the import-substituting industrialization period 
deepened dependent relations with the core instead, aiding the 
development of autonomous industries. This heavy import depen-
dence in turn, led to foreign exchange problems and to a deepe-
ning of credit dependence on metropolitan banks and international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. So, 
instead of limiting the benefits accruing to metropolitan capital-
ists and moving towards a diversified autonomous industrial 
sector, the import-substituting industrialization policies of the 
1960's deepened the core-periphery dependent relationships. As 
S.B.D. De Silva pointed out, although in some third world 
countries 
the inwardly-oriented policies threatened the interests of 
foreign capital in varying degrees through import substi-
tuting industrialization, the state monopoly of certain bran-
ches of foreign trade and the partial indigenization of capi-
tal and management... in the absence of a political revolu-
tion, [these countries] failed to disengage themselves fully 
from the imperialist system (S.B.D. De Silva, 1982:484). 
On the agricultural front the 'green revolution' pro-
gramme, which was launched in mid-1960's, was another avenue 
for metropolitan capital to gain a foothold in the periphery. The 
effects of the 'green revolution' on the peasant sector of Sri 
Lanka is discussed later in this chapter. The point made here is 
that the 'green revolution' was yet another development policy 
which enabled the metropolitan capital to gain further inroads 
into the periphery. During the period in which the 'green 
revolution' was in vogue (from mid 1960s to mid 1970s) metropo-
litan capital, particularly the multinational corporations dealing 
with agrochemicals, fertilizer, agricultural machinery and other 
inputs, enjoyed a lucrative and captive market in Sri Lanka. The 
capital intensive agricultural practices associated with the 'green 
revolution' package not only created dependence on imported 
inputs but, as S.B.D. De Silva observed (1982:496), 'ruled out 
indigenous technologies and inputs which are far less ecologically 
harmful'. In recent times the control gained by metropolitan firms 
over the development, conservation, exchange and marketing of 
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seeds and plant genetic resources has created new forms of 
dependence on imported seeds in the periphery, thereby thwarting 
the periphery's efforts at achieving food self-sufficiency. ' 
Between the import-substituting industrialization of the 
1960 ' s and the export-led growth strategy of the post-1977 period, 
fell the United Front regime's (1970-1977) stint of a mixture of 
'popular nationalist' and 'national bourgeoisie developmentalism ' . 
The United Front alliance was a broadly based one. Urban 
workers joined the alliance through the Communist Party and the 
Lanka Sama Samaja Party's participation in the Front. The two 
major Marxist parties' participation in the Front ensured the 
support of the majority of the urban workers in the country 
organized through the trade union movement. The Marxist parties 
also brought in with them a sizable proportion of urban clerical 
workers, students and intelligentsia. Thus the United Front was 
an alliance of the indigenous bourgeoisie ( ' national fraction ) , 
rich and middle peasants ( these groups through the Sri Lanka 
Freedom Party ) urban workers, students and intelligentsia. 
This same period saw the nationalization of foreign-
owned plantations, a land reform programme, and the growth of 
state capitalism, among other policies. As noted in the previous 
chapter, popular support for this regime was derived from a 
handful of programmes such as land reform, the nationalization of 
foreign— owned plantations, and attempts at decentralization 
through peoples' committees and a collective or co-operative youth 
resettlement programme. Towards the end, the strategy began to 
shift in favour of the indigenous bourgeoisie, abandoning the 
populism by which it came to power. The dominant partner in the 
Front has always been the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and after the 
di s mi s sal of the Lanka Sama Samaja Party from the Front, the 
indigenous bourgeoisie, rallying around the Sri Lanka Freedom 
1. For reports on the heated ' seeds ' debate at the FAO, 
see Allain (1984 ) . 
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Party gained total control. Hence gains for the workers have been 
limited and the policies of the United Front regime, in the final 
analysis, amounted to 'national bourgeoisie developmentalist' with 
little more than a sprinkling of populist legislation. 
Tighter import restrictions and a greater degree of state 
participation and control in the economy were features of the 
United Front policies. Areas of state ownership and control rose 
sharply during period 1970-1977. The Gem Corporation, the State 
Film Corporation, the Paddy Marketing Board and the State 
Trading Corporation are a few of the large number of state 
enterprises set up during this regime which brought respective 
trades and industries under the total control of the state. Among 
the redistributive measures of the United Front regime were the 
ceiling on private ownership of land imposed through the Land 
Reforms of 1972, the nationalization of foreign owned plantations, 
a ceiling imposed on private ownership of house-property and 
disposable incomes and, an overhauling of the wage and salary 
structure. 
The accommodation of national bourgeoisie interests by 
the United Front regime is indicated in the Five Year Plan 
(1972-1976) which 'provided for a climate of investment for private 
enterprise which was expected to contribute about 52% of the total 
investment of Rupees 14,820 million envisaged' (Wilson, 1979:106). 
Foreign capital was also welcomed in areas where skills were not 
locally available such as tourism. Under the United Front regime, 
as S.B.D. De Silva (1982:485) pointed out, 'the commercial-cum-
industrial or pseudo-industrial class had virtually a mandate to 
enrich themselves'. Further 'the bourgeoisie that is benefitting 
from the rightward political, swing in 1977 was nurtured by 
professedly left-wing policies' of the United Front. 
So, the actual programmes and policies of the United 
Front did not match its 'socialist' and 'anti-imperialist' rheto-
ric. S.B.D.De Silva (1982-485) accurately assessed: 'On balance, 
the path of development was a capitalist one. What generally 
- 158 - 
occurred in these years was an overhauling of the existing class 
structure.' 
Export-Oriented Industrialization 
The 'neo-colonial' type of alliance favoured by the 
United National Party since its inception came to a climax with 
the enthusiastic adoption of an export-oriented industrialization 
policy by them in their current term of office which commenced in 
1977. 
From the point of view of the peripheral countries, the 
economic justification for an export-led industrialization strategy 
was• derived partly from an analysis of the failure of the 
import-substituting industrialization. One of the major reasons for 
the failure of import-substituting industrialization was the 
incapacity of the domestic market to support or sustain a healthy 
manufacturing sector. The logical alternative then is thought to 
be the setting up of an export-oriented manufacturing sector. 
Barriers to the successful adoption of this strategy are many. 
Third world countries lack modern technological know how, a 
capacity for research and devlopment, and modern managerial 
skills and capital. But the third world does have an abundant 
supply of cheap labour. In addition, export-oriented industries of 
the third world would face protectionist barriers and obstacles 
from the core countries unless the metropolitan capital had a 
stake, by way of collaboration for instance, in the peripheral 
economy embarking on such a strategy. 
As a result, the peripheral nation adopts the export-led 
development strategy of combining foreign capital, technology and 
management skills with its own labour. International sub-
contracting has become a wide practice under this type of strate-
gy. International subcontracting is claimed to 
accelerate industrial development in the third world by 
fostering complementarity of production lines in the new 
international division of labour; bring positive effects on the 
balance of payments of the third world economies; mobilize 
better utilization of the man-power resources in the third 
world economy; strengthen industrial structure; facilitate 
dissemination of scientific and technological knowledge; 
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induce a flow of foreign capital and thus act as a catalyst 
in attracting other investments which would allow both an 
increase in local value added and help to diversify the 
product range (Germidis, 1980:10). 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter the current 
regime adopted a 'neo-colonial' strategy, whereby the Sri Lankan 
economy was re-linked more firmly with the capitalist centres, 
with all elements of the standard package: 
trade and payments liberalization, currency devaluation, 
high interest rates, open door to foreign capital and setting 
up of a Free Trade Zone, and the virtual removal of social 
welfare subsidies (S.B.D. De Silva, 1982:485). 
The government invited foreign investors, offering them cheap, 
educated, highly trainable labour; tax exemptions for 10 years 
and concessions for further 15 years; political stability; a boo-
ming economy; government assistance for setting up industries in 
the Free Trade Zone, and a geographic location along major air 
and sea routes (Barratt Brown, 1982:153). 1 In addition, the regi-
me offered constitutional guarantees for any investments and 
promised strict control of labour. The Free Trade Zone was 
envisaged to bring high foreign exchange earnings, generate high 
employment opportunities, end the need for foreign borrowings and 
begging, and to achieve a technological breakthrough. 
The class alignment in a country pursuing a 'neo-colo-
nial' strategy is one of close alliance between indigenous capi-
talists and metropolitan capitalists. Under the export-oriented 
industrialization policy 
indigenous and foreign capital become involved in an une-
qual relation; when they are in partnership, the foreign 
interests control capital flows, technology and production 
proceeds, and marketing outlets, subserving a profit center 
abroad (S.B.D.De Silva, 1982:507). 
The support for the policies of the current United Natio-
nal Party regime - dubbed as an IMF-run democracy - from the 
metropolitan centres is 'beyond expectations'. For instance it is 
1. For details, see Nugawela (1980). 
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being 'provided all the possible encouragement from the global 
credit agencies and the west-inspired aid consortium' (Wilson, 
1979:111). The international finance promised for 1978 and 1979 
stood at Rupees 17,000 million. 1  
The performance of the Free Trade Zone has been ques-
tioned by researchers. Due to the high import content of the Free 
Trade Zone industries only a small fraction of the total export 
earnings of the Zone accrue to the host country - Sri Lanka. For 
instance, in 1979 the imported raw material content stood at 74% 
of the total exports of the Free Trade Zone hence the net 
earnings was only a small 26% (Balasuriya, 1982:10). 
On employment, it is asserted that as a result of libe-
ralization of imports and consequent foreign competition the local 
hand-loom and textile industry has suffered a loss of jobs. The 
Central Bank of Ceylon Review of 1980 affirmed: 
The total employment in the textile and wearing apparel 
sector is estimated to have decreased by 3% in 1980. An 
increase in the local employment in the garment factories of 
the IPZ [or the Free Trade Zone] was offset by the decline 
in the local employment in the state-owned textile factories 
outside the IPZ. The employment in the state-owned textile 
mills too indicated a decline in the year. The closure of 
several power-loom and hand-loom centre,s has contributed 
towards this decline (Balasuriya, 1982:10).` 
1. cf. Petras's (1978:47-54) observations on the central-
ity of 'imperialist relations' in sustaining neo-colonial regimes 
and destabilizing national-popular regimes. 
2. The Central Bank of Ceylon Annual Report for 1980 
confirmed that the textile and several other industries 'suffered 
from the freer flow of imports'. On account of marketing problems 
the output of textile production 'was curtailed substantially'. 
Further a Central Bank survey found that several small-scale 
industrial enterprises (including those producing handloom 
textiles, paper, chemicals, soaps, paints and fabricated metal 
products) were closed during 1980 as a result of marketing, 
capital, and raw material difficulties (Central Bank of Ceylon, 
1981:29-30). 
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The industries transferred to the periphery are mainly 
the labour intensive ones based on simple assembly line 
methods: textiles and garments, footwear, carpets, wigs, 
plastic products, scientific measuring instruments and 
semi-conductors for the electronics industry (S.B.D. De Silva, 
1982:491). 
Therefore a significant technology transfer to the host country 
does not take place as envisaged by the advocates of interna-
tional subcontracting. In 1982, of the 47 factories established in 
Sri Lanka's Free Trade Zone, 27 factories manufacture garments 
while the rest manufacture shoes, polypropelene bags, electrical 
goods, fishing gear, jewellery, outboard motors, rubber goods, 
tea bags and cashew kernel oil (Greater Colombo Economic 
Commission, 1982:4). Moreover, garment exports accounted for 
95.4% of the gross earnings from the Free Trade Zone exports and 
96.4% of the employment in 1979 in the Free Trade Zone was in 
the garment industry. Corresponding provisional figures for 1980 
were 93% and 86.4% respectively (Central Bank of Ceylon, 
1981:37). These figures on the types of industries and on 
employment indicate the predominance of garment industries in the 
Free Trade Zone. As the garment factories in the Free Trade Zone 
are labour intensive ones using simple assembly operations, they 
do not involve significant technology transfers. Thus industrial 
activities in the Free Trade Zone are limited mainly to assembly 
plant operations without techno-research capacities. 
Lessons from Tunisia, another peripheral nation adopting 
an international subcontracting policy, show that prospects for 
breakthroughs in industrialization in the periphery by means of 
such a policy are bleak (Germidis, 1980:19). As Petras (1978: 
110) pointed out 'externally induced industrial efforts lead to the 
fragmented, externally integrated and technologically dependent 
industrialization' of the third world. The structure of industry, 
levels of development of productive forces, and the 'tentative and 
vulnerable nature of the industrial efforts' distinguish the third 
world 'industrialization' from that of 'Western imperial 
countries ' . 
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It is reported that 'world market factories' - as the 
factories in the industrial enclaves in the third world are dubbed 
'rely on cheap, inevitably non-unionized, female labour 
amenable to simple repetitive tasks' ( S. B .D . De Silva, 1982 :494 ) . 1 
The plight, particularly of the female workers in the Sri Lanka's 
Free Trade Zone has recently been highlighted in the national 
media . 2 
Further, the rise of imports since the liberalization of 
imports and the opening up of the Free Trade Zone has resulted 
in the rapid depletion of Sri Lanka's foreign exchange reserves. 
The country has also witnessed a foreign debt explosion. The 
external public debt as a percentage of GNP has increased from 
16.1% in 1970 to 32.4% in 1970 ( World Bank, 1981 ) . 3 
Relinking the periphery to the world economy through 
externally induced industrialization, operationalized in the form 
of a Free Trade Zone in Sri Lanka, entails the spread of capita-
list relations and the further subsumption of labour under capi-
tal. The creation of a wage labour force in the industrial en-
claves has meant the transfer of sections of the part-life-time 
proletariat into a full life-time proletariat. High wage levels in 
the industrial enclaves relative to other sectors of the economy, 
and 'specific labour relations strategy create a privileged but 
1. A personnel manager of a Taiwan assembly plant 
explains : 'Young male workers are too restless and impatient to 
do monotonous work with no career value. If displeased, they 
sabotage the machines and even threaten the foreman. But girls, 
at most they cry a little ' . It is reported that 'out of a group of 
keen-sighted young women workers in Hewlett Packard' s Malaysian 
outfit, 88% had chronic conjunctivitis after a year of making 
silicon chips with the aid of a microscope' - a testimony to poor 
health and safety records of the miltinationals operating in 
peripheral industrial enclaves. ( Fuentes and Ehrenreich , 1984 :15 ) . 
2. For example, see Kumari Goonesekere (1983 ) and 
Ramanujan (1982 ) . 
3. The outstanding foreign debt of Sri Lanka has 
increased from US$1,013 million in 1978 to US$ 1,471 million in 
1982 ( for 1978 figures, World Bank (1980 ) ; for 1982 figures, Far 
'Eastern Economic Review (1983 ) . 
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apolitical stratum of workers' (B.S.B.D. De Silva, 1982:495). 
Political repression and the emergence of authoritarian 
regimes go hand in hand with the neo-colonial strategy in the 
periphery (Petras, 1978). The United Front regime (1970-1977) has 
been charged by some for ruling the country by 'severely 
repressive laws under a state of emergency' and making 'erosions 
into the prevailing democratic system' (Wilson, 1979:xix). 
Repressive legislation enacted by the current regime to 'discipli-
ne' labour and to suppress dissidents has caused concern among 
human rights groups. It is also alleged that the rule of law in 
the country is decaying and some writers have found an 
association between the economic crisis aggravated by the 
open-economy policy and social unrest, state repression and 
ethnic violence (Gunasinghe, 1983). 
Two of the important policy programmes, in terms of 
their potential for changing rural society, have been selected for 
examination. They are, on the institutional side, the tenure 
reforms and the land reforms enacted in Sri Lanka by the Paddy 
Lands Act and the Land Reform Law; and, on the technological 
front, the 'green revolution' programme. Their failure to achieve 
stated objectives and to bring about desired changes is demon-
strated. It will be shown that the class composition and alliances 
forged by a given regime, largely account for the nature of these 
programmes and their success or failure. 
Tenure Reform 
The call for tenure reform policies arose in the early 
1950's as a result of the exploitative rents charged from the 
tenants by landlords and from insecurity of tenure. It is asserted 
that high share rents tend to depress the level of investment of 
operating capital by tenants, and to lower the labour inputs by 
tenants because the harvest has to be shared. Insecurity of 
tenure and exploitative rents produce economic irrationality in 
the behaviour of tenants and consequently produce a less dynamic 
agricultural sector. Such are the arguments against sharecrop-
ping, although they are, according to Herring (1983:24) not 
substantiated by empirical evidence. 
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Without doubt insecurity of tenure, arising from the 
absence of written contracts and the ability of the landlord to 
evict tenants at will, the absence of a standard rate of rent, 
resulting in rents varying from the traditional half-share of the 
produce to exorbitantly high rates, place the tenant at the mercy 
of the landlord. It should be recalled following the penetration of 
colonial capitalism, land became a commodity and the 'tenants' 
were dispossessed in the process. The feudal land-lo4d became a 
landowneit and the basis of the relation between the landlord and 
the sharecropper was fundamentally altered, although it may 
appear to be unaltered. Alavi's analysis of the Indian situation 
brings out principles of change which are equally true of the Sri 
Lankan situation: 
Being dispossessed, they [peasants] could have no access to 
the means of their livelihood without turning to the 
landowner for whom they now worked out of economic compul-
sion, 'freely'. The peasants were thus trapped, as sellers of 
labour power, by their dispossession. From now on their 
demand was to be for security of tenure rather than for 
freedom to leave the lord (Alavi, 1982a:184). 
Revelations of degenerated conditions of tenure by the 
Kandyan Peasantry Commission were particularly influential in 
drawing the government's attention and concern towards the 
problems of the peasantry and led to the introduction of the 
Paddy Lands Act of 1953 1 which was the first tenure reform 
regulation in the post-independence of Sri Lanka. It was the 
Paddy Lands Act of 1958 which was said to have been written 
with the experience of the lessons learned from the 1953 Act, that 
was heralded as a radical piece of legislation. 
1. The Paddy Lands Act of 1953 which was implemented 
in only two districts of the country, namely Hambantota and 
Batticaloa, contained regulations stipulating the minimum legal 
period for tenancy contracts (5 years), stipulating the form of 
contract (must be written), and prescribing maximum rent payable 
by tenants. Owing to several administrative, legal, political 
problems the implementation of the Act in other districts of the 
island was abandoned and subsequently it became a dead letter. 
As the factors which contributed to the failure of the 1953 Act 
were quite similar to those of the 1958 Act the former is not 
discussed in detail here. For a useful critical discussion of the 
1953 Act see Gold (1977:20-26). 
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The main objectives of the Paddy Lands Act were to 
regulate landlords' authority over tenants, to control rents 
payable by tenants, to confer security of tenure on tenants, to 
regulate the rate of interest payable on loans to purchase 
various agricultural inputs, to fix wage rates for agricultural 
labour, and to establish farmer organizations to aid the 
implementation of the Act and to improve agriculture. Most 
important among the provisions of the Act were those pertaining 
to the subjects of security of tenure, rents and farmer 
organizations. 
Operators who fell under the legal category of tenant, 
or tenant-cultivator as defined in the Act, were to have legally 
protected tenancy in perpetuity and could be evicted only by due 
legal processes. The Act also fixed the rate of rent payable by 
tenant-cultivators. ' In addition the Paddy Lands Act provided for 
the formation of farmer organizations known as Cultivation 
Committees at the Village level, consisting of members elected by 
agricultural operators. The chief functions of the Cultivation 
Committees were: to maintain a register of paddy lands ; to 
maintain and develop irrigation facilities ; to collect dues and 
rates from the cultivators ; •to guarantee loans made to cultiva-
tors; to fix wages of agricultural labourers; to represent culti-
vators to the government; to ensure supply of agricultural 
inputs; and to assist in the implementation of the Act. 
The Department of Agrarian Services, headed by a 
Commissioner, assisted by an Assistant Commissioner in each 
district, was assigned the task of implementing the Act. 
The Paddy Lands Act falls into Herring's (1983:8) 
'intervention regulatory' model of tenure reform . 2 This model does 
1. The original draft stipulation of the maximum rent 
was five bushels per acre. It was finally fixed at ten bushels 
per acre or one quarter of the produce, whichever was less. 
However, as Herring (1983:19) pointed out there is no generally 
accepted criteria to distinguish between ' fair ' and ' exploitative ' 
rent. 
2. Other models in his classification are 'ceiling-redis-
tributive' and 'land-to-the-tiller' models. 
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not attempt fundamental alterations in the social organization of 
production but only the terms of tenancy are readjusted. The 
'tenure reform model has been characteristic of conservative 
regimes desiring minimal change in rural society but fearful of 
agrarian discontent and economic stagnation' (Herring, 1983:8 ) . 
The Paddy Lands Act had difficulties in achieving even its 
limited reformist objectives due to a variety of reasons which are 
examined in the following pages. 
The class character of the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna 
(MEP) coalition serves to explain both the reformist nature and 
the limited objectives of the Paddy Lands Act. The dominant 
partner of the coalition, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, was not a 
political party representing tenants, or peasants and agricultural 
labourers. Rather it drew heavy support from the Sri Lankan 
'second stratum ' , to borrow from Wilson (1979:xviii), comprised of 
rural 'intermediaries' such as Buddhist monks, aguitvedic physi-
cians, school teachers, clerks and mudala-CiA (traders ) 1 
These groups are owners of land in the villages and as 
a rule do not engage in labour, hence they are landlords 
employing tenants or agricultural labour. These groups represen-
ted the rural capitalists, rich peasants and landlords while the 
Paddy Lands Act's proposed benefits are for the tenants, 
agricultural labourers and poor peasants. In fact the interests of 
these two groups run counter to each other and in structural 
terms the groups are antagonists. A radical land-to-the-tiller 
programme, or even a programme of tenurial reform favouring 
poor peasants, naturally will face opposition from the rich 
peasants and the landlords, and would be an unlikely product 
from a political party drawing the bulk of its support from the 
very groups from whom the poor peasants are to be protected. 2 
1. Singer (1964;137) includes these groups within the 
rural elite and Wriggins (1960: 39-40 ) lists them under the 'promi-
nant and influential' village figures. 
2. In fact the Bill was considered more as the brain-
child and personal ' triumph ' of the Marxist minister Philip 
Guna.wardena than as an instrument of the Mahajana Eksath 
Peramuna ' s agricultural development policy. 
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Vehement opposition to the Marxist minister's original 
draft Bill came both from within the cabinet ' and from the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party parliamentarians •who thereby demonstrated 
their class allegiances. The campaign of protest by the vested 
interests in the Sri Lankan Freedom Party resulted in the 
transfer of a part of Philip Gunwardena ' s portfolio - to other 
ministries, scarcely a year after the passage of the Bill. Conse-
quently he was forced to resign. The transfer of parts of the 
portfolio to other ministries jeopardized the successful implemen-
tation of the Paddy Lands Act as intended by the minister who 
created the Bill, for his powers were now circumscribed. 
There was also a campaign opposing the Bill launched 
by the pro-United National Party Lake House media group. Oppo-
sition arose primarily against the rate of rent and powers given 
to Cultivation Committees in the original draft, with the former, 
the opposing interests argued, to be too low and the latter ex-
cessive. 
Before its passage the Bill was subjected to several 
alterations. The maximum rent payable by the tenants was 
increased from five bushels per acre as proposed in the original 
draft to ten bushels per acre. A committee , consisting of leaders 
of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party introduced an amendment whereby 
the composition of Cultivation Committees included one quarter of 
its membership from non-cultivating owners - that is, landlords 
(Gold, 1977:31). Also the provisions in the early draft which 
vested powers in the Cultivation Committees to enact land 
consolidation and collectivization schemes were altered to curtail 
these powers. What became the Act in 1958 was a severely devi-
talized version of the original draft Bill. 
The ineffectiveness of the policy primarily rests on the 
failure, Or more likely, the refusal of the formulators, to 
conceptualize class incongruities and imbalances in rural society, 
1. For instance the minister of Lands (Sri Lanka Free-
dom Party) sought changes to earlier draft. 
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and the 'fundamental failure to perceive "agrarian defects" as 
manifestations of deeper economic forces and structure' (Herring, 
1983:46). The landlords and the rich capitalists who dominate the 
rural power structure are a formidable class for the underprivi-
leged strata such as the tenants and agricultural labourers to 
oppose. Given this imbalance if a policy which is potentially 
unfavourable to the privileged is to be effective, a powerful force 
is needed to counter the opposition from vested interests. This 
force ideally takes the form of a politicized and organized poor 
peasantry. The Sri Lankan peasantry is not so organized. 
A characteristic of the Paddy Lands Act was that the 
burden for demanding and protecting tenants' rights under the 
Act rested on the tenants themselves. However in practice, 
tenants' rights under the Act rested on the tenants themselves. 
However in practice tenants tend to acquiesce rather than demand 
their rights. The acquiescence results from the apprehension by 
the tenant that retaliation might follow if his rights are 
demanded. The tenant being the subordinate party in the tenancy 
'contract' has little or no bargaining power. Moreover under 
conditions of high rural unemployment and underemployment, and 
a lack of alternative opportunities for employment it is rational 
for the tenant to cling to, what most probably is his only means 
of livelihood - that of working the landlord's plot - even under 
exploitative and unfavourable conditions, rather than demanding 
his rights under the law and risk possible eviction. It should be 
noted there are a number of prospective tenants willing to work 
for the landlord under unfavourable conditions, hence the 
landlord need not hesitate to evict the troublesome tenants in the 
fear of finding a replacement would be difficult. A symbiotic 
relationship between landlords, the bureaucracy and political 
representatives makes redress difficult for the peasant. 
Thus the government policy is voluntaristic and places 
the major burden of tenure reform on tenants. But, as a result of 
the very nature of existing agrarian power structure, tenants are 
not sufficiently powerful to demand their rights under the law. 
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Hence they opt for the perpetuation of the existing system of 
customary rights. 
Traditional institutions which have been endured also 
lend support to the existence of contemporary agrarian structure. 
The superior-inferior gradations, customs, and conventions 
associated with the caste system contribute to the acquiescence of 
the poor peasants. For instance, the caste ideology may prevent 
a tenant belonging to a ' low ' or ' inferior ' caste from demanding 
his rights and thereby antagonizing a landlord who belongs to a 
' high ' or ' superior ' caste. ' Remnants of the traditional itaiak a-
iziya or service tenure relations also continue between the tenants 
working the vih.cutaganz and deva-lagam ( or the monastic lands ) 
and the monastic landlords. As seen in chapter three, in the 
past, caste, religion and feudal ideology were intricately linked 
within these relations. However, today, these traditional institu-
tions operate in a context different from pre-colonial feudalism - 
namely in a capitalist context. They no longer rest on the 
structural bases of feudalism. Although superficially they may 
appear ' feudal ' or 'semi — feudal' they have assumed new 
capitalist meanings. The obeisance of the tenants and poor 
peasants now arises mainly from economic circumstances rather 
than from feudal ideology or non-economic coercion. Thus the 
traditional forms continue to serve peripheral capitalism. 
As Herring (1981 ) rightly pointed out, the conditions 
preventing tenants from playing an active role are embedded in 
the existing agrarian structure. As these conditions remain the 
reforms not only fail but aggravate the very problems 2 they seek 
to resolve. 
1. cf. Silva ' s (1979 ) study of Weliwita ( a Kandyan 
Village) where the ' high ' caste pat& people ( descendants of tra-
ditional feudal aristocracy) comprising 10% of the village popu-
lation controlled the bulk of the village land, and formed the 
'big landlord' stratum. 
2. Sanderatne (1972a) arrives at a similar conclusion. 
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For instance, the reforms to tenancy under the Paddy 
Lands Act were followed by a spate of evictions of tenants by 
landlords. At the end of the first year of the Act, 14,500 evic-
tions were reported and by 1960, they totalled 18,000 (Weerawar-
dena, 1971:26). As the implementation of• the Act was limited to 
two districts until 1963, the landlords in other districts had an 
ample opportunity to evict their tenants. The number of com-
plaints of eviction (totalling 43,134 at 1971), however, is likely 
to be less than the actual number of evictions. Firstly, a number 
of evictions may have been unreported for fear of reprisal by 
landlords. Secondly, a number of tenants are reported to have 
been 'persuaded' by landlords to voluntarily surrender their 
tenancy rights, and these surrenders under duress should be 
regarded as evictions. Furthermore a number of tenants were 
prevented from being registered in the official Paddy Lands 
Register as tenants, thereby depriving them of protection under 
the Act. For instance in Selvadurai's (1977) study village, only 
between 17-22% of the tenants were registered in the Paddy Lands 
Register as tenants. These 'concealed' tenancies gave the land-
lords the opportunity to evade the regulations of the Act and 
consequently, to continue exploitation of the tenants.' 
Another evasive tactic employed by landlords was to 
register themselves in the Paddy Lands Register as owner-cultiva-
tors or tenants. The malpractices in registration procedures by 
the landlords were made possible because the Cultivation 
Committees, which maintained and prepared the Paddy Lands 
Register, were often infiltrated by landlords. The penetration of 
Cultivation Coranittees as well as other voluntary and statutory 
organizations at the village level by the rural elites has been 
frequently reported (Narayanasamy, 1978; Wanigaratne, 1977). In 
Mahantegama village some owner-cultivators were reported to have 
connived with the administrative secretaries of the Cultivation 
Committee, by offering cash gifts, to conceal tenants from the 
Committee's register. Further the landlords there resorted to the 
1. The gam baAaga4 in Hambantota district effectively 
prevented the tenants who tilled their lands from establishing 
their status as tenants by convincing the authorities that the 
tillers were not tenants but wage labourers (Gold, 1977:20). 
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practice of making slight alterations in the Paddy Lands 
Registers to the names of tenants who have registered so that a 
discrepancy in a person's name can be taken up as a point of a 
legal argument if and when the need arises ( Wanigaratne, 1977 ) . 
The Cultivation Committees under these circumstances do 
not function as organizations representing the interests of all the 
cultivators. Tenants and agricultural labourers therefore loose 
faith in the Committees and consequently cease to participate 
actively in their affairs. Some tenants remain unregistered for 
fear of reprisal fro m landlords. As a result of threats and 
coercion, out of obligation to the landlord, or as a result of the 
deep economic dependency of the former on the latter, other 
tenants remain unregistered. 
The Act faced many legal and administrative bottlenecks. 
The administrative problems jeopardising effective implementation 
of the Act ranged from corruption, red tape and sheer inefficien-
cies to the symbiotic relationship between the bureaucrats and the 
landlords .1 The net effect was to create a bias in favour of 
landlords against tenants. The bourgeoisie state apparatus - the 
legal system, the judiciary,  , and the bureaucracy - was found to•
be inadequate to achieve the objectives of even this limited and 
reformist Act. As Herring aptly remarked: 
Agrarian reform poses a classic question of• reformist public 
policy in bold relief: how can fundamental structural change 
be effected through the very institutions that service and 
reproduce the existing society and reflect the existing 
distribution of power and privilege (Herring, 1983:2). 
According to the regulations of the Paddy Lands Act, a 
properly constituted Cultivation Committee must have a specified 
proportion of its members elected from among the landowners. The 
landlords, with the intention of sabotage, in many places refused 
to participate in the elections of members for the Cultivation 
Committees. In turn the validity of Cultivation Committees formed 
• 	 1. Also class affiliation and class origin of the state 
officials lead them to undermine implementation of some policies 
(see chapter six, p.139), 
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without the specified number of members from the category of 
landowners was challenged by the landlords themselves in the law 
courts. The law courts rightly deemed the actions of the 
Cultivation Committees, when formed in the above manner, void. 
As a result many Cultivation Committees so formed were unable to 
safeguard the interests of tenants, hence the stated objectives of 
the Act were defeated. 
Implementation of the Act was impeded by yet other 
factors relating to the legal system of Sri Lanka. Legal draftsmen 
demonstrated their ignorance of the realities of Sri Lankan rural 
society in the definitions of the terms ' eviction ' and ' cultivator ' , 
as adopted in the Act. As Gold (1977:34) pointed out, for 
example, the definition of the term 'cultivator' used in the Act 
(prior to amendment ) would not include an tenant-cultivator in 
Sri Lanka as a ' cultivator ' . Similar flaws in the definition of 
the term ' eviction ' were exploited by the landlords to their 
advantage. ' 
Legal and administrative deadlocks regarding the autho-
rity of the Assistant Commissioners of Agrarian Services and the 
authority of the Board of Review to pass judicial decisions about 
the complaints of eviction dragged on without being fully resolved 
until 1970. The courts held that administrative officials (Assistant 
Commissioners and the Board of Review) had no authority to make 
judicial decisions because they were not appointed by the Judicial 
Services Commission which appoints all the officials empowered to 
carry out judicial functions. Accordingly the procedures adopted 
by the law courts regarding the ' vacate-orders ' issued by the 
Board of Review and the Assistant Commissioners to the landlords 
who lost their cases, gave a definite advantage to the landlords. 
On those occasions where these orders were contested, and led to 
an appeal, the law courts often conducted full de nOvo hearings 
of the case. This gave the landlords the opportunity to challenge 
• 1. For details, see Gold's (1977) revealing discussion of 
the legal aspects of the Paddy Lands Act. 
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the administrator's original decision in the law courts with a 
higher probability for success as eminent lawyers were retained 
by them. The services of eminent lawyers were well beyond the 
financial resources of tenants. Moreover, the court hearings 
dragged on for lengthy periods which only the wealthy could 
afford. Therefore the legal battles over cases of eviction of 
tenants had a high probability of ending up in favour of land-
lords. 
The implementors of the Paddy Lands Act seem not to 
have received the co-operation of yet another state organ - the 
police force. According to Gold (1977:77) the police force 'achie-
ved a reputation for acting upon the complaints of landlords 
while not acting upon those of tenants.' The Minister of Agri-
culture made a public complaint against the police, and the 
department of agrarian services reported the police as an obsta-
cle to proper implementation of the Act. The ability of wealthy 
landowners to influence the police was enhanced by the land-
owner's superior economic and political power. As with other 
government officials the wealthy groups develop symbiotic rela-
tionships with the police officials. Among some police officers, 
ignorance of the law hindered the implementation of the Act. 
Meagre salaries paid to police officers, particularly the lower 
ranked officers, increased their vulnerability to bribery which 
fact landowners readily exploited. 
Due largely to these factors, the Act failed to achieve 
its stated objectives in relation to the security of tenure of 
tenants. The Cultivation Committees also failed to carry out their 
expected functions in the area of wage fixation. As many 
Committees were inactive or infiltrated by landlords, or faced 
financial difficulties, the function of maintaining Paddy Lands 
Registers was not properly carried out. They never developed into 
organizations which effectively represented peasants' interests. 
Consequently the general objectives of the Act, such as providing 
for security of tenure and fixing wages, were not met. 
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Regulation of the amount of rent payable by tenants was 
one of the paramount objectives of the Act which it failed to 
achieve. A sizable proportion of tenants continue to pay a rent 
significantly above the rate fixed by the Act. As shown in Table 
7.1, the proportion of tenants paying half or more of the produce 
as rent are particularly high in Hambantota and Kandy districts 
- 83% and 74% respectively. In Amuradhapura and Polonnaruwa 
(which are leading paddy-growing districts in terms of acreage 
recorded), 48% and 34% of the tenants, respectively in the two 
districts, pay rents above the legal stipulation. More recent 
research in the villages Ambana and Mawela in the wet zone also 
reported 82% of the tenants paying half share or more of the 
total produce as rent (Wanigaratne, Gooneratne and Shanmugarat-
nam, 1979:5). 
According to Gold, the Paddy Lands Act is an example 
of 'unresolved compromise' where 
reformers will point to the change in ideals as embodied in 
the substantive parts of the new law while the traditional 
leadership will remain confident that the law is basically 
unenforceable (Gold, 1977:14). 
In the Paddy Lands Act, as demonstrated above, the substance of 
the law was emasculated and compromised to suit vested interests 
and even the compromised law, the opposing forces ensured, is 
not effectively implemented. ' 
The Land Reform Programme 
Through the Land Reform Law No.1 of 1972 and the Land 
Reform (Amendment) Law No.39 of 1975 the United Front 
government fixed a ceiling on private ownership of land (by 
individuals as well as private and public companies) and natio-
nalized the lands in excess of the ceiling by vesting ownership 
of them in the state. A portion of the land vested in the state 
were redistributed individually as well as collectively. 
1. The Paddy Lands Act of 1958 was amended five times 
between 1958 and 1970 and was repealed and replaced by the 
Agricultural Lands Law No. 42 of 1973. This act was short-lived 
as the United Front regime was voted out of office in 1977 and 
the new United National Party regime repealed the 1973 Act by 
the Agrarian Services Act of 1979. 
TABLE 7.1 : Distribution of Tenants According to Land Rent Paid by Them in Selected Districts of 
Sri Lanka, 1975. 
Tenants Paying: Total No. of Tenants 	 Half of the Produce 	 Rent Fixed District 	 in the Sample 	 or More 	 by Law 
No. No 
Hambantota 115 7 6 14 12 
Kandy 123 103 83 14 11 
Polonnaruwa 35 12 34 19 54 
Anuradhapura 58 28 48 28 48 
Colombo 80 62 74 3 4 
SOURCE: Agrarian Research and Training Institute (1975). 
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The circumstances leading to this seemingly radical land 
reform programme are strongly related to the politcal deve-
lopments of the early 1970's. The general elections of 1970 
brought a landslide victory to the United Front, then comprised 
of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, the Communist Party, and the 
Lanka Sama Samaja Party, whose manifesto promised socialistic 
economic and social policies to gain support of the under-privi-
leged. However the first year of the United Front rule indicated 
that their promises were limited to populist rhetoric. In April 
1971 the government was confronted with an armed revolt launched 
by the youth who were discontented both with the United Front's 
performance and with the existing parliamentary system's inabi-
lity to cope satisfactorily with the problems of the country. The 
dissidents, organized under the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna or the 
Peoples' Liberation Front, carried out an armed attack on several 
police stations in the island in an attempt to seize state power 
and as Gold (1977:199) assessed 'came surprisingly close to 
toppling the elected civil administration'. 
The United Front government, shaken by this unconven-
tional and unprecedented attack, was prompted to introduce an 
ostensibly socialist land reform programme in 1972. The minister 
of agriculture at that time said that the 'prime reason for the 
land reform was the 1971 revolt' (Sanderatne, 1972b:8) indicating 
it was partly a reflex action by the government. 
The regulations of the Land Reform Laws of 1972 and 
1975 fixed a ceiling of 25 acres of paddy lands and 50 acres of 
other agricultural land for private ownership. The Land Reform 
Commission was established to manage the lands vested in the 
state. Maximization of agricultural production and employment, 
and reductions of inequalities in the distribution of wealth and 
income, were the major objectives of the land reform (Peiris, 
1978:611). 
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The Land Refor m Co m mission during its two year 
statutory period, expropriated a total of 563,411 acres of land 
from individuals who owned tracts above the ceiling fixed by the 
Land Reform Law No.1 1972 ( see table 7.2 ) . Under the Land 
Reform Law no. 39 of 1975 a total of 417,957 acres of land owned 
by public companies (both Sterling and Rupee companies) were 
vested in the state (Peiris , 1978 :618 ) . The vested lands were 
alienated to individuals, co-operatives, collective farms and to 
various state agencies ( see table 7.3 ) . 
Although the term 'land reform' is used to describe the 
programme it did not extend beyond the nationalization of 
privately owned land above the fixed ceiling. The land reform 
programme hardly altered the structure of land ownership in the 
paddy producing sector. Nor did it change the agrarian power 
structure of the peasant sector. The impact of the land reform on 
the peasant sector was insignificant because paddy lands were 
marginally affected by the reform. The Law affected only 11.4% of 
the total agricultural area of the country.' Therefore a majority 
of the agricultural area remained unaffected. This unaffected 
area was mainly the peasant agricultural sector, comprising small 
paddy holdings. 
It was the high ceiling of ownership fixed by the Law 
for paddy lands ( 25 acres) which resulted in most of the paddy 
area in the country falling outside the purview of the Land 
Reform Law. According to the Census of Agriculture (1962 ) , 98% of 
the agricultural holdings reporting Paddy cultivation were 
holdings of less than 10 acres and these holdings accounted for 
84% of the sown area ( Hameed et al., 1979:13 ) . Further, the 
proportion of paddy lands in holdings above 25 acres in the 
island is extremely small. In 1972 only 6% of the total paddy 
holdings were above 25 acres (Peiris , 1978 : 615 ) . Therefore only a 
small portion, 6% of the total paddy holdings came under 
1. Total 	 agricultural area of Sri Lanka in 1972 was 
4,925,268 acres and the total extent of land expropriated under 
the Land Reform Law no.1 of 1972 was 563,411 acres ( Wanigara-
tne , Gooneratne and Shamugaratnam , 1979:108 ) . 
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Table 7.2: Extent of Land Acquired Through the Land Reform Law 
No.1 of 1972, Sri Lanka 
Type of land 	 Extent Acquired 	 % of Total Extent 
(Acres) 	 Acquired 
Tea 	 139,354 	 24.7 
Rubber 	 82,563 	 14.6 
Coconut 	 112,523 	 20.0 
Paddy 	 18,407 	 3.3 
Other Crops 	 30,303 	 5.4 
Uncultivated Land 	 180,261 	 32.0 
Total • 	 563,411. 	 100.0. 
SOURCE: Wanigaratne, Gooneratne, and Shanmugaratnam (1979:108). 
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Table 7.3; Recipients of Land Reform Lands by Mid 1976,   
Sri Lanka 
Recipient Extent 
(Acres) 
State Plantation Corporation 196,531 20.0 
Upcountry Co-operative Estates 
Development Board (USAWASAMA) 67,548 6.9 
Peoples 'Estate Development 
Board ( JANAWASAMA) 230,473 23.5 
Co-operative Settlements 49,651 5.1 
Land Commissioner's Department 70,722 7.2 
District Land Reform Authorities 28,897 3.0 
Livestock Development Board 7,673 0.9 
Coconut, Tea and Rubber Research 
Institutes 12,003 1.2 
Coconut Cultivation Board 2,261 0.2 
Under Government Agents and 
Assistant Government Agents 29,913 3.1 
Conservator of Forests 1,364 0.1 
Agricultural Productivity Committees 4,208 0.5 
Sri Lanka Cashew Corporation 165 
Sugar Corporation 2,829 0.3 
Multi-Purpose Co-operative Societies 2,725 0.3 
Special Co-operative Organizations 1,878 0.2 
District Development Projects 1,025 0.1 
Distributed among Villagers 52,215 5.3 
Electoral Level Land Reform Co-operatives 184,677 18.9 
Other Recipients 31,000 3.1 
Total 981,368 99.9 
SOURCE: Wanigaratne, Gooneratne, and Shanmugaratnam (1979 :110 ) . 
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the purview of the Law. ' As shown in Table 7.4, in contrast to 
nearly 24% of tea and 15% of the total rubber acreage na-
tionalized, only a very low 1% of the total area sown to paddy 
was acquired through the Land Reform Law. As evident from these 
figures the impact of land reform on the peasant sector was 
minimal. Therefore the problems of landlessness, low production 
and general poverty in the peasant sector were untouched by the 
land reforms. Thus as Sanderatne wrote: 
Paddy farmers with tenure problems will still have to rely 
on the provisions of the Paddy Lands Act of 1958, which 
have so far proved largely ineffective... The day when most 
or all of Sri Lanka's paddy farmers own the lands they till 
remains distant (Sanderatne, 1926:13). 
If, for instance, the ceilings of land ownership and 
'floor level' recommended by the International Labour Office 
(1971:95) were adopted, a radical change in the structure of 
ownership of land in the country (both paddy and export crop 
land) would have taken place, The ILO recommended a ceiling of 
ownership of 10 acres for paddy and 20 acres for other crops. 
Further, they set a 'floor level' of two acres of paddy, five 
acres of coconut and four acres for other crops and suggested 
consolidation of holdings below these limits to bring them to the 
floor level. However, programmes based on the imposition of such 
a low ceiling and consolidation of minute holdings would not only 
be politically costly for any regime attempting them but also 
would be unthinkable from a regime dominated by political 
parties representing the interests of, and drawing support largely 
from, rural capitalists and landed interests. Hence the conserva-
tive land reform in 1972. 
Nevertheless the nationalization of plantations over 50 
acres brought about some changes in the structure of land-
ownership in the country. For a start, it limited maximum owner- 
1. In terms of a4weddum.iged paddy lands (lands which 
are ridged, bounded and otherwise prepared for the cultivation of 
paddy) 98.90% were under small holdings (holdings of less than 
20 acres) and only 1.1% were under estates (above 20 acres) in 
1973 (Sri Lanka, 1980:25). 
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TABLE 7.4 	: Extent of Land Under Principal Crops and Extent of 
Land acquired Through the Land Reform Law No.1 of 1972, 
Sri Lanka 
Crop Acreage Under Cultivation Acreage Acquired Acreage Acquired as a % of Acreage under Cultivation 
Tea 597,645 139,354 23.3 
Rubber 567,002 82,563 14.6 
Coconut 1,152,428 112,523 9.8 
Paddy 1,794,572 18,407 1.0 
SOURCE: Marga (1978) for acreage under cultivation and Peiris (1978) for acreage acquired. 
NOTE: 	 According to Peiris's (1978:616) calculation 1.4% of the 
total cultivated extent of paddy has been acquired. He takes 1,401,500 acres as the total cultivated extent. Hence the slight 
discrepancy. 
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ship to 50 acres and by so doing the land reform law put an end 
to foreign ownership of plantations in Sri Lanka. In this it dealt 
a damaging blow to the big land-owning elites. However it should 
be noted that compensation is being paid to owners of the 
expropriated lands (Abeysinghe, 1979:56; Lakshman, 1980: 24). 
While the funds paid to foreign interests would have been 
transferred abroad, no data are available on the avenues in 
which the local recipients of compensation utilized their funds. 
Expropriations took place at a time of attractive investment 
opportunities and provision of generous investment incentives for 
the private capitalists. (The government extended tax privileges 
to tourism and the gem trade during the United Front regime, for 
example). Lakshman stated: 
it is possible that at least some of the recipients of compen-
sation for lands acquired under Land Reform Laws have 
invested in profitable ventures, thereby regaining the ear-
ning potential they lost at the time of these reforms (Laksh-
man, 1980:25). 
The reform was not a redistributive land-to-the-tiller 
one, as most of the vested land remained under state ownership. 
Only a small proportion was distributed among the peasants (see 
Table 8.3). The placement of a large proportion of land vested in 
the state under the control of government agencies is yet another 
instance of government policies of post-independence regimes 
leading to increase in power of the personnel in the state 
agencies. Under state-guided capitalism the 'intermediary strata' 
or the state bourgeoisie steering the state apparatus, grew in 
power and authority and also in income. 
The United Front faced a dilemma on the issue of dispo-
sal of vested land. One of the immediate goals of the land reform 
was distribution of land among the landless (Wanigaratne, 
Gooneratne and Shamugaratnam, 1978:74). Although there was a 
pressing need (and political promises had been made) to dis-
tribute land among the landless, to complicate matters there was 
a techno-economic argument against the subdivision of large 
plantations into small holdings on the grounds that the cultiva-
tion of cash crops, especially tea, in small holdings is ineffi- 
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cient and counterproductive (Peiris, 1978:622). At the same time 
there was an ideological thrust from the Marxists for the land to 
be converted into collective and co-operative forms of manage-
ment. Further, the underprivileged violently demonstrated their 
frustration in the 1971 revolt and the government was not willing 
to face the prospect of a repeat performance. 
The techno-economic argument against the subdivision of 
cash crop holdings has been questioned. Sanderatne, for instance, 
noted: 
It is reported that tea in Kenya and rubber in Malaysia are 
efficiently grown in small holdings. It does not mean that 
the experience in Kenya and Malaysia will necessarily be 
true in Sri Lanka but there is room for investigation 
(Sanderatne, 1972b:16). 
Clearly the higher productivities of large plantations and low 
productivity in small holdings is not simply a function of their 
respective sizes. The high productivity of the large plantations is 
partly attributable to exploitation of Tamil labourers under 
appalling working conditions and over-generous state patronage 
for the plantation sector particularly during the colonial period. 
The long absence of state incentives for the small-holder sector 
(it has received state attention only since the 1960's) is a power-
ful determinant of its relatively low productivity. 
A ,strong case for or against collective and co-operative 
farming cannot be based on Sri Lanka's past experience which is 
1 limited to few 'sporadic attempts' . Research into the feasibility 
of collective farming in Sri Lanka is scanty and therefore leaves 
room for a reconsideration of' the possibilities for organizing of 
plantations in forms other than in large estates. 
The government decided in favour of the techno-economic 
position and the lion' s share of the lands was retained in the 
1 .Peiris (1975: 87-89) , however, on the basis of 
evidence, gathered from these few sporadic collective farming 
experiments of the pre-land reform period, questions the 
feasibility of converting large estates into co-operative and 
collective forms of cultivation and management. 
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form of large plantations under the management of several 
different state agencies, while a small amount (some 115,000 
acres) was distributed among peasant families in the form of 
small holdings (Peiris, 1978:621). A sizable proportion (24% of the 
total extent alienated) was converted into collective settlements 
(see Table 8.3), co-operative farms and youth settlements which 
were held under communal ownership and co-operative mana-
gement. These co-operative farms or settlements ran into numerous 
problems including mismanagement, corruption, mistrust between 
the settlers and the villagers in surrounding hamlets (Gold, 
1979:201; Peiris, 1978:629). However these problems are not unique 
to collective farms or settlements because decreasing production 
and productivity levels, corruption and mismanagement are also 
associated with the large estates managed by the state agencies 
(Peiris, 1978). 
Thus the land reform brought about changes at least in 
the imposition •of a ceiling of ownership of land, and in ending 
foreign ownership in the plantation sector. Yet the land reform 
did not mean eliminating social inequality among people in terms 
of differential ownership and distribution of wealth in the 
country. Other areas of private ownership of capital were not 
only retained but further encouraged. Neither was it a 
land-to-the-tiller or a redistributive programme but only a 
nationalization programme. It did not change the village level 
power structure in any way, nor did it contribute to changed 
living conditions for the rural poor. The class interests of the 
dominant groups of society largely explains the conservative 
nature of such policies. As pointed out by Herring: 
although land reforms are universally argued for in terms 
of social justice and economic efficiency, the political reality .  
in South Asian societies is that such reforms are promulgated 
by ruling elites largely composed of or structurally 
dependent on agrarian elites (Herring, 1983:3). 
In the absence of a peasants' movement their involve-
ment in the making of the policy was a passive and minimal one. 
The crucial role such a movement plays is demonstrated by the 
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Chinese experience. The politicization of peasants seem to be a 
necessary conditon for the success of even a mildly reformist land 
policy. Lehmann (1980:13) found peasant mass organization 
essential to protect the benefit of land reform. 
'Green Revolution' 
The development of High Yielding Varieties of food 
grains, especially of rice and wheat, and accompanying techno-
logical changes in agricultural methods which took place in the 
mid-1960's have collectively been described as the 'green 
revolution'. The 'green revolution' was considered to be a break-
through in agricultural development which would result in a 
dramatic increase in food production and contribute to the re-
solution of the problems of food shortages and poverty. In fact 
a notable increase in food production in Sri Lanka, and in some 
other countries, has been recorded since the advent of the new 
technology. ' Yet the introduction of High Yielding Varieties and 
associated improved techniques is only one of the factors 
contributing to this increase and it is difficult to isolate and 
quantify its unique contribution. 
The early promise of the 'green revolution', reflected in 
the production increases seen during the 1960's and early 1970's, 
seems to have faded. In Farmer's words, 
there is a large question mark.:. against the 'green revO-
lution' as a means of overcOrhing in the longer term the 
basic South Asian• problem_of food supply and increasingly 
intolerable poverty (Fariner, 1977:2). 
More serious than the disappointments over its incapacity to 
sustain increased food production are the criticisms levelled 
against the 'green revolution' for its adverse social and economic 
effects on the sections of the rural population in the third world. 
1. However Griffin (1974:5) studying data from the Latin 
American, African, Near and Far Eastern regions shows that the 
rate of the growth of food output in these regions has remained 
essentially constant between 1955 and 1970. Further, the growth 
of rice production in the same regions in the same period shows 
no dramatic increase in the trend of production. 
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Several researchers have presented evidence to show that the 
'green revolution' has in-built biases which favour wealthy 
farmers and serve to increase social and economic inequality in 
rural society and to hasten the process of polarization of rural 
classes. In fact the main beneficiaries of the 'green revolution' 
appear to be the wealthy farmers. 
The programme has also been criticised for deepening 
the dependence of third world agriculture on multinational com-
panies. It has been argued that the 'green revolution' has 
furthered the subsumption of rural labour under capital and to 
have generalized capitalist relations. Griffin comments: 
The expression 'green revolution' is a political slogan 
which (misleadingly) suggests there has been a major 
breakthrough in agricultural production, that this has been 
done in a peaceful context without the need for institutional 
reform, and indeed, that technological change is an 
alternative to political change (Griffin, 1974:2). 
The discussion which follows brings together evidence from Sri 
Lanka to substantiate the above criticisms and to account for the 
failure of the 'green revolution' in Sri Lanka. 
The adoption of High Yielding Varieties of paddy, and 
the new improved technology by the Sri Lankan farmers has been 
remarkable. National level data show a steady increase in the 
adoption of High Yielding Varieties from 3% of the total sown area 
of paddy in 1958 to 60% in 1970 (Hameed, 1977:47). The area 
under these varieties accounted for 83% of the total area in 1980. 
As shown in Table 7.5 total paddy production in Sri Lanka rose 
from 36.6 million bushels in 1958 (the year High Yielding 
Varieties were first introduced) to 64.6 million in 1968 and to 
90.5 million in 1978. Average yield of paddy increased from 34.4 
bushels per acre in 1958 to 46.5 in 1968. In 1978 the figure was 
50.7 bushels per acre. Between 1951 and 1970 average annual 
growth rate of paddy production was about 13%. However this rate 
recorded a low 3.2% in the decade beginning in 1970. This 
increase in total production and yield per unit cultivated is 
attributable to a combination of factors. Major among them are 
expansion of area under cultivation, development of irrigation 
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TABLE 7.5 : Volume of Output and Yield of Paddy 
Sri Lanka 1951-1980 
Year 	 Output 	 Yield 
Milt= Bushels Bushels per Acre 
1951 22.0 26.0 1952 28.9 30.8 1953 21.9 27.0 1954 31.1 30.3 1955 35.7 32.5 1956 27.5 30.0 1957 31.2 27.3 1958 36.6 34.4 1959 36.4 35.1 1960 43.0 36.4 1961 43.1 36.1 1962 48.1 37.9 1963 49.2 35.0 1964 50.5 38.7 1965 36.3 34.3 1966 45.7 35.6 1967 55.1 41.3 1968 64.6 46.5 1969 65.9 48.1 1970 77.4 51.3 1971 66.8 45.9 1972 62.9 46.9 1973 62.9 44.6 1974 76.7 45.7 1975 55.3 44.0 1976 60.0 45.0 1977 80.3 49.0 1978 90.5 50.7 1979 91.8 53.4 1980 102.1 56.8 
SOURCES:fnmm 1951-1960 Snodgrass (1966-331), from 1961-1969 Bansil (1971:273), and from 1970-1980 Central Bank of Ceylon (1978:21, 1980:22). 
- 188, - 
facilites leading to expansion of area under cultivation and in 
double cropping, adaption of High Yielding Varieties and 
accompanying improved technology, improvements in the institutio-
nal network of supporting services such as credit, marketing and 
extension, and subsidies and incentives by the governement to the 
producers. The exact size of the contribution made by the 'green 
revolution' package towards the increase in production and 
productivity cannot be measured. However the total volume of 
paddy production in Sri Lanka is still below the volume required 
to feed its people and the yield levels are substantially below 
the potential of the new technology (Dias, 1977:64). 
In spite of many benefits, the package has also had an 
undesirable social and economic impact on rural society. As it 
will become clear from the following discussion, the undesirable 
social and economic impact on the society was brought about more 
by the structural conditions of the society in which the 
technology is applied than by the intrinsic qualities of the new 
technology. 
All operators who have adopted High Yielding Varieties 
do not obtain yield levels potential of them owing to several 
reasons. Unlike traditional varieties the High Yielding Varieties 
require the use of a variety of complementary inputs such as 
chemical fertilizer, weedicides, pesticides and the adoption of 
improved farm practices ranging from transplanting to weed and 
pest control. Therefore, the proper adoption of High Yielding 
Varieties involve higher capital costs. Incorrect use or non-use of 
complementary inputs and farm practices inevitably produces 
yields below the potential of High Yielding Varieties and amounts 
to a waste of resources (Dias, 1977:58). Clearly then, the ability 
to invest higher amounts of capital governs the degree of benefits 
obtainable from the 'green revolution' package. Hence in a 
society where access to and ownership of the means of production 
are greatly skewed, the 'green revolution' becomes biased in 
favour of the wealthy producers. 
- 189 - 
Dias (1977) in his study of Hambantota district reported 
that most cultivators who have adopted High Yielding Varieties 
obtained yields substantially below the potential of the new 
technology as a result of inefficiency , of the state agricultural 
support services such as credit, fertilizer and agrochemicals 
delivery schemes, and extension services. It can be inferred from 
the above situation in Hambantota that operators who have a 
superior economic position are better able to benefit from the new 
technology. Therefore capitalist farmers and landlords are better 
served by the 'green revolution' than are the poor peasants. 
Agricultural credit is crucial to the success of the 
'green revolution'. It should be noted that even prior to the 
introduction of High Yielding Varieties indebtedness among the 
peasantry in Sri Lanka was widespread. A survey in 1957 found 
that 60% of the surveyed agricultural families were indebted (Sri 
Lanka, 1957 :7 ). Further, despite the establishment of state-
sponsored credit schemes, which charge relatively lower rate of 
interest, the non-institutional sources of credit such as money 
lenders, relatives, friends, landlords and traders, continue to 
play an important role in terms of the total volume of credit they 
advance (Sri Lanka, 1957:9). Reference has already been made 
to the exploitative role played by some landlords, and traders as 
money lenders. Lengthy procedures, and the red tape involved in 
obtaining credit from government agencies, the non-eligibility of 
some peasants for credit from institutional sources due to 
previous defaults, and stringent collateral requirements stipulated 
by these sources, normally attract peasants away from insti-
tutional credit sources and towards relatively high interest 
non-institutional sources. 
The increased need for credit with the introduction of 
High Yielding Varieties and inefficiency of institutional credit 
schemes have been extra leverage for the money lenders to acqui-
re wealth. The continuing role of the rural money lenders follo-
wing the 'green revolution' has been observed by researchers 
(Selvadurai, 1977:194). The 'green revolution' in effect has 
strengthened the position of wealthy strata in the agrarian struc- 
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ture by supplying the extra leverage to appropriate surpluses 
generated by the peasants. Further, the Agrarian Research and 
Training Institute (1975 ) reported that larger farmers have grea-
ter accessibility to agricultural credit than do smaller farmers, 
especially in the Kandy and Polonnaruwa districts. In the Kandy 
district, 'land owners' have obtained the greater portion of their 
credit from institutional sources than was the case with other 
tenurial categories. So it is that wealthy farmers, due to their 
superior risk-bearing ability, their ownership of means of pro-
duction, their access to inputs and superior capacitiy for invest-
ment, are at an advantgage over the poorer peasants in bene-
fitting from the new technology. 
As the village level organizations, such as the co-opera-
tives, Cultivation Committees through which the supporting servi-
ces like the delivery of inputs, and implements are dispensed, 
are infiltrated by the wealthy social strata ( Selvadurai , 1977: 
195 ) they become major beneficiaries of the governments' agricul-
tural development programmes. Symbiotic relations between the 
rural elites and the government officials of the departments which 
provide services such as agricultural extension, credit and 
marketing make it easier for the elites to gain unfair advantage, 
by their control over the goods and services provided by the 
central government ( Alexander , 1981 :120 ) . 
The extra demand created for agrochemicals and agri-
cultural implements such as sprayers, water pumps and small 
tractors by the introduction of High Yielding Varieties has opened 
up lucrative entrepreneurial opportunities for the rural capitalits 
(Amerasinghe . 1977; Selvadurai , 1977 ) . Although the introduction 
of High Yielding Varieties appears not to have directly led to 
increase in tractorization in Sri Lanka, the mechanization of 
agriculture in recent years has been beneficial to the rural 
1. A portion of the loans raised by poor peasants, 
ostensibly for agricultural activities, is often• spent on consump-
tion needs whereas the wealthy farmers are able to invest the 
whole amount raised. Therefore the wealthy farmer is always 
likely to gain high returns. 
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capitalists. (Harriss, 1977:168). A group of researchers observed: 
relatively well-off businessmen, plantation owners and villa-
ge entrepreneurs own a major proportion of all tractors and 
have almost total monopoly on the more efficient tractors 
(Hameed et al., 1977:43). 
The loans granted by the government to prospective buyers of 
tractors, further, are tailored to suit the requirements and capa-
bility of the wealthy and the high-value collaterals required by 
the banks which advance credit have prevented the small 
farmers, from receiving credit to purchase tractors (Gooneratne, 
1975:31). Harriss (1977) found that in Hambantota, the pattern of 
tractor ownership, dominated by businessmen who charged 
extremely high hire-rates, reflected an oligopolistic market and 
the non-tractor owning farmers were in an extremely weak 
bargaining position. In the Dry Zone it is reported that 'tractor 
owners have doubled their command of paddy land since the 
acquisition of tractors' (Harriss, 1977:176). Jayaweera (1973:43) 
sums up the plight of the peasant: 
in the tractor owner who is invariably an affluent farmer 
the subsistence farmer has acquired a new oppressor... A 
new feudalism of technology has grown up around tractor 
owners. 
The increased use of chemical fertilizer, agrochemical 
and implements such as water pumps and sprayers created a 
lucrative market for the multinational corporations in Sri Lanka. 
The green revolution package, in contrast to the policy of 
self-reliance, is a programme which particularly benefitted the 
multinational corporation controlling and trading modern agricul-
tural technology. 
The preceeding discussion shows that the 'green revolu-
tion's' benefits have been unequally distributed in favour of the 
rural capitalists. In turn this fact leads to increased class 
polarization. 
The post-independence national regimes in Sri Lanka 
have not brought about fundamental changes in the peripheral 
capitalist structure in the country. As the above discussion on 
the strategies and selected policy programmes has demonstrated, 
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they have contributed to reinforce the peripheral position of the 
country in the world capitalist economy. The elite strata have 
benefitted from the pattern of development which the government 
strategies have promoted since independence. Griffin's comments 
highlight an important aspect of the government development 
policies: 
It is hardly plausible that the policies are based on igno-
rance... The ends as well as the means of government policy 
usually are largely determined by the government's source of 
support... In most states this support comes from local elites 
and economic policy is designed to further their interests 
(Griffin, 1974:172). 
Therefore it is of crucial importance to analyse class alignments 
and alliances of the post-independence regimes to fully under-
stand their strategies and consequent patterns of development. 
The persistence of extraversion in the economy testifies 
to the continuity of a peripheral capitalist structure. Statistical 
information pertaining to the period after 1948 shows this 
continuity well in the post-colonial period. The high degree of 
specialization in, and dependence on, only three export commodi-
ties is revealed in the ratios of specialized exports to total 
exports. The export of tea, rubber and coconut accounted for 
90% of the exports from Sri Lanka in 1968 as was the case in 
1948 I.L.O., 1971:10). As Table 7.6 shows, the value of tea, 
rubber and coconut exports together constituted a very high 88.9% 
of the total value of exports in 1971 and 75.8% and 55.5% in 1975 
and 1980 respectively. Further, around 90% of the total production 
of both tea and rubber was designated for export markets. Thus 
the extraverted nature of the Sri Lankan economy remains 
fundamentally unaltered. It should be recalled this structural 
feature is argued to be associated with the unequal exchange 
(Amin 1976). 
The peripheral capitalist pattern of development has led 
to an increase in poverty, marginalization and inequality in Sri 
Lankan society, despite successive governments' development 
programmes. Lee (1977), interpreting data from the Consumer 
Finance Surveys of 1963 and 1973, argues that income inequality 
in Sri Lanka either remained unchanged or increased slightly 
Table 7.6 : Volume and Value of Tea, Rubber and Coconut Exports 
from Sri Lanka, 1971 - 1980 
Product 	 1971 	 1972 	 1973 	 1974 	 1975 	 1976 	 1977 	 1978 	 1979 	 1980 
Exported Volume as a Percentage of the Total Production 
Tea 	 95.4 •89.2 97.6 86.2 99.7 N.A. 	 89.2 96.9 91.0 96.8 
Rubber 	 91.4 	 92.3 	 N.A. 	 96.7 N.A. 	 90.0 	 92.0 	 88.7 	 83.8 	 91.0 
Coconut 	 56.3 	 60.3 	 38.4 	 40.6 	 48.9 	 47.0 	 31.0 	 42.1 	 45.6 	 34.6 
Value of Tea, Rubber and Coconut exports as a percentage of the total exports 
Tea Rubber 	 88.9 	 34.2 	 76.3 	 71.8 	 75.8 	 70.0 	 71.8 	 71.1 	 62.2 	 55.0 Coconut 
SOURCE: Central Bank of Ceylon (1978 and 1980). 
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during the period. Lakshman (1980:35) has pointed out that the 
shifts in economic and social policy since 1977 have created 
'disequalising tendencies' and the net impact of the new policies 
has been towards greater inequality in the pattern of income 
distribution in Sri Lanka'. Data on the level of poverty in the 
years 1969 and 1977 show a significant increase in the percentage 
of population in poverty. For instance, as shown in table 7.7, 
the percentage of the total population in acute poverty more than 
doubled from 18% in 1969-70 to 38% in 1977-78. 1 These trends 
indicated by the national level data are consistent with the 
findings of many village studies which unanimously report 
increase in marginalization of sections of the rural population, 
increasing poverty and inequality.
2 
1. See Chapter One, p.8, footnote 1. 
2. See Chapter Five,:p.122 . 
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TABLE 1.7 : Estimated Population by Poverty Level 
Sri Lanka, 1969-1970 and 1977-1978 (Millions) 
Urban 	 Rural 	 Estate 	 Total Total No. in 
Sector 	 Sector 	 Sector 	 Poverty as a 
% of total 
Population 
Acute poverty 
1969-70 0.345 1.923 N.A. 2.268 18 
1977-78 1.099 3.835 0.474 5.408 38 
Other Poverty 
1969-70 0.632 2.105 0.768 3.505 29 
1977-78 0.636 3.248 0.499 4.383 31 
All Poverty 
1969-70 0.977 4.028 0.768 5.773 47 
1977-78 1.735 7.083 0.972 9.791 69 
SOURCE: Colombo Plan (1978). 
CHAPTER 8 
CONCLUSION 
The object of this thesis has been to analyze the pattern 
of development in Sri Lanka and to examine causes and conse-
quences of that pattern. This thesis has attempted to interpret 
the Sri Lankan development experience from a theoretical stance 
sensitized by elements of the 'neo-Marxist' and 'underdevelop-
mentalist' perspectives. It has been argued that the development 
experience cannot be explained by focussing merely on exchange 
relations in the world market but requires analysis of internal 
structures of the society and their articulation with the world 
market forces. 
The modernization perspective has been shown to be 
inadequate to explain the pattern of development particularly in 
the colonized societies of the third world. The dependency and 
the world system perspectives are useful insofar as they expose 
the weaknesses of the modernization theory by bringing into focus 
the penetration of capitalism into the peripheral societies. These 
perspectives give an adequate account of the absorption of 
peripheral societies into a world capitalist economy which is 
dominated by the core economies and of the eventual influences 
these factors have been exerting on the pattern of development in 
the peripheral societies. However, world system and dependency 
schemes are not adequate to analyze the changes in the 
structures internal to the formation of peripheral societies and 
therefore require supplementation. It is necessary to combine 
elements of the dependency and world systems paradigms with 
that of the 'Marxist' analyses in order to obtain a fuller 
understanding of societal change in the periphery. While the 
dependency and world systems approaches throw light on the 
external forces and transnational structures which shape and 
influence the course and pattern of development in the periphery, 
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the 'Marxist' approaches emphasize the analysis of internal 
structures of peripheral societies. It has been argued that in 
order to be fruitful any theoretical perspective which aims at 
interpreting third world development must be one which looks at 
the nature of internal structures of peripheral societies and the 
way in which they are located within the world market or within 
transnational forces. 
The central issue to be addressed is the nature of the 
interaction between the internal and external forces and the 
consequent conditions and patterns of development. In carrying 
Out such an analysis the main questions to be addressed relate to 
the transformation of the peripheral societies under the influence 
of contact with the now advanced industrial societies, the class 
and state formation consequent upon this contact, the changes in 
the world economy and the relations between the peripheral 
societies and the metropolitan societies which dominate the world 
economy, and the consequent conditions of development. 
And so it has been argued that the development expe-
rience of Sri Lanka cannot be explained in terms of the movement 
from a 'traditional' to a 'modernized' society but rather in terms 
of the interaction between colonial capital and the structures 
internal to the Sri Lankan social formation. It is shown that the 
pre-colonial 'feudal' social formation was transformed, under the 
impact of colonial capital, into what may be described as a 
'peripheral' capitalist formation which may be distinguished 
from the 'metropolitan' capitalism of the core. It has been 
argued that characterizing contemporary Sri Lankan social forma-
tion as 'feudal' or 'semi feudal' is a misconception because those 
social relations and social institutions which appear superficially 
as unaltered continuations of the 'feudal' society actually have 
been structurally transformed. Insofar as they have remained 
they have assumed new meanings and operate under conditions of 
capitalism not under those of feudalism. 
It follows that the penetration of colonial capitalism and 
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the subsequent integration of Sri Lankan society into world 
capitalism as a 'peripheral' society marked the beginnings of the 
present pattern of development. In that process of integration the 
physical as well as the social organization of production typical 
of the pre-colonial formation underwent a transformation. 
Establishment of specialization in peripheral types of economic 
activities, coupled with a de-industrialization policy,created an 
extraverted and lopsided economy. • As distinct from metropolitan 
capitalism , sectors of Sri Lanka 's economy came to be 
internally disarticulated and commodity production became extern-
ally articulated or dependent on the links with the metropolitan 
economies. The outcome has been a pattern of 'externally depen-
dent development' as opposed to an 'autonomous' or self-sustain-
ing one. 
Labour and land became commodified in this process. 
The dispossession of the direct producers of the primary means of 
production and the monetization of exchange relations followed the 
transformation of production relations. The bases of production 
relations assumed a capitalist character. 
The formation of bourgeois political, legal and admini-
trative structures completed the establishment of a superstructure 
ancillary to the existence of this peripheral capitalist social 
formation. While the peasantry underwent a process of differen-
tiation, an indigenous bourgeoisie linked with the metropolis 
economically as well as socially and culturally, emerged at the 
national level. The national class structure in Sri Lanka is 
characterized by the dominance of this indigenous bourgeoisie 
including the 'national' and 'comprador' fractions, the politico-
administrative elite and the metropolitan bourgeoisie. The repro-
duction of the geographically split circuit of generalized commo-
dity production under peripheral capitalism is aided by the 
powerful structural presence of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and a 
liaison or comprador groups in the peripheral society. 
The alliances of classes dominating the state have defi-
ned the nature of strategies of accumulation or 'development'. 
Since independence these strategies have ranged between the 
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'national bourgeois developmentalist' (operationalized for instance 
through import-substituting industrialization) and the 'neo-colo-
nial' (operationalized for instance through export-oriented indus-
trialization ). The 'national' bourgeoisie has not been able to 
sustain a 'national developmentalist' strategy and the tendency 
has been to realign their populist and nationalist strategies 
closer to a neo-colonial strategy which means a close alliance 
with the metropolitan bourgeoisie. However, the competing inte-
rests of the fractions of the bourgeoisie provide an arena for 
shifts in class alliances and consequently in development 
strategies. 
No post-independence development strategies have been 
able to fundamentally change the economic structure. The overall 
outcome of the strategies has been deeper integration and depen-
dence on the metropolitan economies. The adoption of a 'neo-colo-
nial strategy' particularly has been marked by increasing class 
polarization, widening economic inequality, and the marginaliza-
tion of poorer social strata. The transformation of sections of the 
population into 'super-exploited' part-life-time proletarians and 
the adoption of a more authoritarian political machine have been 
trends associated with the neo-colonial strategy in Sri Lanka. 
The policy programmes targeted at the development of 
the rural or the peasant sector have benefitted most those social 
groups at the top of the rural socio-economic hierarchy. 
Categories of capitalist landowners and merchant and usurer 
capitalists have immensely benefitted from programmes such as the 
'green revolution'. The programmes have failed to reach the 
poorer strata by penetrating the agrarian power structure. With 
the further subsumption of rural producers by capital, categories 
such as poor peasants, landless labourers and tenants have 
become marginalized. The failure to see that problems •of rural 
society are rooted in the agrarian structure largely explains the 
ineffectiveness of the reformist policies. The reformist (as opposed 
to a transformationist) character of the programmes of the 
national regimes in turn reflects the class composition and 
alliances of a given political regime. 
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Sri Lankan society retains a peripheral character. This 
character will continue to be reproduced unless, at the macro 
level, the national government pursues a strategy based upon a 
policy of 'autochthonous' or autonomous development. The aim of 
such a development policy would be to break from dependent 
external relations with the metropolitan economies and also to 
overcome internal as well as external forces which produce 
destabilizing influences. In order to remove the extraverted, 
internally disarticulated and externally dependent economic 
strait-jacket, economic activity would need to be reoriented 
mainly -towards internal markets, and towards 'essential' products 
It is of crucial importance that the class configuration 
of the state should be one which is conducive to, and willing to 
bring about, specific structural changes. It has been argued that 
the refusal of the interlocking classes to effect fundamental 
structural changes is responsible for the failure of reformist 
policies. Policy models are derived from distinct normative and 
empirical (causal-conceptual) paradigms that specify the values 
defining, for instance, an acceptable degree of social inequality 
or inequality in the distribution of power and opportunity in 
society (Herring, 1983:4). The normative and empirical paradigms 
in turn are defined and determined by the prevailing social 
formation and its related class structure. As Petras (1978:68) 
points out: 'Policy decisions reflect the efforts by different social 
interests within the class structure to shape specific allocation of 
state resources to improve their relative position'. 
In Sri Lanka policy models are being derived from a 
class structure of a peripheral capitalist formation. Structural 
changes therefore depend on changes in the class configuration of 
the state. Changes in the class configuration will follow cor-
responding changes in the normative paradigm from which the 
state policies are derived. 'Progressive' class alliances and 
major ideological and value changes play crucially important 
roles in such a transformatory exercise. The mass organization of 
rural strata, including poor peasants, agricultural workers and 
tenants, would be a necessary step in this direction. A 
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programme of rural decentralization leading to the direct 
participation of these rural strata in determining the development 
strategy (as opposed to their mere political representation in 
centralized structures through the elite dominated political 
parties) would also be necessary to change the course of rural 
development. 
The implication that any primordial conditions or traits 
inherent in 'traditional' social formation in societies such as Sri 
Lanka prevent their 'development' is misconceived. To view the 
'development' of these societies in terms of the public policies 
which are seen as attempts to break down traditional 'barriers' 
to modernization by the 'modernizing elites' is also incorrect. 
Indeed the presence and spread of many of the attributes of 
modernization can be found in third world societies. Yet, the 
outcome of this process of 'modernization' has not been desirable 
for a significant portion of the population who remain in poverty. 
Hence it may be called 'modernization without development'. The 
groups which form the 'modernizing elites' are in fact often 
create and benefit from the uneven and inequitable pattern of 
development of the third world societies. For instance Petras 
(1978:74), using the term modernization to describe 'the conver-
sion of autonomous agro-subsistence economy to a dependent 
non-industrial society', calls for the 'demodernization' of 
peripheral societies as a prerequisite for 'socialist development'. 
Modernization comes into conflict with the development of the 
productive forces, forcing an increasing share into non-
productive activities as well as facilitating the outflow of 
capital and importation of nonessential goods. Rather than 
being considered a prerequisite for 'development', 'moderni-
zation' should be seen as a major obstacle to the rational 
allocation of resources and manpower involving gross class, 
regional, and sectoral imbalances (Petras, 1978:77). 
Indeed the unique cultural, social and geographical 
features of a given peripheral society and the nature of contact 
with colonial capitalism together influence the pattern of 
development in that society. In the case under study, the Sri 
Lankan caste system and Sri Lankan Buddhism, for instance, 
have been such influences. Yet overriding this uniqueness are 
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some principles of societal transformation under colonial capital-
ism which take a more general character and are applicable to 
more than one colonized society. Peripheralization of the 
economies, the class and state formation, and the nature of 
articulation of the internal structures with the external forces in 
the peripheral capitalist society and the consequent patterns of 
development reflect a greater similarity and generality. 
The failure of the modernization perspective in explai-
ning the development experience of third world societies having 
been amply exposed, the next task confronting the social scientist 
is to formulate an alternative theoretical framework. While the 
dependency, the world system, and the variety of 'Marxist' 
approaches noted in the first chapter are advances along this 
line, the level of their development and refinement is less than 
complete. A general theory of socio-economic transformation of 
peripheral societies requires more research. This task calls for 
further studies of the various aspects of the internal structures 
of different third world societies under the influence of the 
expansion of capitalism. The present thesis is but an attempt 
to examine Sri Lankan case from this expanded view point. 
Although the newer theoretical perspectives have been 
widely utilized in :the,, study of societies in Latin America and 
•'• 
Africa their application to the study of societies in the Indian 
subcontinent is relatively limited. This is particularly so in the 
case of Sri Lanka. Therefore this thesis contributes towards 
filling a vacuum and is an addition to the presently small but 
growing body of research within these perspectives which attempts 
to re-examine and interpret the development experience of Sri 
Lanka. 
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